Charon/docs/plans/current_spec.md

Fresh Install Bug Investigation — Comprehensive Plan

Date: 2026-03-17 Source: Community user bug report (see docs/plans/chores.md) Confidence Score: 85% — High certainty based on code analysis; some issues require runtime reproduction to confirm edge cases.

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1. Executive Summary

A community user performed a clean start / fresh installation of Charon and reported 7 bugs. After thorough code analysis, the findings are:

#	Issue	Classification	Severity
1	Missing database values before CrowdSec enabling	LIKELY BUG	Medium
2	CrowdSec requires CLI register before enrollment	BY DESIGN (auto-handled)	Low
3	UI bugs on first enabling CrowdSec	LIKELY BUG	Medium
4	"Required value" error when enabling CrowdSec	CONFIRMED BUG	Medium
5	Monitor TCP port — UI can't add	LIKELY BUG	Medium
6	HTTP always down but HTTPS okay	CONFIRMED BUG	High
7	Security blocked local connection to private IP	BY DESIGN (with UX gap)	Medium

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2. Detailed Investigation

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Issue 1: Missing Database Values Before CrowdSec Enabling

User report: "some database missing values — i think before crowdsec enabling"

Files Examined

• backend/internal/models/security_config.go — SecurityConfig model definition
• backend/internal/models/setting.go — Setting key-value model
• backend/internal/api/routes/routes.go (L93-L120) — AutoMigrate call
• backend/internal/api/handlers/security_handler.go (L69-L215) — GetStatus handler
• backend/cmd/seed/main.go — Seed data (dev only)

Root Cause Analysis

On a fresh install:

1. SecurityConfig table is auto-migrated but has NO seed row. GORM AutoMigrate creates the table schema but does not insert default rows. The SecurityConfig model has no GORM default: tags on key fields like CrowdSecMode, WAFMode, or RateLimitMode — they start as Go zero values (empty strings for strings, false for bools, 0 for ints).

2. GetStatus handler gracefully handles missing SecurityConfig — it queries WHERE name = 'default' and if not found, falls back to static config defaults. However, the settings table is completely empty on a fresh install because no settings are seeded. The handler reads settings like feature.cerberus.enabled, security.crowdsec.enabled, etc. via raw SQL — these return empty results, so the fallback chain works but returns all-disabled state.

3. The Start handler in crowdsec_handler.go creates a SecurityConfig row on first enable (line 466-475), but only when the user toggles CrowdSec on. Before that point, the DB has no security_configs row at all.

4. Fields like WAFParanoiaLevel have gorm:"default:1" but most fields don't. On a fresh install, if any code reads SecurityConfig expecting populated defaults (e.g., crowdsec_api_url), it gets empty strings.

Key issue: The crowdsecPowerMutation in Security.tsx calls updateSetting('security.crowdsec.enabled', 'true', ...) before calling startCrowdsec(). The updateSetting call uses UpdateSettingRequest which has binding:"required" on Value. The value "true" satisfies this. However, no SecurityConfig row exists yet — the Start handler creates it. The sequence is:

1. Frontend calls updateSetting — creates/updates a setting row ✓
2. Frontend calls startCrowdsec() — backend Start handler creates SecurityConfig OR updates existing one ✓

This works, but the GetStatus handler returns stale/empty data between step 1 and step 2 because the optimistic update in the frontend doesn't account for the SecurityConfig not existing yet.

Classification: LIKELY BUG

The system functionally works but returns confusing intermediate states during the first enable sequence. The missing SecurityConfig row and absence of seeded settings means the /security/status endpoint returns an all-empty/disabled state until the user explicitly toggles something.

Proposed Fix

1. Add a database seed step to the main application startup (not just the dev seed tool) that ensures a default SecurityConfig row exists with sensible defaults:

   // In routes.go or main.go after AutoMigrate
   var cfg models.SecurityConfig
   if err := db.Where("name = ?", "default").FirstOrCreate(&cfg, models.SecurityConfig{
       UUID:           "default",
       Name:           "default",
       Enabled:        false,
       CrowdSecMode:   "disabled",
       WAFMode:        "disabled",
       RateLimitMode:  "disabled",
       CrowdSecAPIURL: "http://127.0.0.1:8085",
   }).Error; err != nil {
       log.Warn("Failed to seed default SecurityConfig")
   }
   

