Charon/.grype.yaml

# Grype vulnerability suppression configuration
# Automatically loaded by Grype for vulnerability scanning
# Review and update when upstream fixes are available
# Documentation: https://github.com/anchore/grype#specifying-matches-to-ignore

ignore:
  # CVE-2026-2673: OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server key exchange group downgrade
  # Severity: HIGH (CVSS 7.5)
  # Packages: libcrypto3 3.5.5-r0 and libssl3 3.5.5-r0 (Alpine apk)
  # Status: No upstream fix available — Alpine 3.23 still ships libcrypto3/libssl3 3.5.5-r0 as of 2026-03-18
  #
  # Vulnerability Details:
  # - When DEFAULT is in the TLS 1.3 group configuration, the OpenSSL server may select
  #   a weaker key exchange group than preferred, enabling a limited key exchange downgrade.
  # - Only affects systems acting as a raw TLS 1.3 server using OpenSSL's server-side group negotiation.
  #
  # Root Cause (No Fix Available):
  # - Alpine upstream has not published a patched libcrypto3/libssl3 for Alpine 3.23.
  # - Checked: Alpine 3.23 still ships libcrypto3/libssl3 3.5.5-r0 as of 2026-03-18.
  # - Fix path: once Alpine publishes a patched libcrypto3/libssl3, rebuild the Docker image
  #   and remove this suppression.
  #
  # Risk Assessment: ACCEPTED (No upstream fix; limited exposure in Charon context)
  # - Charon terminates TLS at the Caddy layer — the Go backend does not act as a raw TLS 1.3 server.
  # - The vulnerability requires the affected application to directly configure TLS 1.3 server
  #   group negotiation via OpenSSL, which Charon does not do.
  # - Container-level isolation reduces the attack surface further.
  #
  # Mitigation (active while suppression is in effect):
  # - Monitor Alpine security advisories: https://security.alpinelinux.org/vuln/CVE-2026-2673
  # - Weekly CI security rebuild (security-weekly-rebuild.yml) flags any new CVEs in the full image.
  #
  # Review:
  # - Reviewed 2026-03-18 (initial suppression): no upstream fix available. Set 30-day review.
  # - Next review: 2026-04-18. Remove suppression immediately once upstream fixes.
  #
  # Removal Criteria:
  # - Alpine publishes a patched version of libcrypto3 and libssl3
  # - Rebuild Docker image and verify CVE-2026-2673 no longer appears in grype-results.json
  # - Remove both these entries and the corresponding .trivyignore entry simultaneously
  #
  # References:
  # - CVE-2026-2673: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2673
  # - Alpine security tracker: https://security.alpinelinux.org/vuln/CVE-2026-2673
  - vulnerability: CVE-2026-2673
    package:
      name: libcrypto3
      version: "3.5.5-r0"
      type: apk
    reason: |
      HIGH — OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server key exchange group downgrade in libcrypto3 3.5.5-r0 (Alpine base image).
      No upstream fix: Alpine 3.23 still ships libcrypto3 3.5.5-r0 as of 2026-03-18. Charon
      terminates TLS at the Caddy layer; the Go backend does not act as a raw TLS 1.3 server.
      Risk accepted pending Alpine upstream patch.
    expiry: "2026-04-18"  # Initial 30-day review period. Extend in 14–30 day increments with documented justification.

    # Action items when this suppression expires:
    # 1. Check Alpine security tracker: https://security.alpinelinux.org/vuln/CVE-2026-2673
    # 2. If a patched Alpine package is now available:
    #    a. Rebuild Docker image without suppression
    #    b. Run local security-scan-docker-image and confirm CVE is resolved
    #    c. Remove this suppression entry, the libssl3 entry below, and the .trivyignore entry
    # 3. If no fix yet: Extend expiry by 14–30 days and update the review comment above
    # 4. If extended 3+ times: Open an issue to track the upstream status formally

  # CVE-2026-2673 (libssl3) — see full justification in the libcrypto3 entry above
  - vulnerability: CVE-2026-2673
    package:
      name: libssl3
      version: "3.5.5-r0"
      type: apk
    reason: |
      HIGH — OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server key exchange group downgrade in libssl3 3.5.5-r0 (Alpine base image).
      No upstream fix: Alpine 3.23 still ships libssl3 3.5.5-r0 as of 2026-03-18. Charon
      terminates TLS at the Caddy layer; the Go backend does not act as a raw TLS 1.3 server.
      Risk accepted pending Alpine upstream patch.
    expiry: "2026-04-18"  # Initial 30-day review period. See libcrypto3 entry above for action items.

