- C1: Replace all ClickHouse string interpolation with parameterized queries
(query_params) to eliminate SQL injection in analytics endpoints
- C3: Strip Caddy placeholder patterns from redirect rules, protected paths,
and Authentik auth endpoint to prevent config injection
- C4: Replace WAF custom directive blocklist with allowlist approach — only
SecRule/SecAction/SecMarker/SecDefaultAction permitted; block ctl:ruleEngine
and Include directives
- H2: Validate GCM authentication tag is exactly 16 bytes before decryption
- H3: Validate forward auth redirect URIs (scheme, no credentials) to prevent
open redirects
- H4: Switch 11 analytics/WAF/geoip endpoints from session-only requireAdmin
to requireApiAdmin supporting both Bearer token and session auth
- H5: Add input validation for instance-mode (whitelist) and sync-token
(32-char minimum) in settings API
- M1: Add non-root user to l4-port-manager Dockerfile
- M5: Document Caddy admin API binding security rationale
- Document C2 (custom config injection) and H1 (SSRF via upstreams) as
intentional admin features
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SQLite was too slow for analytical aggregations on traffic_events and
waf_events (millions of rows, GROUP BY, COUNT DISTINCT). ClickHouse is
a columnar OLAP database purpose-built for this workload.
- Add ClickHouse container to Docker Compose with health check
- Create src/lib/clickhouse/client.ts with singleton client, table DDL,
insert helpers, and all analytics query functions
- Update log-parser.ts and waf-log-parser.ts to write to ClickHouse
- Remove purgeOldEntries — ClickHouse TTL handles 90-day retention
- Rewrite analytics-db.ts and waf-events.ts to query ClickHouse
- Remove trafficEvents/wafEvents from SQLite schema, add migration
- CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD is required (no hardcoded default)
- Update .env.example, README, and test infrastructure
API response shapes are unchanged — no frontend modifications needed.
Parse state (file offsets) remains in SQLite.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the ?rd= query parameter in the Caddy→portal redirect with a
_cpm_rd HttpOnly cookie (Secure, SameSite=Lax, Path=/portal, 10min TTL).
The portal server component reads and immediately deletes the cookie,
then processes it through the existing validation and redirect intent flow.
This removes the redirect URI from the browser URL bar while maintaining
all existing security properties (domain validation, server-side storage,
one-time opaque rid).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace client-controlled redirectUri with server-side redirect intents.
The portal server component validates the ?rd= hostname against
isForwardAuthDomain, stores the URI in a new forward_auth_redirect_intents
table, and passes only an opaque rid (128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed) to
the client. Login endpoints consume the intent atomically (one-time use,
10-minute TTL) and retrieve the stored URI — the client never sends the
redirect URL to any API endpoint.
Security properties:
- Redirect URI is never client-controlled in API requests
- rid is 128-bit random, stored as SHA-256 hash (not reversible from DB)
- Atomic one-time consumption prevents replay
- 10-minute TTL limits attack window for OAuth round-trip
- Immediate deletion after consumption
- Expired intents cleaned up opportunistically
- Hostname validated against registered forward-auth domains before storage
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add per-user API token limit (max 10) and name length validation (max 100 chars)
- Return 404 instead of 500 for "not found" errors in API responses
- Disable X-Powered-By header to prevent framework fingerprinting
- Enforce http/https protocol on proxy host upstream URLs
- Remove stale comment about OAuth users defaulting to admin role
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Use config.oauth.providerName (e.g. "Keycloak", "Google") instead of
the raw provider ID "oauth2" in audit summaries. Include user name or
email in sign-in and sign-up messages for easier log reading.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remove unused imports, functions, and variables flagged by
@typescript-eslint/no-unused-vars and no-useless-assignment rules.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two bugs caused mTLS to be silently disabled when all issued client
certificates for a CA were revoked:
1. New cert-based trust model (caddy.ts): When deriving CA IDs from
trusted cert IDs, revoked certs were invisible (active-only query),
causing derivedCaIds to be empty and the domain to be dropped from
mTlsDomainMap entirely — no mTLS policy at all. Fix by falling back
to a cert-ID-to-CA-ID lookup that includes revoked certs, keeping the
domain in the map so it gets a fail-closed policy.