2. Add default setting rows for feature flags (feature.cerberus.enabled, etc.) during startup.

---

Issue 2: CrowdSec Still Needs CLI Register Before Enrollment

User report: "crowdsec still needs cli register before you can enroll"

Files Examined

• backend/internal/crowdsec/console_enroll.go (L250-L330) — ensureCAPIRegistered() and checkLAPIAvailable()
• backend/internal/api/handlers/crowdsec_handler.go (L1262-L1360) — ConsoleEnroll handler
• backend/internal/api/handlers/crowdsec_handler.go (L458-L581) — Start handler (bouncer registration)

Root Cause Analysis

The enrollment flow already handles CAPI registration automatically:

1. ConsoleEnroll handler calls h.Console.Enroll(ctx, …)
2. Enroll() calls s.checkLAPIAvailable(ctx) — verifies LAPI is running (retries 5x with exponential backoff, ~45s total)
3. Enroll() calls s.ensureCAPIRegistered(ctx) — checks for online_api_credentials.yaml and runs cscli capi register if missing
4. Then runs cscli console enroll --name <agent> <token>

The auto-registration IS implemented. However, the user may have encountered:

• Timing issue: If CrowdSec was just started, LAPI may not be ready yet. The checkLAPIAvailable retries for ~45s, but if the user triggered enrollment immediately after starting CrowdSec, the timeout may have expired.
• Feature flag: Console enrollment is behind FEATURE_CROWDSEC_CONSOLE_ENROLLMENT feature flag, which defaults to disabled (false). The isConsoleEnrollmentEnabled() method returns false unless explicitly enabled via DB setting or env var. Without this flag, the enrollment endpoint returns 404.
• Error messaging: If CAPI registration fails, the error message might be confusing, leading the user to think they need to manually run cscli capi register.

Classification: BY DESIGN (with potential UX gap)

The auto-registration logic exists and works. The feature flag being off by default means the user likely tried to enroll via the console enrollment UI (which is hidden/unavailable) and ended up using the CLI instead. If they tried via the exposed bouncer registration endpoint, that's a different flow — CAPI registration is only auto-triggered by the console enrollment path, not the bouncer registration path.

Proposed Fix

1. Improve error messaging when LAPI check times out during enrollment
2. Consider auto-running cscli capi register during the Start handler (not just during enrollment)
3. Document the enrollment flow more clearly for users

---

Issue 3: UI Bugs on First Enabling CrowdSec

User report: "ui bugs on first enabling crowdsec"

Files Examined

• frontend/src/pages/Security.tsx (L168-L229) — crowdsecPowerMutation
• frontend/src/pages/Security.tsx (L440-L452) — CrowdSec toggle Switch
• frontend/src/pages/CrowdSecConfig.tsx (L1-L100) — CrowdSec config page
• frontend/src/components/CrowdSecKeyWarning.tsx — Key warning component

Root Cause Analysis

When CrowdSec is first enabled on a fresh install, several things happen in sequence:

1. crowdsecPowerMutation calls updateSetting('security.crowdsec.enabled', 'true', ...)
2. Then calls startCrowdsec() which takes 10-60 seconds
3. Then calls statusCrowdsec() to verify
4. If LAPI ready, ensureBouncerRegistration() runs on the backend
5. onSuccess callback invalidates queries

During this ~30s window:

• The toggle should show loading state, but the Switch component reads crowdsecStatus?.running ?? status.crowdsec.enabled — if crowdsecStatus is stale (from the initial useEffect fetch), the toggle may flicker.
• The CrowdSecConfig page polls LAPI status every 5 seconds — on first enable, this will show "not running" until LAPI finishes starting.
• The CrowdSecKeyWarning component checks key status — on first enable, no bouncer key exists yet, potentially triggering warnings.
• ConfigReloadOverlay shows when isApplyingConfig is true, but the CrowdSec start operation takes significantly longer than typical config operations.

Specific bugs likely seen:

• Toggle flickering between checked/unchecked as different queries return at different times
• Stale "disabled" status shown while CrowdSec is actually starting
• Bouncer key warning appearing briefly before registration completes
• Console enrollment section showing "LAPI not ready" errors

Classification: LIKELY BUG

The async nature of CrowdSec startup (10-60s) combined with multiple independent polling queries creates a poor UX during the first-enable flow.

