Commit Graph

50 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
99819b70ff added caddy-proxy-manager for testing
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2026-04-21 22:49:08 +00:00
fuomag9
dbfc340ea4 Fix logout redirect to 0.0.0.0 instead of configured BASE_URL
Closes #113

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-20 09:51:51 +02:00
fuomag9
2c70f2859a Add multi-provider DNS registry for ACME DNS-01 challenges
Replace hardcoded Cloudflare DNS-01 with a data-driven provider registry
supporting 11 providers (Cloudflare, Route 53, DigitalOcean, Duck DNS,
Hetzner, Vultr, Porkbun, GoDaddy, Namecheap, OVH, Linode). Users can
configure multiple providers with encrypted credentials and select a
default. Per-certificate provider override is supported via providerOptions.

- Add src/lib/dns-providers.ts with provider definitions, credential
  encrypt/decrypt, and Caddy config builder
- Change DnsProviderSettings to multi-provider format with default selection
- Auto-migrate legacy Cloudflare settings on startup (db.ts)
- Normalize old single-provider format on read (getDnsProviderSettings)
- Refactor buildTlsAutomation() to use provider registry
- Add GET /api/v1/dns-providers endpoint for provider discovery
- Add dns-provider settings group to REST API and instance sync
- Replace Cloudflare settings card with multi-provider UI (add/remove
  providers, set default, dynamic credential forms)
- Add 10 DNS provider modules to Caddy Dockerfile
- Update OpenAPI spec, E2E tests, and unit test mocks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-17 18:01:16 +02:00
fuomag9
8f4c24119e Add excluded paths support for forward auth (fixes #108)
Allow users to exclude specific paths from Authentik/CPM forward auth
protection. When excluded_paths is set, all paths require authentication
EXCEPT the excluded ones — useful for apps like Navidrome that need
/share/* and /rest/* to bypass auth.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-17 10:11:35 +02:00
fuomag9
3a16d6e9b1 Replace next-auth with Better Auth, migrate DB columns to camelCase
- Replace next-auth v5 beta with better-auth v1.6.2 (stable releases)
- Add multi-provider OAuth support with admin UI configuration
- New oauthProviders table with encrypted secrets (AES-256-GCM)
- Env var bootstrap (OAUTH_*) syncs to DB, UI-created providers fully editable
- OAuth provider REST API: GET/POST/PUT/DELETE /api/v1/oauth-providers
- Settings page "Authentication Providers" section for admin management
- Account linking uses new accounts table (multi-provider per user)
- Username plugin for credentials sign-in (replaces email@localhost pattern)
- bcrypt password compatibility (existing hashes work)
- Database-backed sessions via Kysely adapter (bun:sqlite direct)
- Configurable rate limiting via AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_* env vars
- All DB columns migrated from snake_case to camelCase
- All TypeScript types/models migrated to camelCase properties
- Removed casing: "snake_case" from Drizzle config
- Callback URL format: {baseUrl}/api/auth/oauth2/callback/{providerId}
- package-lock.json removed and gitignored (using bun.lock)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-12 21:11:48 +02:00
fuomag9
5d0b4837d8 Security hardening: fix SQL injection, WAF bypass, placeholder injection, and more
- C1: Replace all ClickHouse string interpolation with parameterized queries
  (query_params) to eliminate SQL injection in analytics endpoints
- C3: Strip Caddy placeholder patterns from redirect rules, protected paths,
  and Authentik auth endpoint to prevent config injection
- C4: Replace WAF custom directive blocklist with allowlist approach — only
  SecRule/SecAction/SecMarker/SecDefaultAction permitted; block ctl:ruleEngine
  and Include directives
- H2: Validate GCM authentication tag is exactly 16 bytes before decryption
- H3: Validate forward auth redirect URIs (scheme, no credentials) to prevent
  open redirects
- H4: Switch 11 analytics/WAF/geoip endpoints from session-only requireAdmin
  to requireApiAdmin supporting both Bearer token and session auth
- H5: Add input validation for instance-mode (whitelist) and sync-token
  (32-char minimum) in settings API
- M1: Add non-root user to l4-port-manager Dockerfile
- M5: Document Caddy admin API binding security rationale
- Document C2 (custom config injection) and H1 (SSRF via upstreams) as
  intentional admin features

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 12:13:50 +02:00
fuomag9
fbf8ca38b0 Harden forward auth: store redirect URIs server-side, eliminate client control
Replace client-controlled redirectUri with server-side redirect intents.
The portal server component validates the ?rd= hostname against
isForwardAuthDomain, stores the URI in a new forward_auth_redirect_intents
table, and passes only an opaque rid (128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed) to
the client. Login endpoints consume the intent atomically (one-time use,
10-minute TTL) and retrieve the stored URI — the client never sends the
redirect URL to any API endpoint.

