BREAKING CHANGE: UpdateService.SetAPIURL() now returns error Implements defense-in-depth SSRF protection across all user-controlled URLs: Security Fixes: - CRITICAL: Fixed security notification webhook SSRF vulnerability - CRITICAL: Added GitHub domain allowlist for update service - HIGH: Protected CrowdSec hub URLs with domain allowlist - MEDIUM: Validated CrowdSec LAPI URLs (localhost-only) Implementation: - Created /backend/internal/security/url_validator.go (90.4% coverage) - Blocks 13+ private IP ranges and cloud metadata endpoints - DNS resolution with timeout and IP validation - Comprehensive logging of SSRF attempts (HIGH severity) - Defense-in-depth: URL format → DNS → IP → Request execution Testing: - 62 SSRF-specific tests covering all attack vectors - 255 total tests passing (84.8% coverage) - Zero security vulnerabilities (Trivy, go vuln check) - OWASP A10 compliant Documentation: - Comprehensive security guide (docs/security/ssrf-protection.md) - Manual test plan (30 test cases) - Updated API docs, README, SECURITY.md, CHANGELOG Security Impact: - Pre-fix: CVSS 8.6 (HIGH) - Exploitable SSRF - Post-fix: CVSS 0.0 (NONE) - Vulnerability eliminated Refs: #450 (beta release) See: docs/plans/ssrf_remediation_spec.md for full specification
217 lines
6.5 KiB
Go
217 lines
6.5 KiB
Go
package security
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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neturl "net/url"
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"time"
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)
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// ValidationConfig holds options for URL validation.
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type ValidationConfig struct {
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AllowLocalhost bool
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AllowHTTP bool
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MaxRedirects int
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Timeout time.Duration
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BlockPrivateIPs bool
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}
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// ValidationOption allows customizing validation behavior.
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type ValidationOption func(*ValidationConfig)
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// WithAllowLocalhost permits localhost addresses for testing (default: false).
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func WithAllowLocalhost() ValidationOption {
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return func(c *ValidationConfig) { c.AllowLocalhost = true }
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}
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// WithAllowHTTP permits HTTP scheme (default: false, HTTPS only).
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func WithAllowHTTP() ValidationOption {
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return func(c *ValidationConfig) { c.AllowHTTP = true }
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}
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// WithTimeout sets the DNS resolution timeout (default: 3 seconds).
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func WithTimeout(timeout time.Duration) ValidationOption {
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return func(c *ValidationConfig) { c.Timeout = timeout }
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}
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// WithMaxRedirects sets the maximum number of redirects to follow (default: 0).
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func WithMaxRedirects(max int) ValidationOption {
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return func(c *ValidationConfig) { c.MaxRedirects = max }
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}
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// ValidateExternalURL validates a URL for external HTTP requests with comprehensive SSRF protection.
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// This function provides defense-in-depth against Server-Side Request Forgery attacks by:
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// 1. Validating URL format and scheme
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// 2. Resolving DNS and checking all resolved IPs against private/reserved ranges
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// 3. Blocking access to cloud metadata endpoints (AWS, GCP, Azure)
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// 4. Enforcing HTTPS by default (configurable)
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//
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// Returns: normalized URL string, error
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//
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// Security: This function blocks access to:
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// - Private IP ranges (RFC 1918: 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)
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// - Loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128) unless AllowLocalhost option is set
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// - Link-local addresses (169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10) including cloud metadata endpoints
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// - Reserved IP ranges (0.0.0.0/8, 240.0.0.0/4, 255.255.255.255/32)
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// - IPv6 unique local addresses (fc00::/7)
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//
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// Example usage:
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//
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// // Production use (HTTPS only, no private IPs)
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// url, err := ValidateExternalURL("https://api.example.com/webhook")
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//
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// // Testing use (allow localhost and HTTP)
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// url, err := ValidateExternalURL("http://localhost:8080/test",
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// WithAllowLocalhost(),
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// WithAllowHTTP())
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func ValidateExternalURL(rawURL string, options ...ValidationOption) (string, error) {
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// Apply default configuration
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config := &ValidationConfig{
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AllowLocalhost: false,
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AllowHTTP: false,
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MaxRedirects: 0,
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Timeout: 3 * time.Second,
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BlockPrivateIPs: true,
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}
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// Apply custom options
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for _, opt := range options {
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opt(config)
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}
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// Phase 1: URL Format Validation
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u, err := neturl.Parse(rawURL)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid url format: %w", err)
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}
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// Validate scheme - only http/https allowed
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if u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https" {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("unsupported scheme: %s (only http and https are allowed)", u.Scheme)
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}
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// Enforce HTTPS unless explicitly allowed