Proposed Fix

1. Add a dedicated "starting" state to the CrowdSec toggle — show a spinner/loading indicator for the full duration of the start operation
2. Suppress CrowdSecKeyWarning while a start operation is in progress
3. Debounce the LAPI status polling to avoid showing transient "not ready" states
4. Use the mutation's isPending state to disable all CrowdSec-related UI interactions during startup

---

Issue 4: "Required Value" Error When Enabling CrowdSec

User report: "enabling crowdsec throws ui 'required value' error but enables okay"

Files Examined

• frontend/src/pages/Security.tsx (L100-L155) — toggleServiceMutation
• frontend/src/pages/Security.tsx (L168-L182) — crowdsecPowerMutation
• backend/internal/api/handlers/settings_handler.go (L115-L120) — UpdateSettingRequest struct
• frontend/src/api/settings.ts (L27-L29) — updateSetting function

Root Cause Analysis

This is a confirmed bug caused by Gin's binding:"required" validation tag on the Value field:

type UpdateSettingRequest struct {
    Key      string `json:"key" binding:"required"`
    Value    string `json:"value" binding:"required"`
    Category string `json:"category"`
    Type     string `json:"type"`
}

The crowdsecPowerMutation calls:

await updateSetting('security.crowdsec.enabled', enabled ? 'true' : 'false', 'security', 'bool')

When enabled is true, the value "true" satisfies binding:"required". So the direct CrowdSec toggle shouldn't fail here.

The actual bug path: The crowdsecPowerMutation calls updateSetting and then startCrowdsec(). The startCrowdsec() triggers the backend Start handler which internally creates/updates settings. If there's a race condition where the frontend also calls a related updateSetting with an empty value (e.g., a cascading toggle for an uninitialized setting), Gin's binding:"required" treats empty string "" as missing for string fields, producing a validation error.

Broader problem: Any code path that calls updateSetting with an empty value (e.g., clearing an admin whitelist, resetting a configuration) triggers this validation error. This is incorrect — an empty string is a valid value for a setting.

Classification: CONFIRMED BUG

The binding:"required" tag on Value in UpdateSettingRequest means any attempt to set a setting to an empty string "" will fail with a "required" validation error. This is incorrect — empty string is a valid value.

Proposed Fix

Remove binding:"required" from the Value field:

type UpdateSettingRequest struct {
    Key      string `json:"key" binding:"required"`
    Value    string `json:"value"` // Empty string is valid
    Category string `json:"category"`
    Type     string `json:"type"`
}

If value must not be empty for specific keys, add key-specific validation in the handler logic.

Reproduction Steps

1. Fresh install of Charon
2. Navigate to Security dashboard
3. Enable Cerberus (master toggle)
4. Toggle CrowdSec ON
5. Observe toast error containing "required" or "required value"
6. Despite the error, CrowdSec still starts successfully

---

Issue 5: Monitor TCP Port — UI Can't Add

User report: "monitor tcp port ui can't add"

Files Examined

• frontend/src/pages/Uptime.tsx (L342-L500) — CreateMonitorModal
• frontend/src/api/uptime.ts (L80-L97) — createMonitor API
• backend/internal/api/handlers/uptime_handler.go (L30-L60) — CreateMonitorRequest and Create handler
• backend/internal/services/uptime_service.go (L1083-L1140) — CreateMonitor service method

Root Cause Analysis

The frontend CreateMonitorModal supports TCP:

const [type, setType] = useState<'http' | 'tcp'>('http');
// ...
<option value="tcp">{t('uptime.monitorTypeTcp')}</option>

The backend validates:

Type string `json:"type" binding:"required,oneof=http tcp https"`

And TCP format validation:

if monitorType == "tcp" {
    if _, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(urlStr); err != nil {
        return nil, fmt.Errorf("TCP URL must be in host:port format: %w", err)
    }
}

Possible issues:

1. The URL placeholder may not update when TCP is selected — user enters http://... format instead of host:port
2. No client-side format validation that changes based on type
3. The backend error message about host:port format may not surface clearly through the API error chain

Classification: LIKELY BUG

The i18n placeholder string urlPlaceholder is "https://example.com or tcp://host:port". The tcp:// scheme prefix is misleading — the backend's net.SplitHostPort() expects raw host:port (no scheme). A user following the placeholder guidance would submit tcp://192.168.1.1:8080, which fails SplitHostPort parsing because the :// syntax is not a valid host:port format. This is the likely root cause.

