- C1: Replace all ClickHouse string interpolation with parameterized queries
(query_params) to eliminate SQL injection in analytics endpoints
- C3: Strip Caddy placeholder patterns from redirect rules, protected paths,
and Authentik auth endpoint to prevent config injection
- C4: Replace WAF custom directive blocklist with allowlist approach — only
SecRule/SecAction/SecMarker/SecDefaultAction permitted; block ctl:ruleEngine
and Include directives
- H2: Validate GCM authentication tag is exactly 16 bytes before decryption
- H3: Validate forward auth redirect URIs (scheme, no credentials) to prevent
open redirects
- H4: Switch 11 analytics/WAF/geoip endpoints from session-only requireAdmin
to requireApiAdmin supporting both Bearer token and session auth
- H5: Add input validation for instance-mode (whitelist) and sync-token
(32-char minimum) in settings API
- M1: Add non-root user to l4-port-manager Dockerfile
- M5: Document Caddy admin API binding security rationale
- Document C2 (custom config injection) and H1 (SSRF via upstreams) as
intentional admin features
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace client-controlled redirectUri with server-side redirect intents.
The portal server component validates the ?rd= hostname against
isForwardAuthDomain, stores the URI in a new forward_auth_redirect_intents
table, and passes only an opaque rid (128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed) to
the client. Login endpoints consume the intent atomically (one-time use,
10-minute TTL) and retrieve the stored URI — the client never sends the
redirect URL to any API endpoint.
Security properties:
- Redirect URI is never client-controlled in API requests
- rid is 128-bit random, stored as SHA-256 hash (not reversible from DB)
- Atomic one-time consumption prevents replay
- 10-minute TTL limits attack window for OAuth round-trip
- Immediate deletion after consumption
- Expired intents cleaned up opportunistically
- Hostname validated against registered forward-auth domains before storage
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remove unused imports, functions, and variables flagged by
@typescript-eslint/no-unused-vars and no-useless-assignment rules.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Fix broken rate limiting: add registerFailedAttempt/resetAttempts calls
- Remove raw session token from exchange table; generate fresh token at redemption
- Fix TOCTOU race: atomic UPDATE...WHERE used=false for exchange redemption
- Delete exchange records immediately after redemption
- Change bcrypt.compareSync to async bcrypt.compare to prevent event loop blocking
- Fix IP extraction: prefer x-real-ip, fall back to last x-forwarded-for entry
- Restrict redirect URI scheme to http/https only
- Add Origin header CSRF check on login and session-login endpoints
- Remove admin auto-access bypass from checkHostAccess (deny-by-default for all)
- Revoke forward auth sessions when user status changes away from active
- Validate portal domain against registered forward-auth hosts to prevent phishing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CPM can now act as its own forward auth provider for proxied sites.
Users authenticate at a login portal (credentials or OAuth) and Caddy
gates access via a verify subrequest, eliminating the need for external
IdPs like Authentik.
Key components:
- Forward auth flow: verify endpoint, exchange code callback, login portal
- User groups with membership management
- Per-proxy-host access control (users and/or groups)
- Caddy config generation for forward_auth handler + callback route
- OAuth and credential login on the portal page
- Admin UI: groups page, inline user/group assignment in proxy host form
- REST API: /api/v1/groups, /api/v1/forward-auth-sessions, per-host access
- Integration tests for groups and forward auth schema
Also fixes mTLS E2E test selectors broken by the RBAC refactor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
