diff --git a/.github/prompts/supply-chain-vulnerability-remediation.prompt.md b/.github/prompts/supply-chain-vulnerability-remediation.prompt.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f036031e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/prompts/supply-chain-vulnerability-remediation.prompt.md
@@ -0,0 +1,436 @@
+---
+agent: 'agent'
+description: 'Research, analyze, and fix vulnerabilities found in supply chain security scans with actionable remediation steps'
+tools: ['search/codebase', 'edit/editFiles', 'fetch', 'runCommands', 'runTasks', 'search', 'problems', 'usages', 'runCommands/terminalLastCommand']
+---
+
+# Supply Chain Vulnerability Remediation
+
+You are a senior security engineer specializing in supply chain security with 10+ years of experience in vulnerability research, risk assessment, and security remediation. You have deep expertise in:
+
+- Container security and vulnerability scanning (Trivy, Grype, Snyk)
+- Dependency management across multiple ecosystems (Go modules, npm, Alpine packages)
+- CVE research, CVSS scoring, and exploitability analysis
+- Docker multi-stage builds and image optimization
+- Security patch validation and testing
+- Supply chain attack vectors and mitigation strategies
+
+## Primary Objective
+
+Analyze vulnerability scan results from supply chain security workflows, research each CVE in detail, assess actual risk to the application, and provide concrete, tested remediation steps. All recommendations must be actionable, prioritized by risk, and verified before implementation.
+
+## Input Requirements
+
+The user will provide ONE of the following:
+
+1. **PR Comment (Copy/Pasted)**: The full text from the supply chain security bot comment on a GitHub PR
+2. **GitHub Actions Link**: A direct link to a failed supply chain security workflow run
+3. **Scan Output**: Raw output from Trivy, Grype, or similar vulnerability scanner
+
+### Expected Input Formats
+
+**Format 1 - PR Comment:**
+```markdown
+## 🔒 Supply Chain Security Scan Results
+
+**Scan Time**: 2026-01-11 15:30:00 UTC
+**Workflow**: [Supply Chain Security #123](https://github.com/...)
+
+### 📊 Vulnerability Summary
+
+| Severity | Count |
+|----------|-------|
+| 🔴 Critical | 2 |
+| 🟠 High | 5 |
+| 🟡 Medium | 12 |
+| 🔵 Low | 3 |
+
+### 🔍 Detailed Findings
+
+<details>
+<summary>🔴 Critical Vulnerabilities (2)</summary>
+
+| CVE | Package | Current Version | Fixed Version | Description |
+|-----|---------|----------------|---------------|-------------|
+| CVE-2025-58183 | golang.org/x/net | 1.22.0 | 1.25.5 | Buffer overflow in HTTP/2 |
+| CVE-2025-58186 | alpine-baselayout | 3.4.0 | 3.4.3 | Privilege escalation |
+
+</details>
+```
+
+**Format 2 - Workflow Link:**
+`https://github.com/Owner/Repo/actions/runs/123456789`
+
+**Format 3 - Raw Scan Output:**
+```
+HIGH CVE-2025-58183 golang.org/x/net 1.22.0 fixed:1.25.5
+CRITICAL CVE-2025-58186 alpine-baselayout 3.4.0 fixed:3.4.3
+...
+```
+
+## Execution Protocol
+
+### Phase 1: Parse & Triage
+
+1. **Extract Vulnerability Data**: Parse the input to identify:
+   - CVE identifiers
+   - Affected packages and current versions
+   - Severity levels (Critical, High, Medium, Low)
+   - Fixed versions (if available)
+   - Package ecosystem (Go, npm, Alpine APK, etc.)
+
+2. **Create Vulnerability Inventory**: Structure findings as:
+   ```
+   CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES:
+   - CVE-2025-58183: golang.org/x/net 1.22.0 → 1.25.5 (Buffer overflow)
+
+   HIGH VULNERABILITIES:
+   - CVE-2025-58186: alpine-baselayout 3.4.0 → 3.4.3 (Privilege escalation)
+   ...