2. Legacy CA-based model (caddy-mtls.ts): buildClientAuthentication
returned null when all certs were revoked, relying on Caddy's
experimental "drop" TLS connection policy field which didn't work
reliably. Fix by pinning to the CA cert itself as a trusted_leaf_certs
entry — no client cert can hash-match a CA certificate (and presenting
the CA cert would require its private key, already a full compromise).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Fix broken rate limiting: add registerFailedAttempt/resetAttempts calls
- Remove raw session token from exchange table; generate fresh token at redemption
- Fix TOCTOU race: atomic UPDATE...WHERE used=false for exchange redemption
- Delete exchange records immediately after redemption
- Change bcrypt.compareSync to async bcrypt.compare to prevent event loop blocking
- Fix IP extraction: prefer x-real-ip, fall back to last x-forwarded-for entry
- Restrict redirect URI scheme to http/https only
- Add Origin header CSRF check on login and session-login endpoints
- Remove admin auto-access bypass from checkHostAccess (deny-by-default for all)
- Revoke forward auth sessions when user status changes away from active
- Validate portal domain against registered forward-auth hosts to prevent phishing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- New /users page with search, inline editing, role/status changes, and deletion
- Model: added updateUserRole, updateUserStatus, deleteUser functions
- API: PUT /api/v1/users/[id] now supports role and status fields, added DELETE
- Safety: cannot change own role/status or delete own account
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CPM can now act as its own forward auth provider for proxied sites.
Users authenticate at a login portal (credentials or OAuth) and Caddy
gates access via a verify subrequest, eliminating the need for external
IdPs like Authentik.
Key components:
- Forward auth flow: verify endpoint, exchange code callback, login portal
- User groups with membership management
- Per-proxy-host access control (users and/or groups)
- Caddy config generation for forward_auth handler + callback route
- OAuth and credential login on the portal page
- Admin UI: groups page, inline user/group assignment in proxy host form
- REST API: /api/v1/groups, /api/v1/forward-auth-sessions, per-host access
- Integration tests for groups and forward auth schema
Also fixes mTLS E2E test selectors broken by the RBAC refactor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Caddy's certmagic creates storage dirs with hardcoded 0700 permissions,
making the web container's supplementary group membership ineffective.
Rather than working around this with ACLs or chmod hacks, remove the
feature entirely — it was cosmetic (issuer/expiry display) for certs
that Caddy auto-manages anyway.
Also bump access list dropdown timeout from 5s to 10s to fix flaky E2E test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Traffic (24h) card's "Blocked" percentage only counted
geo-blocks from trafficEvents. Now also queries wafEvents to
include WAF-blocked requests in the total.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The caddy-blocker plugin already emits "request blocked" log entries
for geo/IP blocks, but they were going to Caddy's default log (stdout)
instead of /logs/access.log because http.handlers.blocker was not in
the access log include list. The existing log parser and dashboard were
already wired up to count these — they just never received the data.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Remove unused `/* global process */` in next.config.mjs
- Attach cause to rethrown error in secret.ts legacy key expiry
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The H7 fix made trustHost default to false, which caused redirect loops
in environments where NEXTAUTH_URL is set (including Docker and tests).