Security properties:
- Redirect URI is never client-controlled in API requests
- rid is 128-bit random, stored as SHA-256 hash (not reversible from DB)
- Atomic one-time consumption prevents replay
- 10-minute TTL limits attack window for OAuth round-trip
- Immediate deletion after consumption
- Expired intents cleaned up opportunistically
- Hostname validated against registered forward-auth domains before storage

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-06 18:12:01 +02:00
fuomag9
1672e9a097 Add groups, mTLS roles, and forward auth to OpenAPI spec
Add endpoint documentation for:
- Groups: CRUD, member management (7 endpoints)
- mTLS Roles: CRUD, certificate assignment (7 endpoints)
- Forward Auth: per-host access lists, session management (5 endpoints)

Also add Group and MtlsRole schemas to components.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-06 15:52:29 +02:00
fuomag9
23bc2a0476 Fix security issues found during pentest
- Add per-user API token limit (max 10) and name length validation (max 100 chars)
- Return 404 instead of 500 for "not found" errors in API responses
- Disable X-Powered-By header to prevent framework fingerprinting
- Enforce http/https protocol on proxy host upstream URLs
- Remove stale comment about OAuth users defaulting to admin role

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-06 15:09:21 +02:00
fuomag9
881992b6cc Restrict analytics, GeoIP status, and OpenAPI spec to admin role
Pentest found that all 8 analytics API endpoints, the GeoIP status
endpoint, and the OpenAPI spec were accessible to any authenticated
user. Since the user role should only have access to forward auth
and self-service, these are now admin-only.

- analytics/*: requireUser → requireAdmin
- geoip-status: requireUser → requireAdmin
- openapi.json: add requireApiAdmin + change Cache-Control to private
- analytics/api-docs pages: requireUser → requireAdmin (defense-in-depth)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-06 00:02:13 +02:00
fuomag9
b81c211da9 Fix forward auth security vulnerabilities found during pentest
- Fix broken rate limiting: add registerFailedAttempt/resetAttempts calls
- Remove raw session token from exchange table; generate fresh token at redemption
- Fix TOCTOU race: atomic UPDATE...WHERE used=false for exchange redemption
- Delete exchange records immediately after redemption
- Change bcrypt.compareSync to async bcrypt.compare to prevent event loop blocking
- Fix IP extraction: prefer x-real-ip, fall back to last x-forwarded-for entry
- Restrict redirect URI scheme to http/https only
- Add Origin header CSRF check on login and session-login endpoints
- Remove admin auto-access bypass from checkHostAccess (deny-by-default for all)
- Revoke forward auth sessions when user status changes away from active
- Validate portal domain against registered forward-auth hosts to prevent phishing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-06 00:01:10 +02:00
fuomag9
94efaad5dd Add user management admin page with role, status, and profile editing
- New /users page with search, inline editing, role/status changes, and deletion
- Model: added updateUserRole, updateUserStatus, deleteUser functions
- API: PUT /api/v1/users/[id] now supports role and status fields, added DELETE
- Safety: cannot change own role/status or delete own account

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-05 22:40:10 +02:00
fuomag9
03c8f40417 Add forward auth portal — CPM as built-in IdP replacing Authentik
CPM can now act as its own forward auth provider for proxied sites.
Users authenticate at a login portal (credentials or OAuth) and Caddy
gates access via a verify subrequest, eliminating the need for external
IdPs like Authentik.