Proposed Fix

1. Fix the i18n translation string in frontend/src/locales/en/translation.json: change "urlPlaceholder" from "https://example.com or tcp://host:port" to "https://example.com or host:port" (removing the misleading tcp:// scheme)
2. Update URL placeholder dynamically: placeholder={type === 'tcp' ? '192.168.1.1:8080' : 'https://example.com'}
3. Add helper text below URL field explaining expected format per type
4. Add client-side format validation before submission

---

Issue 6: HTTP Always Down but HTTPS Okay

User report: "http always down but https okay"

Files Examined

• backend/internal/services/uptime_service.go (L727-L810) — checkMonitor method
• backend/internal/security/url_validator.go (L169-L300) — ValidateExternalURL
• backend/internal/network/safeclient.go (L1-L113) — IsPrivateIP, NewSafeHTTPClient

Root Cause Analysis

CONFIRMED BUG caused by SSRF protection blocking private IP addresses for HTTP monitors.

In checkMonitor, HTTP/HTTPS monitors go through:

case "http", "https":
    validatedURL, err := security.ValidateExternalURL(
        monitor.URL,
        security.WithAllowLocalhost(),
        security.WithAllowHTTP(),
        security.WithTimeout(3*time.Second),
    )

Then use:

client := network.NewSafeHTTPClient(
    network.WithTimeout(10*time.Second),
    network.WithDialTimeout(5*time.Second),
    network.WithMaxRedirects(0),
    network.WithAllowLocalhost(),
)

Critical path:

1. ValidateExternalURL resolves the monitor's hostname via DNS
2. It checks ALL resolved IPs against network.IsPrivateIP()
3. IsPrivateIP blocks RFC 1918 ranges: 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16
4. WithAllowLocalhost() only allows 127.0.0.1, localhost, ::1 — does NOT allow private IPs

If the monitor URL resolves to a private IP (common for self-hosted services), ValidateExternalURL blocks the connection with: "connection to private ip addresses is blocked for security".

Why HTTPS works but HTTP doesn't: The user's HTTPS monitors likely point to public domains (via external DNS/CDN) that resolve to public IPs. HTTP monitors target private upstream IPs directly (e.g., http://192.168.1.100:8080), which fail the SSRF check.

Meanwhile, TCP monitors use raw net.DialTimeout("tcp", ...) with NO SSRF protection at all — they bypass the entire validation chain.

Note: The PR should add a code comment in uptime_service.go at the TCP net.DialTimeout call site acknowledging this deliberate SSRF bypass. TCP monitors currently only accept admin-configured host:port (no URL parsing, no redirects), so the SSRF attack surface is minimal. If SSRF validation is added to TCP in the future, it must also respect WithAllowRFC1918().

Classification: CONFIRMED BUG

Uptime monitoring for self-hosted services on private networks is fundamentally broken by SSRF protection. The WithAllowLocalhost() option is insufficient — it only allows 127.0.0.1/localhost, not the RFC 1918 ranges that self-hosted services use.

Proposed Fix

Add a WithAllowRFC1918() option for admin-configured uptime monitors that selectively unblocks only RFC 1918 private ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16) while keeping cloud metadata (169.254.169.254), link-local, loopback, and reserved ranges blocked.

Dual-layer fix required — both the URL validation and the safe dialer must be updated:

Layer 1: url_validator.go — Add WithAllowRFC1918() validation option:

// In checkMonitor:
validatedURL, err := security.ValidateExternalURL(
    monitor.URL,
    security.WithAllowLocalhost(),
    security.WithAllowHTTP(),
    security.WithAllowRFC1918(), // NEW: Only unblocks 10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16
    security.WithTimeout(3*time.Second),
)

Layer 2: safeclient.go — Add AllowRFC1918 to ClientOptions and respect it in safeDialer:

// In ClientOptions:
AllowRFC1918 bool // Permits connections to RFC 1918 private IPs only

// New option constructor:
func WithAllowRFC1918() Option {
    return func(opts *ClientOptions) {
        opts.AllowRFC1918 = true
    }
}

// In safeDialer, before IsPrivateIP check:
if opts.AllowRFC1918 && isRFC1918(ip.IP) {
    continue // Allow RFC 1918, still block link-local/metadata/reserved
}

// In NewSafeHTTPClient call in checkMonitor:
client := network.NewSafeHTTPClient(
    network.WithTimeout(10*time.Second),
    network.WithDialTimeout(5*time.Second),
    network.WithMaxRedirects(0),
    network.WithAllowLocalhost(),
    network.WithAllowRFC1918(), // NEW: Must match URL validator layer
)

Without the safeDialer fix, connections pass URL validation but are still blocked at dial time. Both layers must allow RFC 1918.