When NEXTAUTH_URL is explicitly configured, the operator has declared
the canonical URL, making Host header validation unnecessary.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Remove unused imports (users, and) from api-tokens model
- Fix password_hash destructure lint error in user routes
- Fix apiErrorResponse mock pattern in all 12 test files (use instanceof)
- Remove stale eslint-disable directives from test files
- Add eslint override for tests (no-explicit-any, no-require-imports)
- Fix unused vars in settings and tokens tests
- Fix unused tokenB in integration test
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- API token model (SHA-256 hashed, debounced lastUsedAt) with Bearer auth
- Dual auth middleware (session + API token) in src/lib/api-auth.ts
- 23 REST endpoints under /api/v1/ covering all functionality:
tokens, proxy-hosts, l4-proxy-hosts, certificates, ca-certificates,
client-certificates, access-lists, settings, instances, users,
audit-log, caddy/apply
- OpenAPI 3.1 spec at /api/v1/openapi.json with fully typed schemas
- Swagger UI docs page at /api-docs in the dashboard
- API token management integrated into the Profile page
- Fix: next build now works under Node.js (bun:sqlite aliased to better-sqlite3)
- 89 new API route unit tests + 11 integration tests (592 total)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add udp/ prefix to upstream dial addresses for UDP proxy hosts
(Caddy L4 requires udp/ prefix on both listen and dial for UDP)
- Fix TCP "disabled host" test to check data echo instead of connection
refusal (Docker port mapping always accepts TCP handshake)
- Add waitForTcpRoute before "both ports" test to handle re-enable timing
- Increase UDP route wait timeout to 30s for listener startup
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Fix Caddy L4 config to use "udp/:PORT" listen syntax for UDP proxy hosts
(previously used bare ":PORT" which Caddy treated as TCP)
- Fix TCP unused port test to check data echo instead of connection refusal
(Docker port mapping accepts TCP handshake even without a Caddy listener)
- Fix mTLS import test to wait for sheet close and scope cert name to table
- Fix CA certificate generate test to scope name assertion to table
- Remaining L4 routing test failures are infrastructure issues with Docker
port forwarding and Caddy L4 UDP listener startup timing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Banner (L4PortsApplyBanner):
- Accept refreshSignal prop; re-fetch /api/l4-ports when it changes
- Signal fires immediately after create/edit/delete/toggle in L4ProxyHostsClient
without waiting for a page reload
Master-slave replication (instance-sync):
- Add l4ProxyHosts to SyncPayload.data (optional for backward compat
with older master instances that don't include it)
- buildSyncPayload: query and include l4ProxyHosts, sanitize ownerUserId
- applySyncPayload: clear and re-insert l4ProxyHosts in transaction;
call applyL4Ports() if port diff requires it so the slave's sidecar
recreates caddy with the correct ports
- Sync route: add isL4ProxyHost validator; backfill missing field from
old masters; validate array when present
Tests (25 new tests):
- instance-sync.test.ts: buildSyncPayload includes L4 data, sanitizes ownerUserId;
applySyncPayload replaces L4 hosts, handles missing field, writes trigger
when ports differ, skips trigger when ports already match
- l4-ports-apply-banner.test.ts: banner refreshSignal contract + client
increments counter on all mutation paths
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- New l4_proxy_hosts table and Drizzle migration (0015)
- Full CRUD model layer with validation, audit logging, and Caddy config
generation (buildL4Servers integrating into buildCaddyDocument)
- Server actions, paginated list page, create/edit/delete dialogs
- L4 port manager sidecar (docker/l4-port-manager) that auto-recreates
the caddy container when port mappings change via a trigger file
- Auto-detects Docker Compose project name from caddy container labels
- Supports both named-volume and bind-mount (COMPOSE_HOST_DIR) deployments
- getL4PortsStatus simplified: status file is sole source of truth,
trigger files deleted after processing to prevent stuck 'Waiting' banner
- Navigation entry added (CableIcon)
- Tests: unit (entrypoint.sh invariants + validation), integration (ports
lifecycle + caddy config), E2E (CRUD + functional routing)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Production (Docker): src/lib/db.ts now uses bun:sqlite + drizzle-orm/bun-sqlite.
No native addon compilation needed — bun:sqlite is a Bun built-in. The Dockerfile
drops all native build tools (python3, make, g++) and uses --ignore-scripts.
Tests (Vitest/Node.js): bun:sqlite is unavailable under Node.js, so:
- tests/helpers/db.ts keeps better-sqlite3 + drizzle-orm/better-sqlite3 for
integration tests that need a real in-memory SQLite
- vitest.config.ts aliases bun:sqlite → a thin better-sqlite3 shim and
drizzle-orm/bun-sqlite → drizzle-orm/better-sqlite3 for unit tests that
transitively import src/lib/db.ts without executing any queries
- better-sqlite3 stays as a devDependency (test-only, not built in Docker)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds two new UI-configurable Caddy patterns that previously required raw JSON:
- Per-path redirect rules (from/to/status) emitted as a subroute handler before
auth so .well-known paths work without login; supports full URLs, cross-domain
targets, and wildcard path patterns (e.g. /.well-known/*)
- Path prefix rewrite that prepends a segment to every request before proxying
(e.g. /recipes → upstream sees /recipes/original/path)
Config is stored in the existing meta JSON column (no schema migration). Includes
integration tests for meta serialization and E2E functional tests against a real
Caddy instance covering relative/absolute destinations, all 3xx status codes, and
various wildcard combinations. Adds traefik/whoami to the test stack to verify
rewritten paths actually reach the upstream.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- accept wildcard proxy host domains like *.example.com with validation and normalization
- make exact hosts win over overlapping wildcards in generated routes and TLS policies
- add unit coverage for host-pattern priority and wildcard domain handling
- add a single test:all entry point and clean up lint/typecheck issues so the suite runs cleanly
- run mobile layout Playwright checks under both chromium and mobile-iphone
When allowWebsocket=true and WAF is enabled, the WAF handler sits first
in the handler chain and processes the initial HTTP upgrade request
(GET + Upgrade: websocket). If any rule matches, Coraza can block the
handshake before SecAuditEngine captures it — producing no log entry
and an unexplained connection failure from the client's perspective.
