5d0b4837d8
- C1: Replace all ClickHouse string interpolation with parameterized queries (query_params) to eliminate SQL injection in analytics endpoints - C3: Strip Caddy placeholder patterns from redirect rules, protected paths, and Authentik auth endpoint to prevent config injection - C4: Replace WAF custom directive blocklist with allowlist approach — only SecRule/SecAction/SecMarker/SecDefaultAction permitted; block ctl:ruleEngine and Include directives - H2: Validate GCM authentication tag is exactly 16 bytes before decryption - H3: Validate forward auth redirect URIs (scheme, no credentials) to prevent open redirects - H4: Switch 11 analytics/WAF/geoip endpoints from session-only requireAdmin to requireApiAdmin supporting both Bearer token and session auth - H5: Add input validation for instance-mode (whitelist) and sync-token (32-char minimum) in settings API - M1: Add non-root user to l4-port-manager Dockerfile - M5: Document Caddy admin API binding security rationale - Document C2 (custom config injection) and H1 (SSRF via upstreams) as intentional admin features Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
14 lines
428 B
TypeScript
14 lines
428 B
TypeScript
import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
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import { requireApiAdmin, apiErrorResponse } from '@/src/lib/api-auth';
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import { getAnalyticsHosts } from '@/src/lib/analytics-db';
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export async function GET(request: NextRequest) {
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try {
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await requireApiAdmin(request);
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const hosts = await getAnalyticsHosts();
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return NextResponse.json(hosts);
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} catch (error) {
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return apiErrorResponse(error);
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}
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}
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