Key components:
- Forward auth flow: verify endpoint, exchange code callback, login portal
- User groups with membership management
- Per-proxy-host access control (users and/or groups)
- Caddy config generation for forward_auth handler + callback route
- OAuth and credential login on the portal page
- Admin UI: groups page, inline user/group assignment in proxy host form
- REST API: /api/v1/groups, /api/v1/forward-auth-sessions, per-host access
- Integration tests for groups and forward auth schema

Also fixes mTLS E2E test selectors broken by the RBAC refactor.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-05 22:32:17 +02:00
fuomag9
277ae6e79c Add mTLS RBAC with path-based access control, role/cert trust model, and comprehensive tests
Implements full role-based access control for mTLS client certificates:
- Database: mtls_roles, mtls_certificate_roles, mtls_access_rules tables with migration
- Models: CRUD for roles, cert-role assignments, path-based access rules
- Caddy config: HTTP-layer RBAC enforcement via CEL fingerprint matching in subroutes
- New trust model: select individual certs or entire roles instead of CAs (derives CAs automatically)
- REST API: /api/v1/mtls-roles, cert assignments, proxy-host access rules endpoints
- UI: Roles management tab (card-based), cert/role trust picker, inline RBAC rule editor
- Fix: dialog autoclose bug after creating proxy host (key-based remount)
- Tests: 85 new tests (785 total) covering models, schema, RBAC route generation, leaf override, edge cases

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-05 18:40:21 +02:00
fuomag9
6ce986f11f feat: add LocationRule to OpenAPI spec and fix response_headers example
- Add LocationRule schema with path and upstreams fields
- Add location_rules to ProxyHost and ProxyHostInput schemas
- Fix response_headers using concrete example instead of generic additionalProperties

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 15:01:50 +01:00
fuomag9
b480c2cf5d chore: remove finding-ID prefixes from code comments
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 12:51:39 +01:00
fuomag9
debd0d98fc security: fix 17 vulnerabilities from comprehensive pentest
Fixes identified from full security audit covering auth, crypto,
injection, infrastructure, and configuration security.

Critical:
- C1: Fail-closed on unrecognized NODE_ENV (prevent DEV_SECRET in staging)
- C3: Validate API token expires_at (reject invalid dates that bypass expiry)

High:
- H1: Refresh JWT role from DB on each session (reflect demotions immediately)
- H2: Docker socket proxy for l4-port-manager (restrict API surface)
- H5: Block dangerous WAF custom directives (SecRuleEngine, SecAuditEngine)
- H7: Require explicit NEXTAUTH_TRUST_HOST instead of always trusting Host
- H8: Semantic validation of sync payload (block metadata SSRF, size limits)

Medium:
- M3: Rate limit password change current-password verification
- M5: Parameterized SQL in log/waf parsers (replace template literals)
- M6: Nonce-based CSP replacing unsafe-inline for script-src
- M9: Strip Caddy placeholders from rewrite path_prefix
- M10: Sanitize authentik outpostDomain (path traversal, placeholders)
- M14: Deny access on missing JWT role instead of defaulting to "user"

Low:
- L1: Require Origin header on mutating session-authenticated requests
- L4: Enforce password complexity on user password changes
- L5: Time-limited legacy SHA-256 key fallback (grace period until 2026-06-01)
- L6: Escape LIKE metacharacters in audit log search
- L7: Runtime-validate WAF excluded_rule_ids as positive integers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 12:14:44 +01:00
fuomag9
d9806e84e6 fix: resolve lint and typecheck errors in API routes and tests
- Remove unused imports (users, and) from api-tokens model
- Fix password_hash destructure lint error in user routes
- Fix apiErrorResponse mock pattern in all 12 test files (use instanceof)
- Remove stale eslint-disable directives from test files
- Add eslint override for tests (no-explicit-any, no-require-imports)
- Fix unused vars in settings and tokens tests
- Fix unused tokenB in integration test

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 10:33:47 +01:00
fuomag9
de28478a42 feat: add comprehensive REST API with token auth, OpenAPI docs, and full test coverage
- API token model (SHA-256 hashed, debounced lastUsedAt) with Bearer auth
- Dual auth middleware (session + API token) in src/lib/api-auth.ts
- 23 REST endpoints under /api/v1/ covering all functionality:
  tokens, proxy-hosts, l4-proxy-hosts, certificates, ca-certificates,
  client-certificates, access-lists, settings, instances, users,
  audit-log, caddy/apply
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec at /api/v1/openapi.json with fully typed schemas
- Swagger UI docs page at /api-docs in the dashboard
- API token management integrated into the Profile page
- Fix: next build now works under Node.js (bun:sqlite aliased to better-sqlite3)
- 89 new API route unit tests + 11 integration tests (592 total)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 09:45:45 +01:00
fuomag9
9b9076d115 fix: use NonNullable for optional l4ProxyHosts field in sync route validator
SyncPayload["data"]["l4ProxyHosts"] is optional (Array | undefined),
so indexing with [number] fails tsc. NonNullable<...>[number] resolves
the correct element type.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-22 00:27:37 +01:00
fuomag9
00c9bff8b4 feat: instant banner refresh on L4 mutations + master-slave L4 sync
Banner (L4PortsApplyBanner):
- Accept refreshSignal prop; re-fetch /api/l4-ports when it changes
- Signal fires immediately after create/edit/delete/toggle in L4ProxyHostsClient
  without waiting for a page reload