This is safe because uptime monitors are admin-configured only — they require authentication. SSRF protection's purpose is to prevent untrusted user-initiated requests to internal services, not admin-configured health checks. Cloud metadata and link-local remain blocked even with this option.

Reproduction Steps

1. Fresh install of Charon
2. Add a proxy host pointing to a local service (e.g., 192.168.1.100:8080)
3. Monitor auto-creates with http://yourdomain.local
4. Monitor status shows "down" with SSRF error
5. HTTPS monitor to a public domain succeeds

---

Issue 7: Security Blocked Local Connection to Private IP

User report: "security blocked local connection to private ip — status in db just noticed randomly"

Files Examined

• backend/internal/network/safeclient.go (L22-L55) — privateCIDRs list
• backend/internal/network/safeclient.go (L74-L113) — IsPrivateIP function
• backend/internal/security/url_validator.go (L169-L300) — ValidateExternalURL
• backend/internal/services/uptime_service.go (L727-L810) — checkMonitor

Root Cause Analysis

Direct consequence of Issue 6. The SSRF protection blocks ALL RFC 1918 private IP ranges, plus loopback, link-local, and reserved ranges. This protection is applied at:

1. URL Validation (ValidateExternalURL) — blocks at URL validation time
2. Safe Dialer (safeDialer) — blocks at DNS resolution / connection time

The user noticed in the database because:

• The uptime monitor's status field shows "down"
• The heartbeat message stores the SSRF rejection error
• This status persists in the database and is visible through the monitoring UI

Classification: BY DESIGN (with UX gap)

The SSRF protection is correctly implemented for security. However, the application needs to differentiate between:

1. External user-initiated URLs (webhooks, notification endpoints) — MUST block private IPs
2. Admin-configured monitoring targets — SHOULD allow private IPs (trusted, intentional configs)

Proposed Fix

Same as Issue 6 — introduce WithAllowRFC1918() for admin-configured monitoring (both url_validator.go and safeclient.go layers). Additionally:

1. Add a clear UI message when a monitor is down due to SSRF protection
2. Log the specific blocked IP and reason for admin debugging

---

3. Reproduction Steps Summary

Fresh Install Test Sequence

1. Deploy Charon from a clean image (no existing database)
2. Complete initial setup (create admin user)
3. Navigate to Security dashboard

Issue 1: Check Network tab → GET /api/v1/security/status — verify response has populated defaults

Issue 4: Enable Cerberus → Toggle CrowdSec ON → Watch for "required" error toast

Issue 3: During CrowdSec start (~30s), observe UI for flickering/stale states

Issue 5: Uptime → Add Monitor → Select TCP → Enter 192.168.1.1:8080 → Submit

Issues 6 & 7: Add proxy host to private IP → Wait for auto-sync → Check HTTP monitor status

---

4. Implementation Plan

Phase 1: Playwright E2E Tests

Test	File	Description
Fresh security dashboard loads	tests/security/fresh-install.spec.ts	Verify status endpoint returns valid defaults on empty DB
CrowdSec enable flow completes	tests/security/fresh-install.spec.ts	Toggle CrowdSec on, verify no validation errors
Setting update with empty value	tests/security/fresh-install.spec.ts	Verify setting can be cleared
TCP monitor creation	tests/uptime/create-monitor.spec.ts	Create TCP monitor via UI
HTTP monitor for private IP	tests/uptime/private-ip-monitor.spec.ts	Create HTTP monitor for private IP, verify it connects
TCP placeholder updates dynamically	tests/uptime/create-monitor.spec.ts	Verify placeholder changes when switching to TCP type

Phase 1b: Backend Unit Tests

Test	File	Description
UpdateSettingRequest with empty value	settings_handler_test.go	Verify empty string "" is accepted for Value field (Issue 4)
TCP monitor with private IP	uptime_service_test.go	Regression: if SSRF is added to TCP later, private IPs must still work
Cloud metadata blocked with RFC 1918 allowed	safeclient_test.go	169.254.169.254 remains blocked even when AllowRFC1918 = true
safeDialer with RFC 1918 allowance	safeclient_test.go	Dial to 10.x.x.x succeeds with AllowRFC1918, dial to 169.254.x.x fails
ValidateExternalURL with RFC 1918	url_validator_test.go	RFC 1918 IPs pass validation; link-local/metadata still rejected