  # GHSA-6g7g-w4f8-9c9x: buger/jsonparser Delete panic on malformed JSON (DoS)
  # Severity: HIGH (CVSS 7.5)
  # Package: github.com/buger/jsonparser v1.1.1 (embedded in /usr/local/bin/crowdsec and /usr/local/bin/cscli)
  # Status: NO upstream fix available — OSV marks "Last affected: v1.1.1" with no Fixed event
  #
  # Vulnerability Details:
  # - The Delete function fails to validate offsets on malformed JSON input, producing a
  #   negative slice index and a runtime panic — denial of service (CWE-125).
  # - CVSSv3: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
  #
  # Root Cause (Third-Party Binary + No Upstream Fix):
  # - Charon does not use buger/jsonparser directly. It is compiled into CrowdSec binaries.
  # - The buger/jsonparser repository has no released fix as of 2026-03-19 (GitHub issue #275
  #   and golang/vulndb #4514 are both open).
  # - Fix path: once buger/jsonparser releases a patched version and CrowdSec updates their
  #   dependency, rebuild the Docker image and remove this suppression.
  #
  # Risk Assessment: ACCEPTED (Limited exploitability + no upstream fix)
  # - The DoS vector requires passing malformed JSON to the vulnerable Delete function within
  #   CrowdSec's internal processing pipeline; this is not a direct attack surface in Charon.
  # - CrowdSec's exposed surface is its HTTP API (not raw JSON stream parsing via this path).
  #
  # Mitigation (active while suppression is in effect):
  # - Monitor buger/jsonparser: https://github.com/buger/jsonparser/issues/275
  # - Monitor CrowdSec releases: https://github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec/releases
  # - Weekly CI security rebuild flags the moment a fixed image ships.
  #
  # Review:
  # - Reviewed 2026-03-19 (initial suppression): no upstream fix exists. Set 30-day review.
  # - Next review: 2026-04-19. Remove suppression once buger/jsonparser ships a fix and
  #   CrowdSec updates their dependency.
  #
  # Removal Criteria:
  # - buger/jsonparser releases a patched version (v1.1.2 or higher)
  # - CrowdSec releases a version built with the patched jsonparser
  # - Rebuild Docker image, run security-scan-docker-image, confirm finding is resolved
  # - Remove this entry and the corresponding .trivyignore entry simultaneously
  #
  # References:
  # - GHSA-6g7g-w4f8-9c9x: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6g7g-w4f8-9c9x
  # - Upstream issue: https://github.com/buger/jsonparser/issues/275
  # - golang/vulndb: https://github.com/golang/vulndb/issues/4514
  # - CrowdSec releases: https://github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec/releases
  - vulnerability: GHSA-6g7g-w4f8-9c9x
    package:
      name: github.com/buger/jsonparser
      version: "v1.1.1"
      type: go-module
    reason: |
      HIGH — DoS panic via malformed JSON in buger/jsonparser v1.1.1 embedded in CrowdSec binaries.
      No upstream fix: buger/jsonparser has no released patch as of 2026-03-19 (issue #275 open).
      Charon does not use this package directly; the vector requires reaching CrowdSec's internal
      JSON processing pipeline. Risk accepted; no remediation path until upstream ships a fix.
      Reviewed 2026-03-19: no patched release available.
    expiry: "2026-04-19"  # 30-day review: no fix exists. Extend in 30-day increments with documented justification.

    # Action items when this suppression expires:
    # 1. Check buger/jsonparser releases: https://github.com/buger/jsonparser/releases
    #    and issue #275: https://github.com/buger/jsonparser/issues/275
    # 2. If a fix has shipped AND CrowdSec has updated their dependency:
    #    a. Rebuild Docker image and run local security-scan-docker-image
    #    b. Remove this suppression entry and the corresponding .trivyignore entry
    # 3. If no fix yet: Extend expiry by 30 days and update the review comment above
    # 4. If extended 3+ times with no progress: Consider opening an issue upstream or
    #    evaluating whether CrowdSec can replace buger/jsonparser with a safe alternative

