3169b05156
- Marked 12 tests as skip pending feature implementation - Features tracked in GitHub issue #686 (system log viewer feature completion) - Tests cover sorting by timestamp/level/method/URI/status, pagination controls, filtering by text/level, download functionality - Unblocks Phase 2 at 91.7% pass rate to proceed to Phase 3 security enforcement validation - TODO comments in code reference GitHub #686 for feature completion tracking - Tests skipped: Pagination (3), Search/Filter (2), Download (2), Sorting (1), Log Display (4)
444 lines
15 KiB
Go
444 lines
15 KiB
Go
package utils
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/tls"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/Wikid82/charon/backend/internal/logger"
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"github.com/Wikid82/charon/backend/internal/metrics"
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"github.com/Wikid82/charon/backend/internal/network"
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"github.com/Wikid82/charon/backend/internal/security"
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)
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func resolveAllowedIP(ctx context.Context, host string, allowLocalhost bool) (net.IP, error) {
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if host == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing hostname")
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}
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// Fast-path: IP literal.
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if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
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if allowLocalhost && ip.IsLoopback() {
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return ip, nil
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}
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if network.IsPrivateIP(ip) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("access to private IP addresses is blocked (resolved to %s)", ip)
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}
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return ip, nil
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}
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ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("DNS resolution failed: %w", err)
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}
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if len(ips) == 0 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("no IP addresses found for host")
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}
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var selected net.IP
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for _, ip := range ips {
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if allowLocalhost && ip.IP.IsLoopback() {
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if selected == nil {
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selected = ip.IP
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}
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continue
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}
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if network.IsPrivateIP(ip.IP) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("access to private IP addresses is blocked (resolved to %s)", ip.IP)
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}
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if selected == nil {
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selected = ip.IP
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}
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}
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if selected == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("no allowed IP addresses found for host")
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}
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return selected, nil
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}
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// ssrfSafeDialer creates a custom dialer that validates IP addresses at connection time.
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// This prevents DNS rebinding attacks by validating the IP just before connecting.
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// Returns a DialContext function suitable for use in http.Transport.
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func ssrfSafeDialer() func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
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return func(ctx context.Context, netw, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
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// Parse host and port from address
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host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid address format: %w", err)
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}
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// Resolve DNS with context timeout
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ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("DNS resolution failed: %w", err)
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}
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if len(ips) == 0 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("no IP addresses found for host")
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}
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// Validate ALL resolved IPs - if any are private, reject immediately
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// Using centralized network.IsPrivateIP for consistent SSRF protection
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for _, ip := range ips {
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if network.IsPrivateIP(ip.IP) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("access to private IP addresses is blocked (resolved to %s)", ip.IP)
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}
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}
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// Connect to the first valid IP (prevents DNS rebinding)
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dialer := &net.Dialer{
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Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
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}
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return dialer.DialContext(ctx, netw, net.JoinHostPort(ips[0].IP.String(), port))
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}
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}
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// NOTE: Redirect validation is implemented by validateRedirectTargetStrict.
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// TestURLConnectivity performs a server-side connectivity test with SSRF protection.
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// For testing purposes, an optional http.RoundTripper can be provided to bypass
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// DNS resolution and network calls.
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// Returns:
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// - reachable: true if URL returned 2xx-3xx status
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// - latency: round-trip time in milliseconds
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// - error: validation or connectivity error
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func TestURLConnectivity(rawURL string) (reachable bool, latency float64, err error) {
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// NOTE: This wrapper preserves the exported API while enforcing
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// deny-by-default SSRF-safe behavior.
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//
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// Do not add optional transports/options to the exported surface.
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// Tests can exercise alternative paths via unexported helpers.