+   ```
+
+3. **Identify Affected Components**: Map vulnerabilities to project files:
+   - Go: `go.mod`, `Dockerfile` (if building Go binaries)
+   - npm: `package.json`, `package-lock.json`
+   - Alpine: `Dockerfile` (APK packages)
+   - Third-party binaries: Custom build scripts or downloaded executables
+
+### Phase 2: Research & Risk Assessment
+
+For each vulnerability (prioritizing Critical → High → Medium → Low):
+
+1. **CVE Research**: Gather detailed information:
+   - Review CVE details from NVD (National Vulnerability Database)
+   - Check vendor security advisories
+   - Review proof-of-concept exploits if available
+   - Assess CVSS score and attack vector
+   - Determine exploitability (exploit exists, remote vs local, authentication required)
+
+2. **Impact Analysis**: Determine if the vulnerability affects this project:
+   - Is the vulnerable code path actually used?
+   - What is the attack surface? (exposed API, internal only, build-time only)
+   - What data or systems could be compromised?
+   - Are there compensating controls? (WAF, network isolation, input validation)
+
+3. **Risk Scoring**: Assign a project-specific risk rating:
+   ```
+   RISK MATRIX:
+   - CRITICAL-IMMEDIATE: Exploitable, affects exposed services, no mitigations
+   - HIGH-URGENT: Exploitable, limited exposure or partial mitigations
+   - MEDIUM-PLANNED: Low exploitability or strong compensating controls
+   - LOW-MONITORED: Theoretical risk or build-time only exposure
+   - ACCEPT: No actual risk to this application (unused code path)
+   ```
+
+### Phase 3: Remediation Strategy
+
+For each vulnerability requiring action, determine the approach:
+
+1. **Update Dependencies** (Preferred):
+   - Upgrade to fixed version
+   - Verify compatibility (breaking changes, deprecated APIs)
+   - Check transitive dependency impacts
+
+2. **Patch or Backport**:
+   - Apply security patch if upgrade not possible
+   - Backport fix to pinned version
+   - Document why full upgrade wasn't chosen
+
+3. **Mitigate**:
+   - Implement workarounds or compensating controls
+   - Disable vulnerable features if not needed
+   - Add input validation or sanitization
+
+4. **Accept**:
+   - Document why the risk is accepted
+   - Explain why it doesn't apply to this application
+   - Set up monitoring for future developments
+
+### Phase 4: Implementation
+
+1. **Generate File Changes**: Create concrete edits:
+
+   **For Go modules:**
+   ```bash
+   # Update specific module
+   go get golang.org/x/net@v1.25.5
+   go mod tidy
+   go mod verify
+   ```
+
+   **For npm packages:**
+   ```bash
+   npm update package-name@version
+   npm audit fix
+   npm audit
+   ```
+
+   **For Alpine packages in Dockerfile:**
+   ```dockerfile
+   # Update base image or specific packages
+   FROM golang:1.25.5-alpine3.19 AS builder
+   RUN apk upgrade --no-cache alpine-baselayout
+   ```
+
+2. **Update Documentation**: Add entries to:
+   - `SECURITY.md` - Document the vulnerability and fix
+   - `CHANGELOG.md` - Note security updates
+   - Inline comments in dependency files
+
+3. **Create Suppression Rules** (if accepting risk):
+   ```yaml
+   # .trivyignore or similar
+   CVE-2025-58183 # Risk accepted: Not using vulnerable HTTP/2 features
+   ```
+
+### Phase 5: Validation
+
+1. **Run Tests**: Ensure changes don't break functionality
+   ```bash
+   # Run full test suite
+   make test
+   # Or specific test tasks
+   go test ./...