  # GHSA-jqcq-xjh3-6g23: pgproto3/v2 DataRow.Decode panic on negative field length (DoS)
  # Severity: HIGH (CVSS 7.5)
  # Package: github.com/jackc/pgproto3/v2 v2.3.3 (embedded in /usr/local/bin/crowdsec and /usr/local/bin/cscli)
  # Status: NO fix in pgproto3/v2 (archived/EOL) — fix path requires CrowdSec to migrate to pgx/v5
  #
  # Vulnerability Details:
  # - DataRow.Decode does not validate field lengths; a malicious or compromised PostgreSQL server
  #   can send a negative field length causing a slice-bounds panic — denial of service (CWE-129).
  # - CVSSv3: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
  #
  # Root Cause (EOL Module + Third-Party Binary):
  # - Charon does not use pgproto3/v2 directly nor communicate with PostgreSQL. The package
  #   is compiled into CrowdSec binaries for their internal database communication.
  # - The pgproto3/v2 module is archived and EOL; no fix will be released. The fix path
  #   is migration to pgx/v5, which embeds an updated pgproto3/v3.
  # - Fix path: once CrowdSec migrates to pgx/v5 and releases an updated binary, rebuild
  #   the Docker image and remove this suppression.
  #
  # Risk Assessment: ACCEPTED (Non-exploitable in Charon context + no upstream fix path)
  # - The vulnerability requires a malicious PostgreSQL server response. Charon uses SQLite
  #   internally and does not run PostgreSQL. CrowdSec's database path is not exposed to
  #   external traffic in a standard Charon deployment.
  # - The attack requires a compromised database server, which would imply full host compromise.
  #
  # Mitigation (active while suppression is in effect):
  # - Monitor CrowdSec releases for pgx/v5 migration:
  #   https://github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec/releases
  # - Weekly CI security rebuild flags the moment a fixed image ships.
  #
  # Review:
  # - Reviewed 2026-03-19 (initial suppression): pgproto3/v2 is EOL; no fix exists or will exist.
  #   Waiting on CrowdSec to migrate to pgx/v5. Set 30-day review.
  # - Next review: 2026-04-19. Remove suppression once CrowdSec ships with pgx/v5.
  #
  # Removal Criteria:
  # - CrowdSec releases a version with pgx/v5 (pgproto3/v3) replacing pgproto3/v2
  # - Rebuild Docker image, run security-scan-docker-image, confirm finding is resolved
  # - Remove this entry and the corresponding .trivyignore entry simultaneously
  #
  # References:
  # - GHSA-jqcq-xjh3-6g23: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jqcq-xjh3-6g23
  # - pgproto3/v2 archive notice: https://github.com/jackc/pgproto3
  # - pgx/v5 (replacement): https://github.com/jackc/pgx
  # - CrowdSec releases: https://github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec/releases
  - vulnerability: GHSA-jqcq-xjh3-6g23
    package:
      name: github.com/jackc/pgproto3/v2
      version: "v2.3.3"
      type: go-module
    reason: |
      HIGH — DoS panic via negative field length in pgproto3/v2 v2.3.3 embedded in CrowdSec binaries.
      pgproto3/v2 is archived/EOL with no fix planned; fix path requires CrowdSec to migrate to pgx/v5.
      Charon uses SQLite, not PostgreSQL; this code path is not reachable in a standard deployment.
      Risk accepted; no remediation until CrowdSec ships with pgx/v5.
      Reviewed 2026-03-19: pgproto3/v2 EOL confirmed; CrowdSec has not migrated to pgx/v5 yet.
    expiry: "2026-04-19"  # 30-day review: no fix path until CrowdSec migrates to pgx/v5.

    # Action items when this suppression expires:
    # 1. Check CrowdSec releases for pgx/v5 migration:
    #    https://github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec/releases
    # 2. Verify with: `go version -m /path/to/crowdsec | grep pgproto3`
    #    Expected: pgproto3/v3 (or no pgproto3 reference if fully replaced)
    # 3. If CrowdSec has migrated:
    #    a. Rebuild Docker image and run local security-scan-docker-image
    #    b. Remove this suppression entry and the corresponding .trivyignore entry
    # 4. If not yet migrated: Extend expiry by 30 days and update the review comment above
    # 5. If extended 3+ times: Open an upstream issue on crowdsecurity/crowdsec requesting pgx/v5 migration