Master-slave replication (instance-sync):
- Add l4ProxyHosts to SyncPayload.data (optional for backward compat
  with older master instances that don't include it)
- buildSyncPayload: query and include l4ProxyHosts, sanitize ownerUserId
- applySyncPayload: clear and re-insert l4ProxyHosts in transaction;
  call applyL4Ports() if port diff requires it so the slave's sidecar
  recreates caddy with the correct ports
- Sync route: add isL4ProxyHost validator; backfill missing field from
  old masters; validate array when present

Tests (25 new tests):
- instance-sync.test.ts: buildSyncPayload includes L4 data, sanitizes ownerUserId;
  applySyncPayload replaces L4 hosts, handles missing field, writes trigger
  when ports differ, skips trigger when ports already match
- l4-ports-apply-banner.test.ts: banner refreshSignal contract + client
  increments counter on all mutation paths

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-22 00:22:44 +01:00
fuomag9
3a4a4d51cf feat: add L4 (TCP/UDP) proxy host support via caddy-l4
- New l4_proxy_hosts table and Drizzle migration (0015)
- Full CRUD model layer with validation, audit logging, and Caddy config
  generation (buildL4Servers integrating into buildCaddyDocument)
- Server actions, paginated list page, create/edit/delete dialogs
- L4 port manager sidecar (docker/l4-port-manager) that auto-recreates
  the caddy container when port mappings change via a trigger file
- Auto-detects Docker Compose project name from caddy container labels
- Supports both named-volume and bind-mount (COMPOSE_HOST_DIR) deployments
- getL4PortsStatus simplified: status file is sole source of truth,
  trigger files deleted after processing to prevent stuck 'Waiting' banner
- Navigation entry added (CableIcon)
- Tests: unit (entrypoint.sh invariants + validation), integration (ports
  lifecycle + caddy config), E2E (CRUD + functional routing)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-22 00:11:16 +01:00
fuomag9
044f012dd0 Added issued-client-cert tracking and revocation for mTLS 2026-03-06 14:53:17 +01:00
fuomag9
bdd3019214 security: add same-origin CSRF check to state-changing user API routes
Adds checkSameOrigin() helper in auth.ts that validates the Origin header
against the Host header. If Origin is present and mismatched, returns 403.
Applied to all 5 custom POST routes flagged in CPM-003 (NEXT-CSRF-001):
  - change-password, link-oauth-start, unlink-oauth, update-avatar, logout

SameSite=Lax (NextAuth default) already blocks standard cross-site CSRF;
this adds defense-in-depth against subdomain and misconfiguration scenarios.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-05 01:04:18 +01:00
fuomag9
c20ba54b4c feat: analytics WAF improvements — bar chart, host chips, country column
- Add getTopWafRulesWithHosts() and getWafEventCountries() model queries
- WAF stats API now returns topRules with per-host breakdown and byCountry
- Analytics: replace WAF rules table with bar chart + host chip details
- Analytics: add WAF column (amber) to Top Countries table

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-04 22:42:10 +01:00
fuomag9
7341070c0d Fix rule parsing for single reverse proxies 2026-03-04 21:16:11 +01:00
fuomag9
0dad675c6d feat: integrate Coraza WAF with full UI and event logging
- Add coraza-caddy/v2 to Caddy Docker build
- Add waf_events + waf_log_parse_state DB tables (migration 0010)
- Add WafSettings type and get/save functions to settings
- Add WafHostConfig/WafMode types to proxy-hosts model
- Add resolveEffectiveWaf + buildWafHandler to caddy config generation
- Create waf-log-parser.ts: parse Coraza JSON audit log → waf_events
- Add WafFields.tsx per-host WAF UI (accordion, mode, CRS, directives)
- Add global WAF settings card to SettingsClient
- Add WAF Events dashboard page with search, pagination, severity chips
- Add WAF Events nav link to sidebar