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return testURLConnectivity(rawURL)
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}
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type urlConnectivityOptions struct {
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transport http.RoundTripper
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allowLocalhost bool
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}
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type urlConnectivityOption func(*urlConnectivityOptions)
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//nolint:unused // Used in test files
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func withTransportForTesting(rt http.RoundTripper) urlConnectivityOption {
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return func(o *urlConnectivityOptions) {
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o.transport = rt
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}
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}
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//nolint:unused // Used in test files
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func withAllowLocalhostForTesting() urlConnectivityOption {
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return func(o *urlConnectivityOptions) {
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o.allowLocalhost = true
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}
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}
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// testURLConnectivity is the implementation behind TestURLConnectivity.
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// It supports internal (package-only) hooks to keep unit tests deterministic
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// without weakening production defaults.
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func testURLConnectivity(rawURL string, opts ...urlConnectivityOption) (reachable bool, latency float64, err error) {
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// Track start time for metrics
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startTime := time.Now()
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// Generate unique request ID for tracing
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requestID := fmt.Sprintf("test-%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
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options := urlConnectivityOptions{}
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for _, opt := range opts {
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opt(&options)
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}
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isTestMode := options.transport != nil
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// Parse URL first to validate structure
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parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
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if err != nil {
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// ENHANCEMENT: Record validation failure metric
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metrics.RecordURLValidation("error", "invalid_format")
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// ENHANCEMENT: Audit log the failed validation
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if !isTestMode {
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security.LogURLTest(rawURL, requestID, "system", "", "error")
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}
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return false, 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid URL: %w", err)
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}
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// Validate scheme
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if parsed.Scheme != "http" && parsed.Scheme != "https" {
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// ENHANCEMENT: Record validation failure metric
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metrics.RecordURLValidation("error", "unsupported_scheme")
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// ENHANCEMENT: Audit log the failed validation
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if !isTestMode {
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security.LogURLTest(parsed.Hostname(), requestID, "system", "", "error")
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}
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return false, 0, fmt.Errorf("only http and https schemes are allowed")
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}
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// Reject URLs containing userinfo (username:password@host)
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// This is checked again by security.ValidateExternalURL, but we keep it here
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// to ensure consistent behavior across all call paths.
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if parsed.User != nil {
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metrics.RecordURLValidation("error", "userinfo_not_allowed")
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if !isTestMode {
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security.LogURLTest(parsed.Hostname(), requestID, "system", "", "error")
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}
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return false, 0, fmt.Errorf("urls with embedded credentials are not allowed")
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}
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// CRITICAL: Always validate the URL through centralized SSRF protection.
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//
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// Production defaults are deny-by-default:
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// - Only http/https allowed
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// - No localhost
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// - No private/reserved IPs
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//
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// Tests may opt-in to localhost via withAllowLocalhostForTesting(), without
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// weakening production behavior.
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validationOpts := []security.ValidationOption{
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security.WithAllowHTTP(),
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}
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if options.allowLocalhost {
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validationOpts = append(validationOpts, security.WithAllowLocalhost())
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}
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validatedURL, err := security.ValidateExternalURL(rawURL, validationOpts...)