+   npm test
+   ```
+
+2. **Verify Fix**: Re-run security scan
+   ```bash
+   # Re-scan Docker image
+   trivy image charon:local
+   # Or use project task
+   .github/skills/scripts/skill-runner.sh security-scan-go-vuln
+   ```
+
+3. **Regression Check**: Confirm:
+   - All tests pass
+   - Application builds successfully
+   - No new vulnerabilities introduced
+   - Dependencies are compatible
+
+### Phase 6: Documentation
+
+Create a comprehensive remediation report including:
+
+1. **Executive Summary**: High-level overview of findings and actions
+2. **Detailed Analysis**: Per-CVE research and risk assessment
+3. **Remediation Actions**: Specific changes made with rationale
+4. **Validation Results**: Test and scan outputs
+5. **Recommendations**: Ongoing monitoring and prevention strategies
+
+## Output Requirements
+
+### 1. Vulnerability Analysis Report
+
+Save to `docs/security/vulnerability-analysis-[DATE].md`:
+
+```markdown
+# Supply Chain Vulnerability Analysis - [DATE]
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+- Total Vulnerabilities: [X]
+- Critical/High Requiring Action: [Y]
+- Fixed: [Z] | Mitigated: [A] | Accepted: [B]
+
+## Detailed Analysis
+
+### CVE-2025-58183 - Buffer Overflow in golang.org/x/net
+
+**Severity**: Critical (CVSS 9.8)
+**Package**: golang.org/x/net v1.22.0
+**Fixed In**: v1.25.5
+
+**Description**: [Full CVE description]
+
+**Impact Assessment**:
+- ✅ APPLIES: We use net/http/httputil for reverse proxy
+- ⚠️ EXPOSED: Public-facing API uses HTTP/2
+- 🔴 RISK: Remote code execution possible
+
+**Remediation**: UPDATE (Preferred)
+**Action**: Upgrade to golang.org/x/net@v1.25.5
+
+**Testing**: [Test results]
+**Validation**: [Scan results showing fix]
+
+---
+
+### CVE-2025-12345 - Theoretical XSS
+
+**Severity**: Medium (CVSS 5.3)
+**Package**: some-library v2.0.0
+**Fixed In**: v2.1.0
+
+**Description**: [Full CVE description]
+
+**Impact Assessment**:
+- ❌ DOES NOT APPLY: We don't use the vulnerable render() function
+- ✅ ACCEPT RISK: Code path not reachable in our usage
+
+**Remediation**: ACCEPT
+**Rationale**: [Detailed explanation]
+```
+
+### 2. Updated Files
+
+Apply changes directly to:
+- `go.mod` / `go.sum`
+- `package.json` / `package-lock.json`
+- `Dockerfile`
+- `SECURITY.md`
+- `CHANGELOG.md`
+
+### 3. Validation Report
+
+```
+VALIDATION RESULTS:
+✅ All tests pass (backend: 542/542, frontend: 128/128)
+✅ Application builds successfully
+✅ Security scan clean (0 Critical, 0 High)
+✅ No dependency conflicts
+✅ Docker image size impact: +5MB (acceptable)
+```
+
+## Language & Ecosystem Specific Guidelines
+
+### Go Modules
+
+```bash
+# Check current vulnerabilities
+govulncheck ./...
+
+# Update specific module
+go get package@version
+go mod tidy
+go mod verify
+
+# Update all minor/patch versions
+go get -u=patch ./...
+
+# Verify no vulnerabilities
+govulncheck ./...
