Some deployments never ran migration 0007 that created the
linking_tokens table. The camelCase rename migration (0021) now
creates the table with old column names if missing before renaming.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Set workers: 1 to eliminate parallelism race conditions
- Fix groups test: use .first() for "0 members" assertion
- Fix access-control helper: match by name instead of generic "Delete List"
- Fix forward-auth-oauth: target Dex button specifically, handle /login in Dex URL
- Add comprehensive API security E2E tests (316 tests)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tests every /api/v1/ endpoint (86 endpoints × 4 auth levels = 316 tests):
- Unauthenticated requests → 401 on all endpoints
- User role → 403 on admin-only endpoints
- Viewer role → 403 on admin-only endpoints
- Admin role → allowed on all endpoints
- Cross-user isolation: users cannot access other users' profiles
Uses Bearer API tokens (created directly in DB) to avoid
Better Auth rate limiting during test execution.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Tighten login rate limit from 200/10s to 5/60s to prevent brute-force
- Encrypt OAuth tokens (access/refresh/id) in accounts table via databaseHooks
- Sync password changes to accounts.password so old passwords stop working
- Redact OAuth client secrets in server actions before returning to client
- Add trustHost config (default false) to prevent Host header poisoning
- Add audit logging for successful logins via session create hook
- Add audit logging to OAuth provider update/delete server actions
- Fix provider ID collision by appending name hash suffix to slug
- Fix nullable provider field causing incorrect hasOAuth detection
- Refuse to store plaintext secrets if encryption module fails to load
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace 0.0.0.0/0 with RFC 5737 test ranges (198.51.100.0/24, etc.) in
persistence tests so saving geoblock rules to Caddy doesn't block real
traffic for concurrent test workers. The LAN Only preset save test uses
the API to verify saved values and immediately resets, minimizing the
window where block-all is active.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Radix UI Tabs and Accordion unmount inactive/closed content from the DOM
by default. This caused hidden form inputs to be missing from FormData on
submit — saving while on the Block tab wiped all Allow rules (and vice
versa), and saving with the advanced accordion collapsed wiped redirect
URL, trusted proxies, and response settings.
Fix by adding forceMount to TabsContent and AccordionContent so all form
fields remain in the DOM regardless of which tab/panel is visible.
Also adds E2E regression tests covering both scenarios plus the RFC1918
preset, with proper afterEach cleanup to prevent test interference with
concurrent workers.
Fixes#99
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a quick-apply preset that pre-fills allow CIDRs with private
network ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16) and
block CIDRs with 0.0.0.0/0, addressing the common homelab use case
of restricting services to LAN-only access.
Closes#97
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add missing feature cards (Forward Auth Portal, REST API, OAuth/SSO, mTLS),
update existing cards and spotlights to match current functionality, add new
Authentication and Automation spotlight sections, and refresh all screenshots
with mockup data including populated analytics.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Verifies all Docker containers in the test stack are running and healthy,
including a restart-count check on the l4-port-manager to detect permission
errors or other crash-loop scenarios that previously went unnoticed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- C1: Replace all ClickHouse string interpolation with parameterized queries
(query_params) to eliminate SQL injection in analytics endpoints
- C3: Strip Caddy placeholder patterns from redirect rules, protected paths,
and Authentik auth endpoint to prevent config injection
- C4: Replace WAF custom directive blocklist with allowlist approach — only
SecRule/SecAction/SecMarker/SecDefaultAction permitted; block ctl:ruleEngine
and Include directives
- H2: Validate GCM authentication tag is exactly 16 bytes before decryption
- H3: Validate forward auth redirect URIs (scheme, no credentials) to prevent
open redirects
- H4: Switch 11 analytics/WAF/geoip endpoints from session-only requireAdmin
to requireApiAdmin supporting both Bearer token and session auth
- H5: Add input validation for instance-mode (whitelist) and sync-token
(32-char minimum) in settings API
- M1: Add non-root user to l4-port-manager Dockerfile
- M5: Document Caddy admin API binding security rationale