Fix: when allowWebsocket=true, prepend a phase:1 SecLang rule that
matches Upgrade: websocket (case-insensitive) and turns the rule engine
off for that transaction via ctl:ruleEngine=off. After the 101
Switching Protocols response the connection becomes a raw WebSocket
tunnel that the WAF cannot inspect anyway, so this bypass has no impact
on normal HTTP traffic through the same host.
The rule is inserted before OWASP CRS includes so it always fires first
regardless of which ruleset is loaded.
Add 9 unit tests in caddy-waf.test.ts covering: bypass present/absent,
phase:1 placement, case-insensitive regex, nolog/noauditlog flags,
ordering before CRS, and compatibility with custom directives.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bug: when a proxy host had per-host WAF explicitly disabled (enabled:false)
with waf_mode:"merge" (or no waf_mode set), resolveEffectiveWaf entered the
merge branch and returned enabled:true unconditionally, applying the global
WAF to a host the user had opted out of.
Fix: add `if (host.enabled === false) return null` at the top of the merge
branch. Explicit opt-out now takes precedence over the global setting
regardless of mode. The override mode already handled this correctly.
Also extract resolveEffectiveWaf from caddy.ts into caddy-waf.ts so it
can be unit tested. Add 12 new tests covering no-config fallback,
merge opt-out regression, merge settings combination, and override mode.
What runs without OWASP CRS: only SecRuleEngine + audit directives +
any custom_directives. The @coraza.conf-recommended and CRS includes
are gated behind load_owasp_crs (fixed in previous commit).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The WAF handler always prepended 'Include @coraza.conf-recommended' to the
SecLang directives regardless of load_owasp_crs. The @-prefixed paths only
resolve from the embedded coraza-coreruleset filesystem, which the Caddy
WAF plugin mounts only when load_owasp_crs=true. Without it Caddy fails:
"failed to readfile: open @coraza.conf-recommended: no such file or directory"
Fix: gate all @-prefixed Include directives behind load_owasp_crs.
Also extract buildWafHandler from caddy.ts into caddy-waf.ts so it can be
unit tested in isolation, and add tests/unit/caddy-waf.test.ts (19 tests)
covering the regression, CRS include ordering, excluded rule IDs, and
handler structure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extract pemToBase64Der and buildClientAuthentication from caddy.ts into
a new caddy-mtls.ts module, adding groupMtlsDomainsByCaSet to group mTLS
domains by their CA fingerprint before building TLS connection policies.
Previously all mTLS domains sharing a cert type (auto-managed, imported,
or managed) were grouped into a single policy, causing CA union: a client
cert from CA_B could authenticate against a host that only trusted CA_A.
The fix creates one policy per unique CA set, ensuring strict per-host
CA isolation across all three TLS policy code paths.
Also adds:
- tests/unit/caddy-mtls.test.ts (26 tests) covering pemToBase64Der,
buildClientAuthentication, groupMtlsDomainsByCaSet, and cross-CA
isolation regression tests
- tests/unit/instance-sync-env.test.ts (33 tests) for the five pure
env-reading functions in instance-sync.ts
- tests/integration/instance-sync.test.ts (16 tests) for
buildSyncPayload and applySyncPayload using an in-memory SQLite db
- Fix tests/helpers/db.ts to use a relative import for db/schema so it
works inside vi.mock factory dynamic imports
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When all issued certs for a CA are revoked, buildAuth returns null.