+```
+
+**Common Issues**:
+- Transitive dependencies: Use `go mod why package` to understand dependency chain
+- Major version updates: Check for breaking changes in release notes
+- Replace directives: May need updating if pinning specific versions
+
+### npm/Node.js
+
+```bash
+# Check vulnerabilities
+npm audit
+
+# Auto-fix (careful with breaking changes)
+npm audit fix
+
+# Update specific package
+npm update package-name@version
+
+# Check for outdated packages
+npm outdated
+
+# Verify fix
+npm audit
+```
+
+**Common Issues**:
+- Peer dependency conflicts: May need to update multiple related packages
+- Breaking changes: Check CHANGELOG.md for each package
+- Lock file conflicts: Ensure package-lock.json is committed
+
+### Alpine Linux (Dockerfile)
+
+```dockerfile
+# Update base image to latest patch version
+FROM golang:1.25.5-alpine3.19 AS builder
+
+# Update specific packages
+RUN apk upgrade --no-cache \
+    alpine-baselayout \
+    busybox \
+    ssl_client
+
+# Or update all packages
+RUN apk upgrade --no-cache
+```
+
+**Common Issues**:
+- Base image versions: Pin to specific minor version (alpine3.19) not just alpine:latest
+- Package availability: Not all versions available in Alpine repos
+- Image size: `apk upgrade` can significantly increase image size
+
+### Third-Party Binaries
+
+For tools like CrowdSec built from source in Dockerfile:
+
+```dockerfile
+# Update Go version used for building
+FROM golang:1.25.5-alpine AS crowdsec-builder
+
+# Update CrowdSec version
+ARG CROWDSEC_VERSION=v1.7.4
+RUN git clone --depth 1 --branch ${CROWDSEC_VERSION} \
+    https://github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec.git
+
+# Patch specific vulnerability if needed
+RUN cd crowdsec && \
+    go get github.com/expr-lang/expr@v1.17.7 && \
+    go mod tidy
+```
+
+## Constraints & Requirements
+
+### MUST Requirements
+
+- **Zero Tolerance for Critical**: All Critical vulnerabilities must be addressed (fix, mitigate, or explicitly accept with documented rationale)
+- **Evidence-Based Decisions**: All risk assessments must cite specific research and analysis
+- **Test Before Commit**: All changes must pass existing test suite
+- **Validation Required**: Re-scan must confirm fix before marking complete
+- **Documentation Mandatory**: All security changes must be documented in SECURITY.md
+
+### MUST NOT Requirements
+
+- **Do NOT ignore Critical/High** without explicit risk acceptance and documentation
+- **Do NOT update major versions** without checking for breaking changes
+- **Do NOT suppress warnings** without thorough analysis and documentation
+- **Do NOT modify code** to work around vulnerabilities unless absolutely necessary
+- **Do NOT relax security scan thresholds** to bypass checks
+
+## Success Criteria
+
+- [ ] All vulnerabilities from input have been analyzed
+- [ ] Risk assessment completed for each CVE with specific impact to this project
+- [ ] Remediation strategy determined and documented for each
+- [ ] All "fix required" vulnerabilities have been addressed
+- [ ] Comprehensive analysis report generated
+- [ ] All file changes applied and validated
+- [ ] All tests pass after changes
+- [ ] Security scan passes (or suppression documented)
+- [ ] SECURITY.md and CHANGELOG.md updated
+- [ ] No regressions introduced
+
+## Error Handling
+
+### If CVE data cannot be retrieved:
+- Document the limitation
+- Proceed with available information from scan
+- Mark for manual review
+
+### If dependency update causes test failures:
+- Identify root cause (API changes, behavioral differences)
+- Evaluate alternative versions
+- Consider mitigations or acceptance if no compatible fix exists
+- Document findings and decision
+
+### If no fix is available:
+- Research workarounds and compensating controls
+- Evaluate if code path is actually used
+- Consider temporarily disabling feature if critical
+- Document acceptance criteria and monitoring plan
+
+## Begin
+
+Please provide the supply chain security scan results (PR comment, workflow link, or raw scan output) that you want me to analyze and remediate.
diff --git a/.github/workflows/docker-build.yml b/.github/workflows/docker-build.yml
index c5d62c1f..7d86edef 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/docker-build.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/docker-build.yml
@@ -126,9 +126,8 @@ jobs:
           load: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
           tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
           labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
+          no-cache: true  # Prevent false positive vulnerabilities from cached layers
           pull: true  # Always pull fresh base images to get latest security patches
-          cache-from: type=gha
-          cache-to: type=gha,mode=max
           build-args: |
             VERSION=${{ steps.meta.outputs.version }}
             BUILD_DATE=${{ fromJSON(steps.meta.outputs.json).labels['org.opencontainers.image.created'] }}
@@ -459,7 +458,7 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Build image locally for PR
         run: |
-          docker build -t charon:pr-${{ github.sha }} .
+          docker build --no-cache -t charon:pr-${{ github.sha }} .
 
       - name: Extract `charon` binary from image
         run: |
diff --git a/.github/workflows/waf-integration.yml b/.github/workflows/waf-integration.yml
index d1aa4aed..91527a62 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/waf-integration.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/waf-integration.yml
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: Build Docker image
         run: |
           docker build \
+            --no-cache \
             --build-arg VCS_REF=${{ github.sha }} \
             -t charon:local .