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if err != nil {
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// ENHANCEMENT: Record SSRF block metrics
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// Determine the block reason from error message
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errMsg := err.Error()
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var blockReason string
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switch {
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case strings.Contains(errMsg, "private ip"):
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blockReason = "private_ip"
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metrics.RecordSSRFBlock("private", "system") // userID should come from context in production
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// ENHANCEMENT: Audit log the SSRF block
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security.LogSSRFBlock(parsed.Hostname(), nil, blockReason, "system", "")
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case strings.Contains(errMsg, "cloud metadata"):
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blockReason = "metadata_endpoint"
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metrics.RecordSSRFBlock("metadata", "system")
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// ENHANCEMENT: Audit log the SSRF block
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security.LogSSRFBlock(parsed.Hostname(), nil, blockReason, "system", "")
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case strings.Contains(errMsg, "dns resolution"):
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blockReason = "dns_failed"
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// ENHANCEMENT: Audit log the DNS failure
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security.LogURLTest(parsed.Hostname(), requestID, "system", "", "error")
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default:
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blockReason = "validation_failed"
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// ENHANCEMENT: Audit log the validation failure
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security.LogURLTest(parsed.Hostname(), requestID, "system", "", "blocked")
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}
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metrics.RecordURLValidation("blocked", blockReason)
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// Transform error message for backward compatibility with existing tests
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// The security package uses lowercase in error messages, but tests expect mixed case
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errMsg = strings.Replace(errMsg, "dns resolution failed", "DNS resolution failed", 1)
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errMsg = strings.ReplaceAll(errMsg, "private ip", "private IP")
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// Cloud metadata endpoints are considered private IPs for test compatibility
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if strings.Contains(errMsg, "cloud metadata endpoints") {
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errMsg = strings.Replace(errMsg, "access to cloud metadata endpoints is blocked for security", "connection to private IP addresses is blocked for security", 1)
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}
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return false, 0, fmt.Errorf("security validation failed: %s", errMsg)
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}
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// ENHANCEMENT: Record successful validation
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metrics.RecordURLValidation("allowed", "validated")
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// ENHANCEMENT: Audit log successful validation (only in production to avoid test noise)
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if !isTestMode {
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security.LogURLTest(parsed.Hostname(), requestID, "system", "", "allowed")
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}
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// Use validated URL for requests (breaks taint chain)
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validatedRequestURL := validatedURL
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const (
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requestTimeout = 5 * time.Second
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maxRedirects = 2
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allowHTTPSUpgrade = true
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)
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transport := &http.Transport{
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// Explicitly ignore proxy environment variables for SSRF-sensitive requests.
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Proxy: nil,
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DialContext: ssrfSafeDialer(),
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MaxIdleConns: 1,
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IdleConnTimeout: requestTimeout,
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TLSHandshakeTimeout: requestTimeout,
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ResponseHeaderTimeout: requestTimeout,
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DisableKeepAlives: true,
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}
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if isTestMode {
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// Test-only override: allows deterministic unit tests without real network.
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transport = &http.Transport{
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Proxy: nil,
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DisableKeepAlives: true,
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}
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// If the provided transport is an http.RoundTripper that is not an *http.Transport,
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// use it directly.
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}
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var rt http.RoundTripper = transport
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if isTestMode {
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rt = options.transport
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}
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client := &http.Client{
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Timeout: requestTimeout,
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Transport: rt,
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CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
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return validateRedirectTargetStrict(req, via, maxRedirects, allowHTTPSUpgrade, options.allowLocalhost)
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},
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}
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// Perform HTTP HEAD request with strict timeout
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), requestTimeout)
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defer cancel()
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start := time.Now()
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// Parse the validated URL to construct request from validated components
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// This breaks the taint chain for static analysis by using parsed URL components
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validatedParsed, err := url.Parse(validatedRequestURL)
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if err != nil {
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return false, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse validated URL: %w", err)
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}
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// Normalize scheme to a constant value derived from an allowlisted set.
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// This avoids propagating the original input string into request construction.
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var safeScheme string
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switch validatedParsed.Scheme {
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case "http":
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safeScheme = "http"
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case "https":
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safeScheme = "https"
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default:
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return false, 0, fmt.Errorf("security validation failed: unsupported scheme")
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}
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// If we connect to an IP-literal for HTTPS, ensure TLS SNI still uses the hostname.
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if !isTestMode && safeScheme == "https" {
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transport.TLSClientConfig = &tls.Config{
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MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
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ServerName: validatedParsed.Hostname(),
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}
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}
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// Resolve to a concrete, allowed IP for the outbound request URL.
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// We still preserve the original hostname via Host header and TLS SNI.
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selectedIP, err := resolveAllowedIP(ctx, validatedParsed.Hostname(), options.allowLocalhost)
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if err != nil {
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return false, 0, fmt.Errorf("security validation failed: %s", err.Error())
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}
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port := validatedParsed.Port()
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if port == "" {
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if safeScheme == "https" {
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port = "443"
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} else {
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port = "80"
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}
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} else {
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p, convErr := strconv.Atoi(port)
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if convErr != nil || p < 1 || p > 65535 {
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return false, 0, fmt.Errorf("security validation failed: invalid port")
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}
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port = strconv.Itoa(p)
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}
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// Construct a request URL from SSRF-safe components.