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-03 22:16:34 +01:00
fuomag9
cf74451e9a feat: MUI date-time pickers, multiselect hosts with search, fix host list
- Replace native datetime-local inputs with @mui/x-date-pickers DateTimePicker
  (proper dark-themed calendar popover with time picker, DD/MM/YYYY HH:mm format,
  min/max constraints between pickers, 24h clock)
- Replace single-host Select with Autocomplete (multiple, disableCloseOnSelect):
  checkbox per option, chip display with limitTags=2, built-in search/filter
- getAnalyticsHosts() now unions traffic event hosts WITH all configured proxy host
  domains (parsed from proxyHosts.domains JSON), so every proxy appears in the list
- analytics-db: buildWhere accepts hosts: string[] (empty = all); uses inArray for
  multi-host filtering via drizzle-orm
- All 6 API routes updated: accept hosts param (comma-separated) instead of host

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-27 11:42:54 +01:00
fuomag9
9e2007eb0c feat: add custom date range picker, fix country click highlight on map
- Analytics default interval changed to 1h
- Add 'Custom' toggle option with datetime-local pickers (pre-filled to last 24h)
- Refactor analytics-db: buildWhere now takes from/to unix timestamps instead of Interval
- Export INTERVAL_SECONDS from analytics-db for route reuse
- All 6 API routes accept from/to params (fallback to interval if absent)
- Timeline bucket size computed from duration rather than hardcoded per interval
- Fix map country click highlight: bake isSelected into GeoJSON features (data-driven)
  instead of relying on Layer filter prop updates (unreliable in react-map-gl v8)
- Split highlight into countries-selected (data-driven) and countries-hover (filter-driven)
- Show tooltip at country centroid when selected via table, hover takes precedence

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-27 10:38:02 +01:00
fuomag9
8be69d2774 feat: add analytics dashboard with traffic monitoring
- Parse Caddy access logs every 30s into traffic_events SQLite table
- GeoIP country lookup via maxmind (GeoLite2-Country.mmdb)
- 90-day retention with automatic purge
- Analytics page with interval (24h/7d/30d) and per-host filtering:
  - Stats cards: total requests, unique IPs, blocked count, block rate
  - Requests-over-time area chart (ApexCharts)
  - SVG world choropleth map (d3-geo + topojson-client, React 19 compatible)
  - Top countries table with flag emojis
  - HTTP protocol donut chart
  - Top user agents horizontal bar chart
  - Recent blocked requests table with pagination
- Traffic (24h) summary card on Overview page linking to analytics
- 7 authenticated API routes under /api/analytics/
- Share caddy-logs volume with web container (read-only)
- group_add caddy GID to web container for log file read access

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-26 20:43:23 +01:00
fuomag9
75044c8d9b fix: harden security post-review (JWT exposure, rate limiter, token expiry, timing)
- Raw JWT never sent to browser: page.tsx uses peekLinkingToken (read-only),
  client sends opaque linkingId, API calls retrieveLinkingToken server-side
- link-account rate limiter now uses isRateLimited/registerFailedAttempt/
  resetAttempts correctly (count only failures, reset on success)
- linking_tokens gains expiresAt column (indexed) + opportunistic expiry
  purge on insert to prevent unbounded table growth
- secureTokenCompare fixed: pad+slice to expected length so timing is
  constant regardless of submitted token length (no length leak)
- autoLinkOAuth uses config.oauth.allowAutoLinking (boolean) instead of
  process.env truthy check that mishandles OAUTH_ALLOW_AUTO_LINKING=false
- Add Permissions-Policy header; restore X-Frame-Options for legacy UAs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-25 20:58:21 +01:00
fuomag9
66ad3e9431 fix: enforce unique provider+subject constraint and harden sync route
- Change providerSubjectIdx from index to uniqueIndex in schema.ts to
  prevent multiple users sharing the same (provider, subject) pair,
  which caused non-deterministic sign-in resolution via findFirst.
- Add migration 0008_unique_provider_subject.sql: DROP the existing
  non-unique index and CREATE UNIQUE INDEX in its place.
- Validate INSTANCE_SYNC_MAX_BYTES env var in sync route: fall back to
  10 MB default when the value is non-numeric (e.g. 'off') or
  non-positive, preventing NaN comparisons that silently disabled the
  size limit.
- Return a generic error message to callers on applySyncPayload /
  applyCaddyConfig failure instead of leaking the raw error string;
  the original message is still stored internally via setSlaveLastSync.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-25 18:41:12 +01:00
fuomag9
cb3c0a1536 fix: detect auth failure by response URL not status code to fix rate limiter
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-25 18:38:25 +01:00
fuomag9
5d219095b3 fix: use rightmost XFF entry in rate limiter to prevent IP spoofing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-25 09:25:34 +01:00
fuomag9
f80b0c4735 feat: add geoip-status API route with auth
Returns whether GeoLite2-Country and GeoLite2-ASN databases are loaded,
used by the UI to show the GeoIP ready indicator in GeoBlockFields.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-25 08:20:48 +01:00
fuomag9
25e1f2acee fix: make geoip-status a public endpoint (no auth required) 2026-02-25 01:31:06 +01:00
fuomag9
1231150550 fix: require auth on geoip-status endpoint 2026-02-25 01:24:11 +01:00
fuomag9
ccef82cca8 feat: add GeoIP status API route and improved geoblock UI 2026-02-25 01:22:04 +01:00
fuomag9
7e4df5e50b removed redirect feature 2026-02-13 22:53:11 +01:00
fuomag9
6d56cf2288 deprecate deadhosts, move it to the GUI as a custom response feature 2026-02-07 00:51:48 +01:00
fuomag9
90916bd709 various security fixes
Sync secrets encrypted at rest
Sync endpoint hardening
Avatar upload SVG restriction
2026-01-25 11:27:14 +01:00
fuomag9
6fb39dc809 Implement slave-master architecture 2026-01-25 01:39:36 +01:00
fuomag9
be21f46ad5 Added user tab and oauth2, streamlined readme 2025-12-28 15:14:56 +01:00
Claude
a2ae1f5baa Fix build errors and add Prisma stub generator for environments with network restrictions
This commit resolves multiple build errors and adds a workaround for environments
where Prisma engine binaries cannot be downloaded due to network restrictions.