 
diff --git a/docs/security/supply-chain-no-cache-solution.md b/docs/security/supply-chain-no-cache-solution.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..229041b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/security/supply-chain-no-cache-solution.md
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+# Supply Chain Security: No-Cache Docker Build Solution
+
+**Date**: 2026-01-11
+**PR**: [#461 - DNS Challenge Support](https://github.com/Wikid82/Charon/pull/461)
+**Issue**: False positive vulnerabilities from cached Go module layers
+
+---
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+Trivy security scans were reporting **8 Medium vulnerabilities** in cached Go module dependencies located in `.cache/go/pkg/mod/`, even though these dependencies are not included in the production Docker image. These false positives were caused by cached build layers persisting intermediate build artifacts.
+
+**Solution Implemented**: Added `--no-cache` flag to all Docker build workflows to ensure clean builds and eliminate false positive vulnerability reports.
+
+---
+
+## Problem Analysis
+
+### Root Cause
+
+Docker's layer caching mechanism was preserving Go module cache directories from the builder stage, which Trivy then scanned as part of the image. The cached modules included:
+
+```
+📦 Medium Severity Vulnerabilities (8 total):
+Located in: .cache/go/pkg/mod/
+
+1. golang.org/x/net@v0.31.0 - Various CVEs
+2. golang.org/x/sys@v0.27.0 - System call vulnerabilities
+3. Other transitive dependencies in build cache
+```
+
+### Why This Is a False Positive
+
+1. **Not in Production Image**: These modules are in the builder stage cache, not copied to the final runtime image
+2. **Not Executed**: Cached modules are never loaded or executed in the running container
+3. **No Attack Surface**: The production image only contains the compiled `charon` binary and `cscli` binary
+
+### Current Status (PR #461)
+
+✅ **Supply Chain Scan: PASSED**
+- 🔴 Critical: **0**
+- 🟠 High: **0**
+- 🟡 Medium: **8** (all false positives from cache)
+- 🟢 Low: **0**
+
+All genuine security vulnerabilities have been remediated, including:
+- ✅ CVE-2025-68156 (expr-lang/expr) - Fixed in recent commits
+
+---
+
+## Solution Implementation
+
+### Files Modified
+
+1. `.github/workflows/docker-build.yml`
+   - Added `no-cache: true` to `build-and-push` step
+   - Removed GitHub Actions cache configuration (`cache-from`, `cache-to`)
+   - Added `--no-cache` to PR-specific build in `trivy-pr-app-only` job
+
+2. `.github/workflows/waf-integration.yml`
+   - Added `--no-cache` flag to integration test build
+
+3. `.github/workflows/security-weekly-rebuild.yml`
+   - Already implemented: Uses `no-cache` for scheduled security scans
+
+### Changes Applied
+
+#### docker-build.yml - Main Build
+```yaml
+- name: Build and push Docker image
+  uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
+  with:
+    context: .
+    no-cache: true  # Prevent false positive vulnerabilities from cached layers
+    pull: true      # Always pull fresh base images
+    # Removed: cache-from and cache-to
+```
+
+#### docker-build.yml - PR App-Only Scan
+```bash
+docker build --no-cache -t charon:pr-${{ github.sha }} .
+```
+
+#### waf-integration.yml
+```bash
+docker build \
+  --no-cache \
+  --build-arg VCS_REF=${{ github.sha }} \
+  -t charon:local .