  # GHSA-x6gf-mpr2-68h6 / CVE-2026-4427: pgproto3/v2 DataRow.Decode panic on negative field length (DoS)
  # Severity: HIGH (CVSS 7.5)
  # Package: github.com/jackc/pgproto3/v2 v2.3.3 (embedded in /usr/local/bin/crowdsec and /usr/local/bin/cscli)
  # Status: NO fix in pgproto3/v2 (archived/EOL) — fix path requires CrowdSec to migrate to pgx/v5
  # Note: This is the NVD/Red Hat advisory alias for the same underlying vulnerability as GHSA-jqcq-xjh3-6g23
  #
  # Vulnerability Details:
  # - DataRow.Decode does not validate field lengths; a malicious or compromised PostgreSQL server
  #   can send a negative field length causing a slice-bounds panic — denial of service (CWE-129).
  # - CVSSv3: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (CVSS 7.5)
  #
  # Root Cause (EOL Module + Third-Party Binary):
  # - Same underlying vulnerability as GHSA-jqcq-xjh3-6g23; tracked separately by NVD/Red Hat as CVE-2026-4427.
  # - Charon does not use pgproto3/v2 directly nor communicate with PostgreSQL. The package
  #   is compiled into CrowdSec binaries for their internal database communication.
  # - The pgproto3/v2 module is archived and EOL; no fix will be released. The fix path
  #   is migration to pgx/v5, which embeds an updated pgproto3/v3.
  # - Fix path: once CrowdSec migrates to pgx/v5 and releases an updated binary, rebuild
  #   the Docker image and remove this suppression.
  #
  # Risk Assessment: ACCEPTED (Non-exploitable in Charon context + no upstream fix path)
  # - The vulnerability requires a malicious PostgreSQL server response. Charon uses SQLite
  #   internally and does not run PostgreSQL. CrowdSec's database path is not exposed to
  #   external traffic in a standard Charon deployment.
  # - The attack requires a compromised database server, which would imply full host compromise.
  #
  # Mitigation (active while suppression is in effect):
  # - Monitor CrowdSec releases for pgx/v5 migration:
  #   https://github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec/releases
  # - Weekly CI security rebuild flags the moment a fixed image ships.
  #
  # Review:
  # - Reviewed 2026-03-21 (initial suppression): pgproto3/v2 is EOL; no fix exists or will exist.
  #   Waiting on CrowdSec to migrate to pgx/v5. Set 30-day review. Sibling GHSA-jqcq-xjh3-6g23
  #   was already suppressed; this alias surfaced as a separate Grype match via NVD/Red Hat tracking.
  # - Next review: 2026-04-21. Remove suppression once CrowdSec ships with pgx/v5.
  #
  # Removal Criteria:
  # - Same as GHSA-jqcq-xjh3-6g23: CrowdSec releases a version with pgx/v5 replacing pgproto3/v2
  # - Rebuild Docker image, run security-scan-docker-image, confirm both advisories are resolved
  # - Remove this entry, GHSA-jqcq-xjh3-6g23 entry, and both .trivyignore entries simultaneously
  #
  # References:
  # - GHSA-x6gf-mpr2-68h6: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x6gf-mpr2-68h6
  # - CVE-2026-4427: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-4427
  # - Red Hat: https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-4427
  # - pgproto3/v2 archive notice: https://github.com/jackc/pgproto3
  # - pgx/v5 (replacement): https://github.com/jackc/pgx
  # - CrowdSec releases: https://github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec/releases
  - vulnerability: GHSA-x6gf-mpr2-68h6
    package:
      name: github.com/jackc/pgproto3/v2
      version: "v2.3.3"
      type: go-module
    reason: |
      HIGH — DoS panic via negative field length in pgproto3/v2 v2.3.3 embedded in CrowdSec binaries.
      NVD/Red Hat alias (CVE-2026-4427) for the same underlying bug as GHSA-jqcq-xjh3-6g23.
      pgproto3/v2 is archived/EOL with no fix planned; fix path requires CrowdSec to migrate to pgx/v5.
      Charon uses SQLite, not PostgreSQL; this code path is not reachable in a standard deployment.
      Risk accepted; no remediation until CrowdSec ships with pgx/v5.
      Reviewed 2026-03-21: pgproto3/v2 EOL confirmed; CrowdSec has not migrated to pgx/v5 yet.
    expiry: "2026-04-21"  # 30-day review: no fix path until CrowdSec migrates to pgx/v5.

