Harden forward auth: store redirect URIs server-side, eliminate client control

Replace client-controlled redirectUri with server-side redirect intents.
The portal server component validates the ?rd= hostname against
isForwardAuthDomain, stores the URI in a new forward_auth_redirect_intents
table, and passes only an opaque rid (128-bit random, SHA-256 hashed) to
the client. Login endpoints consume the intent atomically (one-time use,
10-minute TTL) and retrieve the stored URI — the client never sends the
redirect URL to any API endpoint.

Security properties:
- Redirect URI is never client-controlled in API requests
- rid is 128-bit random, stored as SHA-256 hash (not reversible from DB)
- Atomic one-time consumption prevents replay
- 10-minute TTL limits attack window for OAuth round-trip
- Immediate deletion after consumption
- Expired intents cleaned up opportunistically
- Hostname validated against registered forward-auth domains before storage

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
fuomag9
2026-04-06 18:12:01 +02:00
parent 38d29cb7e0
commit fbf8ca38b0
8 changed files with 157 additions and 53 deletions

View File

@@ -5,14 +5,15 @@ import { config } from "@/src/lib/config";
import {
createForwardAuthSession,
createExchangeCode,
checkHostAccessByDomain
checkHostAccessByDomain,
consumeRedirectIntent
} from "@/src/lib/models/forward-auth";
import { logAuditEvent } from "@/src/lib/audit";
import { isRateLimited, registerFailedAttempt, resetAttempts } from "@/src/lib/rate-limit";
/**
* Forward auth login endpoint — validates credentials and starts the exchange flow.
* Called by the portal login form.
* Called by the portal login form with an opaque redirect intent ID (rid).
*/
export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
try {
@@ -26,24 +27,13 @@ export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
const body = await request.json();
const username = typeof body.username === "string" ? body.username.trim() : "";
const password = typeof body.password === "string" ? body.password : "";
const redirectUri = typeof body.redirectUri === "string" ? body.redirectUri : "";
const rid = typeof body.rid === "string" ? body.rid : "";
if (!username || !password) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: "Username and password are required" }, { status: 400 });
}
if (!redirectUri) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: "Redirect URI is required" }, { status: 400 });
}
// Validate redirect URI — only allow http/https schemes
let targetUrl: URL;
try {
targetUrl = new URL(redirectUri);
} catch {
return NextResponse.json({ error: "Invalid redirect URI" }, { status: 400 });
}
if (targetUrl.protocol !== "https:" && targetUrl.protocol !== "http:") {
return NextResponse.json({ error: "Invalid redirect URI scheme" }, { status: 400 });
if (!rid) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: "Missing redirect intent" }, { status: 400 });
}
// Rate limiting — prefer x-real-ip (set by reverse proxy) over x-forwarded-for
@@ -92,6 +82,15 @@ export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
// Successful credential check — reset rate limiter for this IP
resetAttempts(ip);
// Consume the redirect intent — returns the server-stored redirect URI.
// This is a one-time operation: the intent is deleted after consumption.
const redirectUri = await consumeRedirectIntent(rid);
if (!redirectUri) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: "Invalid or expired redirect intent. Please try again." }, { status: 400 });
}
const targetUrl = new URL(redirectUri);
// Check if user has access to the target host
const { hasAccess } = await checkHostAccessByDomain(user.id, targetUrl.hostname);
if (!hasAccess) {