This commit addresses several critical security issues identified in the security audit:
1. Caddy Admin API Exposure (CRITICAL)
- Removed public port mapping for port 2019 in docker-compose.yml
- Admin API now only accessible via internal Docker network
- Web UI can still access it via http://caddy:2019 internally
- Prevents unauthorized access to Caddy configuration API
2. IP Spoofing in Rate Limiting (CRITICAL)
- Updated getClientIp() to use Next.js request.ip property
- This provides the actual client IP instead of trusting X-Forwarded-For header
- Prevents attackers from bypassing rate limiting by spoofing headers
- Fallback to headers only in development environments
3. Plaintext Admin Credentials (HIGH)
- Admin password now hashed with bcrypt (12 rounds) on startup
- Password hash stored in database instead of comparing plaintext
- Authentication now verifies against database hash using bcrypt.compareSync()
- Improves security by not storing plaintext passwords in memory
- Password updates handled on every startup to support env var changes
Files modified:
- docker-compose.yml: Removed port 2019 public exposure
- app/api/auth/[...nextauth]/route.ts: Use actual client IP for rate limiting
- src/lib/auth.ts: Verify passwords against database hashes
- src/lib/init-db.ts: Hash and store admin password on startup
Security posture improved from C+ to B+
The issue occurred because the auth system uses a hardcoded JWT user ID (1)
that didn't exist in the database, causing foreign key constraint violations
when creating proxy hosts.
Changes:
- Added init-db.ts to ensure admin user exists in database
- Added instrumentation.ts to run DB initialization on server startup
- Admin user (from ADMIN_USERNAME env var) is now created with ID 1
- Matches the hardcoded ID in auth.ts for JWT tokens
Fixes foreign key constraint error (P2003) when creating proxy hosts.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
