debd0d98fc
Fixes identified from full security audit covering auth, crypto, injection, infrastructure, and configuration security. Critical: - C1: Fail-closed on unrecognized NODE_ENV (prevent DEV_SECRET in staging) - C3: Validate API token expires_at (reject invalid dates that bypass expiry) High: - H1: Refresh JWT role from DB on each session (reflect demotions immediately) - H2: Docker socket proxy for l4-port-manager (restrict API surface) - H5: Block dangerous WAF custom directives (SecRuleEngine, SecAuditEngine) - H7: Require explicit NEXTAUTH_TRUST_HOST instead of always trusting Host - H8: Semantic validation of sync payload (block metadata SSRF, size limits) Medium: - M3: Rate limit password change current-password verification - M5: Parameterized SQL in log/waf parsers (replace template literals) - M6: Nonce-based CSP replacing unsafe-inline for script-src - M9: Strip Caddy placeholders from rewrite path_prefix - M10: Sanitize authentik outpostDomain (path traversal, placeholders) - M14: Deny access on missing JWT role instead of defaulting to "user" Low: - L1: Require Origin header on mutating session-authenticated requests - L4: Enforce password complexity on user password changes - L5: Time-limited legacy SHA-256 key fallback (grace period until 2026-06-01) - L6: Escape LIKE metacharacters in audit log search - L7: Runtime-validate WAF excluded_rule_ids as positive integers Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
79 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript
79 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript
import { hkdfSync, createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
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import { config } from "./config";
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const PREFIX = "enc:v1:";
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const IV_LENGTH = 12;
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function deriveKey(): Buffer {
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return Buffer.from(
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hkdfSync("sha256", config.sessionSecret, Buffer.alloc(0), "caddy-proxy-manager:secret:v1", 32)
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);
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}
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function deriveKeyLegacy(): Buffer {
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return createHash("sha256").update(config.sessionSecret).digest();
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}
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export function isEncryptedSecret(value: string): boolean {
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return value.startsWith(PREFIX);
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}
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export function encryptSecret(value: string): string {
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if (!value) return "";
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if (isEncryptedSecret(value)) return value;
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const iv = randomBytes(IV_LENGTH);
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const key = deriveKey();
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const cipher = createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, iv);
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const ciphertext = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(value, "utf8"), cipher.final()]);
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const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
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return `${PREFIX}${iv.toString("base64")}:${tag.toString("base64")}:${ciphertext.toString("base64")}`;
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}
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/**
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* L5: Legacy fallback is time-limited. After the migration grace period,
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* the legacy key is no longer tried, forcing re-encryption of old secrets.
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* Set LEGACY_KEY_CUTOFF_DATE env var to extend/disable (ISO 8601 date or "never").
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*/
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const LEGACY_KEY_CUTOFF_ENV = process.env.LEGACY_KEY_CUTOFF_DATE;
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const LEGACY_KEY_CUTOFF = LEGACY_KEY_CUTOFF_ENV === "never"
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? null
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: new Date(LEGACY_KEY_CUTOFF_ENV || "2026-06-01T00:00:00Z");
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export function decryptSecret(value: string): string {
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if (!value) return "";
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if (!isEncryptedSecret(value)) return value;
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// Try new HKDF key first
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try {
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return _decryptWithKey(value, deriveKey());
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} catch (hkdfError) {
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// L5: Only fall back to legacy key within the grace period
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if (LEGACY_KEY_CUTOFF && new Date() > LEGACY_KEY_CUTOFF) {
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throw new Error(
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"[secret] HKDF decryption failed and legacy key grace period has expired. " +
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"Re-encrypt this secret with the current key. " +
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"Set LEGACY_KEY_CUTOFF_DATE=never to temporarily restore legacy key support."
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);
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}
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console.warn("[secret] HKDF decryption failed; retrying with legacy SHA-256 key. Re-encrypt this secret to remove the legacy key dependency.");
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return _decryptWithKey(value, deriveKeyLegacy());
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}
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}
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function _decryptWithKey(value: string, key: Buffer): string {
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const payload = value.slice(PREFIX.length);
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const [ivB64, tagB64, dataB64] = payload.split(":");
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if (!ivB64 || !tagB64 || !dataB64) {
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throw new Error("Invalid encrypted secret format");
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}
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const iv = Buffer.from(ivB64, "base64");
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const tag = Buffer.from(tagB64, "base64");
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const data = Buffer.from(dataB64, "base64");
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const decipher = createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, iv);
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decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
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const plaintext = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(data), decipher.final()]);
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return plaintext.toString("utf8");
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}
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