- C1: Replace all ClickHouse string interpolation with parameterized queries
(query_params) to eliminate SQL injection in analytics endpoints
- C3: Strip Caddy placeholder patterns from redirect rules, protected paths,
and Authentik auth endpoint to prevent config injection
- C4: Replace WAF custom directive blocklist with allowlist approach — only
SecRule/SecAction/SecMarker/SecDefaultAction permitted; block ctl:ruleEngine
and Include directives
- H2: Validate GCM authentication tag is exactly 16 bytes before decryption
- H3: Validate forward auth redirect URIs (scheme, no credentials) to prevent
open redirects
- H4: Switch 11 analytics/WAF/geoip endpoints from session-only requireAdmin
to requireApiAdmin supporting both Bearer token and session auth
- H5: Add input validation for instance-mode (whitelist) and sync-token
(32-char minimum) in settings API
- M1: Add non-root user to l4-port-manager Dockerfile
- M5: Document Caddy admin API binding security rationale
- Document C2 (custom config injection) and H1 (SSRF via upstreams) as
intentional admin features
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pentest found that all 8 analytics API endpoints, the GeoIP status
endpoint, and the OpenAPI spec were accessible to any authenticated
user. Since the user role should only have access to forward auth
and self-service, these are now admin-only.
- analytics/*: requireUser → requireAdmin
- geoip-status: requireUser → requireAdmin
- openapi.json: add requireApiAdmin + change Cache-Control to private
- analytics/api-docs pages: requireUser → requireAdmin (defense-in-depth)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Returns whether GeoLite2-Country and GeoLite2-ASN databases are loaded,
used by the UI to show the GeoIP ready indicator in GeoBlockFields.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