    # Action items when this suppression expires:
    # 1. Check CrowdSec releases for pgx/v5 migration:
    #    https://github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec/releases
    # 2. Verify with: `go version -m /path/to/crowdsec | grep pgproto3`
    #    Expected: pgproto3/v3 (or no pgproto3 reference if fully replaced)
    # 3. If CrowdSec has migrated:
    #    a. Rebuild Docker image and run local security-scan-docker-image
    #    b. Remove this entry, GHSA-jqcq-xjh3-6g23 entry, and both .trivyignore entries
    # 4. If not yet migrated: Extend expiry by 30 days and update the review comment above
    # 5. If extended 3+ times: Open an upstream issue on crowdsecurity/crowdsec requesting pgx/v5 migration

  # GHSA-x744-4wpc-v9h2 / CVE-2026-34040: Docker AuthZ plugin bypass via oversized request body
  # Severity: HIGH (CVSS 8.8)
  # CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
  # CWE: CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization)
  # Package: github.com/docker/docker v28.5.2+incompatible (go-module)
  # Status: Fixed in moby/moby v29.3.1 — NO fix available for docker/docker import path
  #
  # Vulnerability Details:
  # - Incomplete fix for Docker AuthZ plugin bypass (CVE-2024-41110). An attacker can send an
  #   oversized request body to the Docker daemon, causing it to forward the request to the AuthZ
  #   plugin without the body, allowing unauthorized approvals.
  #
  # Root Cause (No Fix Available for Import Path):
  # - The fix exists in moby/moby v29.3.1, but not for the docker/docker import path that Charon uses.
  # - Migration to moby/moby/v2 is not practical: currently beta with breaking changes.
  # - Fix path: once docker/docker publishes a patched version or moby/moby/v2 stabilizes,
  #   update the dependency and remove this suppression.
  #
  # Risk Assessment: ACCEPTED (Not exploitable in Charon context)
  # - Charon uses the Docker client SDK only (list containers). The vulnerability is server-side
  #   in the Docker daemon's AuthZ plugin handler.
  # - Charon does not run a Docker daemon or use AuthZ plugins.
  # - The attack vector requires local access to the Docker daemon socket with AuthZ plugins enabled.
  #
  # Mitigation (active while suppression is in effect):
  # - Monitor docker/docker releases: https://github.com/moby/moby/releases
  # - Monitor moby/moby/v2 stabilization: https://github.com/moby/moby
  # - Weekly CI security rebuild flags the moment a fixed version ships.
  #
  # Review:
  # - Reviewed 2026-03-30 (initial suppression): no fix for docker/docker import path. Set 30-day review.
  # - Next review: 2026-04-30. Remove suppression once a fix is available for the docker/docker import path.
  #
  # Removal Criteria:
  # - docker/docker publishes a patched version OR moby/moby/v2 stabilizes and migration is feasible
  # - Update dependency, rebuild, run security-scan-docker-image, confirm finding is resolved
  # - Remove this entry, the GHSA-pxq6-2prw-chj9 entry, and the corresponding .trivyignore entries simultaneously
  #
  # References:
  # - GHSA-x744-4wpc-v9h2: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x744-4wpc-v9h2
  # - CVE-2026-34040: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34040
  # - CVE-2024-41110 (original): https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41110
  # - moby/moby releases: https://github.com/moby/moby/releases
  - vulnerability: GHSA-x744-4wpc-v9h2
    package:
      name: github.com/docker/docker
      version: "v28.5.2+incompatible"
      type: go-module
    reason: |
      HIGH — Docker AuthZ plugin bypass via oversized request body in docker/docker v28.5.2+incompatible.
      Incomplete fix for CVE-2024-41110. Fixed in moby/moby v29.3.1 but no fix for docker/docker import path.
      Charon uses Docker client SDK only (list containers); the vulnerability is server-side in the Docker
      daemon's AuthZ plugin handler. Charon does not run a Docker daemon or use AuthZ plugins.
      Risk accepted; no remediation path until docker/docker publishes a fix or moby/moby/v2 stabilizes.
      Reviewed 2026-03-30: no patched release available for docker/docker import path.
    expiry: "2026-04-30"  # 30-day review: no fix for docker/docker import path. Extend in 30-day increments with documented justification.

    # Action items when this suppression expires:
    # 1. Check docker/docker and moby/moby releases: https://github.com/moby/moby/releases
    # 2. Check if moby/moby/v2 has stabilized: https://github.com/moby/moby
    # 3. If a fix has shipped for docker/docker import path OR moby/moby/v2 is stable:
    #    a. Update the dependency and rebuild Docker image
    #    b. Run local security-scan-docker-image and confirm finding is resolved
    #    c. Remove this entry, GHSA-pxq6-2prw-chj9 entry, and all corresponding .trivyignore entries
    # 4. If no fix yet: Extend expiry by 30 days and update the review comment above
    # 5. If extended 3+ times: Open an issue to track moby/moby/v2 migration feasibility