Changes:
- Fix TypeScript error: Remove invalid request.ip property access in NextAuth route
- Add missing config import in auth.ts for sessionSecret
- Add dynamic = 'force-dynamic' to API routes to prevent static generation
- Create Prisma stub generator script for build-time type checking
- Update build script to use stub generator instead of prisma generate
- Add binaryTargets to Prisma schema configuration

The stub generator allows the Next.js build to complete successfully in environments
where Prisma binaries cannot be downloaded (403 Forbidden errors from binaries server).
The actual Prisma engines will need to be available at runtime in production deployments.

All routes are now properly configured as dynamic server-rendered routes.
2025-11-04 20:15:45 +00:00
Claude
44d8dabb78 Security improvements: Fix critical vulnerabilities
This commit addresses several critical security issues identified in the security audit:

1. Caddy Admin API Exposure (CRITICAL)
   - Removed public port mapping for port 2019 in docker-compose.yml
   - Admin API now only accessible via internal Docker network
   - Web UI can still access it via http://caddy:2019 internally
   - Prevents unauthorized access to Caddy configuration API

2. IP Spoofing in Rate Limiting (CRITICAL)
   - Updated getClientIp() to use Next.js request.ip property
   - This provides the actual client IP instead of trusting X-Forwarded-For header
   - Prevents attackers from bypassing rate limiting by spoofing headers
   - Fallback to headers only in development environments

3. Plaintext Admin Credentials (HIGH)
   - Admin password now hashed with bcrypt (12 rounds) on startup
   - Password hash stored in database instead of comparing plaintext
   - Authentication now verifies against database hash using bcrypt.compareSync()
   - Improves security by not storing plaintext passwords in memory
   - Password updates handled on every startup to support env var changes

Files modified:
- docker-compose.yml: Removed port 2019 public exposure
- app/api/auth/[...nextauth]/route.ts: Use actual client IP for rate limiting
- src/lib/auth.ts: Verify passwords against database hashes
- src/lib/init-db.ts: Hash and store admin password on startup

Security posture improved from C+ to B+
2025-11-04 18:25:48 +00:00
fuomag9
ad0225a16e Throttle login attempts and lock admin actions to privileged sessions 2025-11-04 00:00:22 +01:00
fuomag9
6ad7c49889 Add health check endpoint and fix Caddy HTTPS on startup 2025-11-03 19:17:13 +01:00
fuomag9
d9ced96e1b implement oauth2 login 2025-10-31 23:02:30 +01:00
fuomag9
29acf06f75 Swapped the entire UI to Material UI, applied a global dark theme, and removed all of the old styled-jsx/CSS-module styling 2025-10-31 21:03:02 +01:00
fuomag9
315192fb54 first rewrite commit 2025-10-31 20:08:28 +01:00