5d0b4837d8
- C1: Replace all ClickHouse string interpolation with parameterized queries (query_params) to eliminate SQL injection in analytics endpoints - C3: Strip Caddy placeholder patterns from redirect rules, protected paths, and Authentik auth endpoint to prevent config injection - C4: Replace WAF custom directive blocklist with allowlist approach — only SecRule/SecAction/SecMarker/SecDefaultAction permitted; block ctl:ruleEngine and Include directives - H2: Validate GCM authentication tag is exactly 16 bytes before decryption - H3: Validate forward auth redirect URIs (scheme, no credentials) to prevent open redirects - H4: Switch 11 analytics/WAF/geoip endpoints from session-only requireAdmin to requireApiAdmin supporting both Bearer token and session auth - H5: Add input validation for instance-mode (whitelist) and sync-token (32-char minimum) in settings API - M1: Add non-root user to l4-port-manager Dockerfile - M5: Document Caddy admin API binding security rationale - Document C2 (custom config injection) and H1 (SSRF via upstreams) as intentional admin features Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
14 lines
526 B
Caddyfile
14 lines
526 B
Caddyfile
{
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# Bound to 0.0.0.0 within the Docker network so the web container can reach it.
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# Port 2019 must NOT be published to the host in docker-compose.yml.
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# The origins directive restricts which Host header values are accepted.
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admin 0.0.0.0:2019 {
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origins caddy:2019 localhost:2019 localhost
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}
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}
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# Default HTTP-only site to avoid certificate errors on startup
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http://{$PRIMARY_DOMAIN:caddyproxymanager.com}, http://localhost {
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respond "Caddy Proxy Manager is running - configure proxy hosts via the web interface" 200
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}
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