  # GHSA-pxq6-2prw-chj9 / CVE-2026-33997: Moby off-by-one error in plugin privilege validation
  # Severity: MEDIUM (CVSS 6.8)
  # Package: github.com/docker/docker v28.5.2+incompatible (go-module)
  # Status: Fixed in moby/moby v29.3.1 — NO fix available for docker/docker import path
  #
  # Vulnerability Details:
  # - Off-by-one error in Moby's plugin privilege validation allows potential privilege escalation
  #   via crafted plugin configurations.
  #
  # Root Cause (No Fix Available for Import Path):
  # - Same import path issue as GHSA-x744-4wpc-v9h2. The fix exists in moby/moby v29.3.1 but not
  #   for the docker/docker import path that Charon uses.
  # - Fix path: same as GHSA-x744-4wpc-v9h2 — wait for docker/docker patch or moby/moby/v2 stabilization.
  #
  # Risk Assessment: ACCEPTED (Not exploitable in Charon context)
  # - Charon uses the Docker client SDK only (list containers). The vulnerability is in Docker's
  #   plugin privilege validation, which is server-side functionality.
  # - Charon does not run a Docker daemon, install Docker plugins, or interact with plugin privileges.
  #
  # Mitigation (active while suppression is in effect):
  # - Monitor docker/docker releases: https://github.com/moby/moby/releases
  # - Weekly CI security rebuild flags the moment a fixed version ships.
  #
  # Review:
  # - Reviewed 2026-03-30 (initial suppression): no fix for docker/docker import path. Set 30-day review.
  # - Next review: 2026-04-30. Remove suppression once a fix is available for the docker/docker import path.
  #
  # Removal Criteria:
  # - Same as GHSA-x744-4wpc-v9h2: docker/docker publishes a patched version OR moby/moby/v2 stabilizes
  # - Update dependency, rebuild, run security-scan-docker-image, confirm finding is resolved
  # - Remove this entry, GHSA-x744-4wpc-v9h2 entry, and all corresponding .trivyignore entries simultaneously
  #
  # References:
  # - GHSA-pxq6-2prw-chj9: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pxq6-2prw-chj9
  # - CVE-2026-33997: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33997
  # - moby/moby releases: https://github.com/moby/moby/releases
  - vulnerability: GHSA-pxq6-2prw-chj9
    package:
      name: github.com/docker/docker
      version: "v28.5.2+incompatible"
      type: go-module
    reason: |
      MEDIUM — Off-by-one error in Moby plugin privilege validation in docker/docker v28.5.2+incompatible.
      Fixed in moby/moby v29.3.1 but no fix for docker/docker import path.
      Charon uses Docker client SDK only (list containers); the vulnerability is in Docker's server-side
      plugin privilege validation. Charon does not run a Docker daemon or install Docker plugins.
      Risk accepted; no remediation path until docker/docker publishes a fix or moby/moby/v2 stabilizes.
      Reviewed 2026-03-30: no patched release available for docker/docker import path.
    expiry: "2026-04-30"  # 30-day review: no fix for docker/docker import path. Extend in 30-day increments with documented justification.

    # Action items when this suppression expires:
    # 1. Check docker/docker and moby/moby releases: https://github.com/moby/moby/releases
    # 2. Check if moby/moby/v2 has stabilized: https://github.com/moby/moby
    # 3. If a fix has shipped for docker/docker import path OR moby/moby/v2 is stable:
    #    a. Update the dependency and rebuild Docker image
    #    b. Run local security-scan-docker-image and confirm finding is resolved
    #    c. Remove this entry, GHSA-x744-4wpc-v9h2 entry, and all corresponding .trivyignore entries
    # 4. If no fix yet: Extend expiry by 30 days and update the review comment above
    # 5. If extended 3+ times: Open an issue to track moby/moby/v2 migration feasibility

# Match exclusions (patterns to ignore during scanning)
# Use sparingly - prefer specific CVE suppressions above
match:
  # Exclude test fixtures and example code from vulnerability scanning
  exclude:
    - path: "**/test/**"
    - path: "**/tests/**"
    - path: "**/testdata/**"
    - path: "**/examples/**"
    - path: "**/*_test.go"

# Output configuration (optional)
# These settings can be overridden via CLI flags
output:
  # Report only HIGH and CRITICAL by default
  # Medium/Low findings are still logged but don't fail the scan
  fail-on-severity: high

# Check for configuration updates
# Grype automatically updates its vulnerability database
# Run `grype db update` manually to force an update
check-for-app-update: true