- Document C2 (custom config injection) and H1 (SSRF via upstreams) as
intentional admin features
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- C1: Replace all ClickHouse string interpolation with parameterized queries
(query_params) to eliminate SQL injection in analytics endpoints
- C3: Strip Caddy placeholder patterns from redirect rules, protected paths,
and Authentik auth endpoint to prevent config injection
- C4: Replace WAF custom directive blocklist with allowlist approach — only
SecRule/SecAction/SecMarker/SecDefaultAction permitted; block ctl:ruleEngine
and Include directives
- H2: Validate GCM authentication tag is exactly 16 bytes before decryption
- H3: Validate forward auth redirect URIs (scheme, no credentials) to prevent
open redirects
- H4: Switch 11 analytics/WAF/geoip endpoints from session-only requireAdmin
to requireApiAdmin supporting both Bearer token and session auth
- H5: Add input validation for instance-mode (whitelist) and sync-token
(32-char minimum) in settings API
- M1: Add non-root user to l4-port-manager Dockerfile
- M5: Document Caddy admin API binding security rationale
- Document C2 (custom config injection) and H1 (SSRF via upstreams) as
intentional admin features
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SQLite was too slow for analytical aggregations on traffic_events and
waf_events (millions of rows, GROUP BY, COUNT DISTINCT). ClickHouse is
a columnar OLAP database purpose-built for this workload.
- Add ClickHouse container to Docker Compose with health check
- Create src/lib/clickhouse/client.ts with singleton client, table DDL,
insert helpers, and all analytics query functions
- Update log-parser.ts and waf-log-parser.ts to write to ClickHouse
- Remove purgeOldEntries — ClickHouse TTL handles 90-day retention
- Rewrite analytics-db.ts and waf-events.ts to query ClickHouse
- Remove trafficEvents/wafEvents from SQLite schema, add migration
- CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD is required (no hardcoded default)
- Update .env.example, README, and test infrastructure
API response shapes are unchanged — no frontend modifications needed.
Parse state (file offsets) remains in SQLite.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the ?rd= query parameter in the Caddy→portal redirect with a
_cpm_rd HttpOnly cookie (Secure, SameSite=Lax, Path=/portal, 10min TTL).
The portal server component reads and immediately deletes the cookie,
then processes it through the existing validation and redirect intent flow.
This removes the redirect URI from the browser URL bar while maintaining
all existing security properties (domain validation, server-side storage,
one-time opaque rid).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace client-controlled redirectUri with server-side redirect intents.
The portal server component validates the ?rd= hostname against
isForwardAuthDomain, stores the URI in a new forward_auth_redirect_intents
table, and passes only an opaque rid (128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed) to
the client. Login endpoints consume the intent atomically (one-time use,
10-minute TTL) and retrieve the stored URI — the client never sends the
redirect URL to any API endpoint.
Security properties:
- Redirect URI is never client-controlled in API requests
- rid is 128-bit random, stored as SHA-256 hash (not reversible from DB)
- Atomic one-time consumption prevents replay
- 10-minute TTL limits attack window for OAuth round-trip
- Immediate deletion after consumption
- Expired intents cleaned up opportunistically
- Hostname validated against registered forward-auth domains before storage
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add per-user API token limit (max 10) and name length validation (max 100 chars)
- Return 404 instead of 500 for "not found" errors in API responses
- Disable X-Powered-By header to prevent framework fingerprinting
- Enforce http/https protocol on proxy host upstream URLs
- Remove stale comment about OAuth users defaulting to admin role
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add five new features to the features list: Forward Auth Portal, mTLS
RBAC, User Roles, User Management, and Groups. Add a Forward Auth
Portal section explaining the built-in IdP, groups, and per-host
access control.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Use config.oauth.providerName (e.g. "Keycloak", "Google") instead of
the raw provider ID "oauth2" in audit summaries. Include user name or
email in sign-in and sign-up messages for easier log reading.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Intermittent failure — the default 5s wasn't enough when the page
loaded slowly during a long E2E run (227/228 passed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Traffic (24h) card and Recent Activity section were visible to