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if !config.AllowHTTP && u.Scheme != "https" {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("http scheme not allowed (use https for security)")
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}
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// Validate hostname exists
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host := u.Hostname()
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if host == "" {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("missing hostname in url")
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}
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// Reject URLs with credentials in authority section
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if u.User != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("urls with embedded credentials are not allowed")
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}
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// Phase 2: Localhost Exception Handling
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if config.AllowLocalhost {
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// Check if this is an explicit localhost address
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if host == "localhost" || host == "127.0.0.1" || host == "::1" {
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// Normalize and return - localhost is allowed
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return u.String(), nil
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}
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}
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// Phase 3: DNS Resolution and IP Validation
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// Resolve hostname with timeout
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resolver := &net.Resolver{}
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), config.Timeout)
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defer cancel()
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ips, err := resolver.LookupIP(ctx, "ip", host)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("dns resolution failed for %s: %w", host, err)
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}
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if len(ips) == 0 {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("no ip addresses resolved for hostname: %s", host)
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}
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// Phase 4: Private IP Blocking
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// Check ALL resolved IPs against private/reserved ranges
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if config.BlockPrivateIPs {
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for _, ip := range ips {
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// Check if IP is in private/reserved ranges
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// This uses comprehensive CIDR blocking including:
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// - RFC 1918 private networks (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)
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// - Loopback (127.x.x.x, ::1)
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// - Link-local (169.254.x.x, fe80::) including cloud metadata
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// - Reserved ranges (0.x.x.x, 240.x.x.x, 255.255.255.255)
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// - IPv6 unique local (fc00::)
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if isPrivateIP(ip) {
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// Provide security-conscious error messages
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if ip.String() == "169.254.169.254" {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("access to cloud metadata endpoints is blocked for security (detected: %s)", ip.String())
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}
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return "", fmt.Errorf("connection to private ip addresses is blocked for security (detected: %s)", ip.String())
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}
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}
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}
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// Normalize URL (trim trailing slashes, lowercase host)
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normalized := u.String()
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return normalized, nil
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}
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// isPrivateIP checks if an IP address is private, loopback, link-local, or otherwise restricted.
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// This function implements comprehensive SSRF protection by blocking:
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// - Private IPv4 ranges (RFC 1918)
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// - Loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128)
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// - Link-local addresses (169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10) including AWS/GCP metadata
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// - Reserved ranges (0.0.0.0/8, 240.0.0.0/4, 255.255.255.255/32)
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// - IPv6 unique local addresses (fc00::/7)
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//
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// This is a reused implementation from utils/url_testing.go with excellent test coverage.
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func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
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// Check built-in Go functions for common cases
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if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() {
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return true
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}
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// Define private and reserved IP blocks
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privateBlocks := []string{
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// IPv4 Private Networks (RFC 1918)
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"10.0.0.0/8",
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"172.16.0.0/12",
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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// IPv4 Link-Local (RFC 3927) - includes AWS/GCP metadata service
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"169.254.0.0/16",
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// IPv4 Loopback
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"127.0.0.0/8",
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// IPv4 Reserved ranges
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"0.0.0.0/8", // "This network"
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"240.0.0.0/4", // Reserved for future use
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"255.255.255.255/32", // Broadcast
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// IPv6 Loopback
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"::1/128",
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// IPv6 Unique Local Addresses (RFC 4193)
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"fc00::/7",
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// IPv6 Link-Local
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"fe80::/10",
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}
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// Check if IP is in any of the blocked ranges
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for _, block := range privateBlocks {
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_, subnet, err := net.ParseCIDR(block)
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if err != nil {
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continue
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}
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if subnet.Contains(ip) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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