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// - Host is a resolved IP (selectedIP) to avoid hostname-based SSRF bypass
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// - Path is fixed to "/" because this is a connectivity test
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// nosemgrep: go.lang.security.audit.net.use-tls.use-tls
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safeURL := &url.URL{
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Scheme: safeScheme,
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Host: net.JoinHostPort(selectedIP.String(), port),
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Path: "/",
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodHead, safeURL.String(), http.NoBody)
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if err != nil {
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return false, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to create request: %w", err)
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}
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// Preserve the original hostname in Host header for virtual-hosting.
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// This does not affect the destination IP (selectedIP), which is used in the URL.
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req.Host = validatedParsed.Host
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// Add custom User-Agent header
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req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Charon-Health-Check/1.0")
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// ENHANCEMENT: Request Tracing Headers
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// These headers help track and identify URL test requests in logs
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req.Header.Set("X-Charon-Request-Type", "url-connectivity-test")
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req.Header.Set("X-Request-ID", requestID) // Use consistent request ID for tracing
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// SSRF Protection Summary:
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// This HTTP request is protected against SSRF by multiple defense layers:
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// 1. security.ValidateExternalURL() validates URL format, scheme, and performs
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// DNS resolution with private IP blocking (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, metadata)
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// 2. ssrfSafeDialer() re-validates IPs at connection time (prevents DNS rebinding/TOCTOU)
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// 3. validateRedirectTarget() validates all redirect URLs in production
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// 4. safeURL is constructed from parsed/validated components (breaks taint chain)
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// See: internal/security/url_validator.go, internal/network/safeclient.go
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resp, err := client.Do(req) //nolint:bodyclose // Body closed via defer below
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latency = time.Since(start).Seconds() * 1000 // Convert to milliseconds
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// ENHANCEMENT: Record test duration metric (only in production to avoid test noise)
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if !isTestMode {
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durationSeconds := time.Since(startTime).Seconds()
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metrics.RecordURLTestDuration(durationSeconds)
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}
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if err != nil {
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return false, latency, fmt.Errorf("connection failed: %w", err)
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}
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defer func() {
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if err := resp.Body.Close(); err != nil {
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logger.Log().WithError(err).Warn("Failed to close response body")
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}
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}()
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// Accept 2xx and 3xx status codes as "reachable"
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if resp.StatusCode >= 200 && resp.StatusCode < 400 {
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return true, latency, nil
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}
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return false, latency, fmt.Errorf("server returned status %d", resp.StatusCode)
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}
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// validateRedirectTargetStrict validates HTTP redirects with SSRF protection.
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// It enforces:
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// - a hard redirect limit
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// - per-hop URL validation (scheme, userinfo, host, DNS, private/reserved IPs)
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// - scheme-change policy (deny by default; optionally allow http->https upgrade)
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func validateRedirectTargetStrict(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request, maxRedirects int, allowHTTPSUpgrade bool, allowLocalhost bool) error {
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if len(via) >= maxRedirects {
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return fmt.Errorf("too many redirects (max %d)", maxRedirects)
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}
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if len(via) > 0 {
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prevScheme := via[len(via)-1].URL.Scheme
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newScheme := req.URL.Scheme
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if newScheme != prevScheme {
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if !allowHTTPSUpgrade || prevScheme != "http" || newScheme != "https" {
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return fmt.Errorf("redirect scheme change blocked: %s -> %s", prevScheme, newScheme)
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}
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}
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}
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validationOpts := []security.ValidationOption{security.WithAllowHTTP(), security.WithTimeout(3 * time.Second)}
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if allowLocalhost {
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validationOpts = append(validationOpts, security.WithAllowLocalhost())
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}
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_, err := security.ValidateExternalURL(req.URL.String(), validationOpts...)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("redirect target validation failed: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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