Previously the code would merge mTLS domains back into a policy with no
client_authentication, silently dropping the requirement and allowing
unauthenticated access (open bypass).
Fix by always splitting mTLS and non-mTLS domains first, then using
drop: true when buildAuth returns null — so a fully-revoked CA causes
Caddy to drop TLS connections for those domains rather than admit them
without a client certificate.
Also removed the redundant first buildAuth(domains) call in the
auto-managed path that was used only as an existence check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Caddy's trusted_leaf_certs is an additional check on top of CA chain
validation, not a replacement. Without trusted_ca_certs, Go's TLS
rejects the client cert before the leaf check runs, causing 'unknown ca'.
Updated buildClientAuthentication to always include the CA cert in
trusted_ca_certs for chain validation, and additionally set
trusted_leaf_certs for managed CAs to enforce revocation. When all
issued certs for a CA are revoked, the CA is excluded from
trusted_ca_certs entirely so chain validation fails for any cert from it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two bugs fixed:
1. buildClientAuthentication was placing issued leaf cert PEMs into
trusted_ca_certs. Caddy uses that field for CA chain validation, not
leaf pinning — putting leaf certs there made chain verification fail
for every presented client cert, causing the browser to be asked
repeatedly. Fixed by using trusted_leaf_certs for managed CAs.
2. If all issued certs for a CA were revoked, the active cert map would
be empty and the code fell back to trusting the CA cert directly,
effectively un-revoking everything. Fixed by tracking which CAs have
ever had issued certs (including revoked) and keeping them in
trusted_leaf_certs mode permanently (empty list = no one trusted).
Also fix CA certificate delete action not surfacing the error message
to the user in production (Next.js strips thrown error messages in
server actions). Changed to return { success, error } and updated the
client dialog to check the result instead of using try/catch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
WafSettings.mode is now 'Off' | 'On' so the legacy DB coercion guard
triggered a TS2367 type error. DB values are already normalised upstream.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DetectionOnly was fundamentally broken in coraza-caddy (actually blocks
requests via anomaly scoring), caused massive audit log flooding, and the
threshold workaround had several issues:
- t:none is meaningless in a SecAction (no target to transform)
- SecRuleEngine directive ordering relative to SecAction is implementation-
defined, making the override fragile
- host.mode ?? 'DetectionOnly' fallbacks silently gave any host without an
explicit mode the broken DetectionOnly behaviour
Changes:
- Remove DetectionOnly from UI (global settings radio, per-host engine mode)
- Coerce legacy DB values of 'DetectionOnly' to 'On' in buildWafHandler
- Fix fallback defaults: host.mode ?? 'DetectionOnly' → host.mode ?? 'On'
- Fix action parsers: unknown mode defaults to 'On' (was 'DetectionOnly')
- Fix global settings defaultValue: ?? 'DetectionOnly' → ?? 'On' (or 'Off')
- Remove the fragile threshold SecAction workaround
- Update types: mode is now 'Off' | 'On' throughout
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
SecAuditEngine On logs every request through the WAF regardless of whether
any rules matched, causing massive disk I/O on busy hosts (e.g. during
Docker image pushes). RelevantOnly still captures DetectionOnly hits because
OWASP CRS rules include auditlog in their SecDefaultAction, so rule-matched
transactions are marked for audit logging. Only truly clean requests (no
rule match at all) are silently skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- DetectionOnly mode: add SecAction to set anomaly score thresholds to
9999999 so rule 949110/980130 never fires; works around coraza-caddy
bug where is_interrupted=true still causes a 403 in detection mode
- Switch SecAuditEngine back to On (from RelevantOnly) so DetectionOnly
hits are captured, now safe because body parts are excluded
- SecAuditLogParts: ABIJDEFHZ → ABFHZ, dropping request body (I),
multipart files (J), intermediate response headers (D), and response
body (E) — prevents multi-MB payloads being written to audit log
- Parser: store both blocked and detected events; filter on rule matched
OR is_interrupted instead of is_interrupted only
- Add blocked column to waf_events (migration 0014); existing rows
default to blocked=true
- WAF Events UI: Blocked/Detected chip in table and drawer header
- Fix misleading help text that said to use Detection Only to observe
traffic before blocking
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