user/viewer roles even though they received empty data. Now both
sections are conditionally rendered only for admin users.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- dashboard.spec.ts: anchor regex /^\d+\s+Proxy Hosts/ to not match
"L4 Proxy Hosts" sidebar link
- role-access.spec.ts: use exact: true for "Proxy Hosts" link
- users.spec.ts: match any user count (/\d+ users?/) since other test
suites create additional users
- groups.spec.ts: remove unused emptyText variable
- link-account.spec.ts: remove unused context parameter
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- dashboard: Match stat cards via link role with count+label pattern
to avoid matching subtitle paragraph containing "certificates"
- role-access: Use Bun.password.hash (built-in bcrypt) instead of
bcryptjs which is not installed in the production container
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- api-docs: Don't rely on CDN-loaded Swagger UI class in test env
- dashboard: Use `p` locator for stat card labels to avoid matching nav
- groups: Scope add-member click to bordered container to avoid nav match
- link-account: Remove assertion on error= URL param (not always present)
- portal: Use exact:true for "Sign in" button (OAuth button also matches)
- role-access: Use ESM imports in bun -e script, use getByLabel for login
fields, increase waitForURL timeout, use exact button match
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Allow non-admin users (user/viewer) to access / and /profile while
blocking admin-only pages. The dashboard layout now uses requireUser()
instead of requireAdmin(), and the sidebar filters nav items by role.
Non-admin users see a minimal welcome page without stat cards.
New test files (86 tests across 7 files):
- dashboard, users, groups, api-docs, portal, link-account specs
- role-access spec with full RBAC coverage for all 3 roles
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remove unused imports, functions, and variables flagged by
@typescript-eslint/no-unused-vars and no-useless-assignment rules.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two bugs caused mTLS to be silently disabled when all issued client
certificates for a CA were revoked:
1. New cert-based trust model (caddy.ts): When deriving CA IDs from
trusted cert IDs, revoked certs were invisible (active-only query),
causing derivedCaIds to be empty and the domain to be dropped from
mTlsDomainMap entirely — no mTLS policy at all. Fix by falling back
to a cert-ID-to-CA-ID lookup that includes revoked certs, keeping the
domain in the map so it gets a fail-closed policy.
2. Legacy CA-based model (caddy-mtls.ts): buildClientAuthentication
returned null when all certs were revoked, relying on Caddy's
experimental "drop" TLS connection policy field which didn't work
reliably. Fix by pinning to the CA cert itself as a trusted_leaf_certs
entry — no client cert can hash-match a CA certificate (and presenting
the CA cert would require its private key, already a full compromise).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pentest found that all 8 analytics API endpoints, the GeoIP status
endpoint, and the OpenAPI spec were accessible to any authenticated
user. Since the user role should only have access to forward auth
and self-service, these are now admin-only.
- analytics/*: requireUser → requireAdmin
- geoip-status: requireUser → requireAdmin
- openapi.json: add requireApiAdmin + change Cache-Control to private
- analytics/api-docs pages: requireUser → requireAdmin (defense-in-depth)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Fix broken rate limiting: add registerFailedAttempt/resetAttempts calls
- Remove raw session token from exchange table; generate fresh token at redemption
- Fix TOCTOU race: atomic UPDATE...WHERE used=false for exchange redemption
- Delete exchange records immediately after redemption
- Change bcrypt.compareSync to async bcrypt.compare to prevent event loop blocking
- Fix IP extraction: prefer x-real-ip, fall back to last x-forwarded-for entry
- Restrict redirect URI scheme to http/https only
- Add Origin header CSRF check on login and session-login endpoints
- Remove admin auto-access bypass from checkHostAccess (deny-by-default for all)
- Revoke forward auth sessions when user status changes away from active
- Validate portal domain against registered forward-auth hosts to prevent phishing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- New /users page with search, inline editing, role/status changes, and deletion
- Model: added updateUserRole, updateUserStatus, deleteUser functions
- API: PUT /api/v1/users/[id] now supports role and status fields, added DELETE
- Safety: cannot change own role/status or delete own account
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