Phase 2: Backend Fixes

PR-1: Fix binding:"required" on Setting Value (Issue 4)

• Files: settings_handler.go, tests
• Validation: go test ./backend/internal/api/handlers/... -run TestUpdateSetting

PR-2: Seed Default SecurityConfig on Startup (Issue 1)

• Files: routes.go or main.go, tests
• Validation: Fresh start → /security/status returns valid defaults

PR-3: Allow RFC 1918 Private IPs for Uptime Monitors (Issues 6 & 7)

• Files: url_validator.go, safeclient.go, uptime_service.go, tests
• Scope: Add WithAllowRFC1918() option to both ValidateExternalURL and NewSafeHTTPClient/safeDialer. Add isRFC1918() helper. Add code comment at TCP net.DialTimeout call site noting deliberate SSRF bypass.
• Validation: HTTP monitor to 192.168.x.x shows "up"; cloud metadata 169.254.169.254 remains blocked

Phase 3: Frontend Fixes

PR-4: CrowdSec Enable UX (Issues 3 & 4)

• Files: Security.tsx, CrowdSecConfig.tsx, CrowdSecKeyWarning.tsx
• Validation: Playwright: CrowdSec toggle smooth, no error toasts

PR-5: Monitor Creation UX for TCP (Issue 5)

• Files: Uptime.tsx, frontend/src/locales/en/translation.json
• Scope: Fix misleading tcp://host:port in i18n placeholder to host:port, add dynamic placeholder per monitor type
• Validation: Playwright: TCP monitor created via UI

Phase 4: Documentation & Integration Testing

• Update Getting Started docs with fresh install notes
• Run full Playwright suite against fresh install

---

5. Commit Slicing Strategy

Decision: Multiple PRs (5 PRs) for safer and faster review.

Trigger reasons:

• Cross-domain changes (backend security, backend settings, frontend)
• Multiple independent fixes with no inter-dependencies
• Each fix is individually testable and rollbackable

Ordered PR Slices

PR	Scope	Files	Dependencies	Validation Gate
PR-1	Fix binding:"required" on Setting Value	settings_handler.go, tests	None	Unit tests pass
PR-2	Seed default SecurityConfig on startup	routes.go/main.go, tests	None	Fresh start returns valid defaults
PR-3	Allow RFC 1918 IPs for uptime monitors (dual-layer)	url_validator.go, safeclient.go, uptime_service.go, tests	None	HTTP monitor to RFC 1918 IP works; cloud metadata still blocked
PR-4	CrowdSec enable UX improvements	Security.tsx, CrowdSecConfig.tsx, CrowdSecKeyWarning.tsx	PR-1	Playwright: smooth toggle
PR-5	Monitor creation UX for TCP + i18n fix	Uptime.tsx, translation.json	None	Playwright: TCP creation works

Rollback: Each PR is independently revertable. No DB migrations or schema changes.

---

6. E2E Test Gaps

Test Suite	Covers Fresh Install?	Gap
tests/security/security-dashboard.spec.ts	No	Needs fresh-db variant
tests/security/crowdsec-config.spec.ts	No	Needs first-enable test
tests/uptime/*.spec.ts	Unknown	Needs TCP + private IP tests

---

7. Ancillary File Review

• .gitignore — No changes needed
• codecov.yml — No changes needed
• .dockerignore — No changes needed
• Dockerfile — No changes needed

---

8. Acceptance Criteria

1. Issue 1: /api/v1/security/status returns populated defaults on a fresh database
2. Issue 2: Documented as by-design; enrollment auto-registers CAPI when needed
3. Issue 3: No toggle flickering or transient error states during first CrowdSec enable
4. Issue 4: No "required value" error toast when enabling/disabling modules
5. Issue 5: TCP monitor creation succeeds with host:port format; i18n placeholder no longer includes misleading tcp:// scheme; dynamic placeholder guides user
6. Issue 6: HTTP monitors to private IPs succeed for admin-configured uptime monitors
7. Issue 7: Uptime heartbeat messages do not contain "private IP blocked" errors for admin monitors