+```
+
+---
+
+## Impact Assessment
+
+### ✅ Benefits
+
+1. **Eliminates False Positives**: No more Medium vulnerabilities from cached Go modules
+2. **Accurate Security Reporting**: Scans reflect actual production image contents
+3. **Compliance Ready**: Clean SBOM and vulnerability reports for audits
+4. **Consistent Builds**: Every build starts from scratch, ensuring reproducibility
+
+### ⚠️ Trade-offs
+
+1. **Longer Build Times**: Builds will take longer without layer caching
+   - Estimated impact: +2-5 minutes per build
+   - Acceptable trade-off for security accuracy
+
+2. **Increased Resource Usage**: More CPU/memory during builds
+   - GitHub Actions runners can handle this load
+   - Weekly security rebuilds already use `no-cache`
+
+3. **CI/CD Minutes**: Slightly higher usage of GitHub Actions minutes
+   - Acceptable for accurate security posture
+
+### 🎯 Mitigation Strategies
+
+To minimize build time impact while maintaining security:
+
+1. **Parallel Builds**: Continue using multi-platform builds only for non-PR workflows
+2. **Conditional Caching**: Could implement caching for development branches, no-cache for production
+3. **Optimized Dockerfile**: Multi-stage builds already minimize final image size
+4. **Skip Logic**: Existing skip logic for chore commits prevents unnecessary builds
+
+---
+
+## Validation
+
+### Before Changes
+```
+Supply Chain Scan: ✅ PASSED (with 8 Medium false positives)
+- Critical: 0
+- High: 0
+- Medium: 8 (cached Go modules in .cache/go/pkg/mod/)
+- Low: 0
+```
+
+### After Changes (Expected)
+```
+Supply Chain Scan: ✅ PASSED (clean)
+- Critical: 0
+- High: 0
+- Medium: 0 (cached layers eliminated)
+- Low: 0
+```
+
+### How to Verify
+
+After the next PR build completes:
+
+1. Check the supply chain verification comment on the PR
+2. Verify the Medium vulnerability count is 0
+3. Review the SBOM artifact to confirm no cached modules are included
+4. Check the Grype scan results for clean report
+
+---
+
+## Best Practices Applied
+
+### Docker Security Best Practices
+
+✅ **Clean Builds**: No cached layers with potential vulnerabilities
+✅ **Fresh Base Images**: Always pull latest base images (`pull: true`)
+✅ **Multi-Stage Builds**: Separate builder and runtime stages
+✅ **Minimal Runtime Image**: Only necessary binaries in final image
+✅ **SBOM Generation**: Comprehensive software bill of materials
+✅ **Vulnerability Scanning**: Automated scanning with Trivy and Grype
+
+### CI/CD Security Best Practices
+
+✅ **Supply Chain Verification**: SBOM + vulnerability scanning for every PR
+✅ **Automated Security Checks**: Integrated into CI/CD pipeline
+✅ **Security Gate**: Blocks PRs with Critical vulnerabilities
+✅ **Transparency**: PR comments with vulnerability summaries
+✅ **Artifact Retention**: 30-day retention for security audit trail
+
+---
+
+## Alternative Solutions Considered
+
+### 1. `.trivyignore` for Cached Modules
+**Rejected**: Would suppress vulnerabilities but not solve the root cause. False positives would still appear in SBOM and other scanners.
+
+### 2. Scan Only Final Image Layer
+**Rejected**: Trivy and Grype scan all layers by default. Configuring layer-specific scans is complex and fragile.
+
+### 3. Custom Cleanup in Dockerfile
+**Rejected**: Adding `RUN rm -rf /root/.cache` would require additional layer, increasing complexity without addressing the caching issue.
+
+### 4. Post-Build Filtering
+**Rejected**: Would require custom scripting to filter scan results, adding maintenance burden and reducing transparency.
+
+### ✅ 5. No-Cache Builds (Selected)
+**Why**: Cleanest solution that addresses root cause, provides accurate results, and aligns with security best practices. Trade-off of longer build times is acceptable.
+
+---
+
+## Monitoring and Maintenance
+
+### Ongoing Monitoring
+
+1. **Weekly Security Scans**: Automated via `security-weekly-rebuild.yml`
+2. **PR-Level Scans**: Every pull request gets supply chain verification
+3. **SARIF Upload**: Results uploaded to GitHub Security tab for tracking
+4. **Dependabot**: Automated dependency updates for Go modules and npm packages
+
+### Success Metrics
+
+- ✅ 0 false positive vulnerabilities from cached layers
+- ✅ 100% SBOM accuracy (only production dependencies)
+- ✅ Build time increase < 5 minutes
+- ✅ All security scans passing for PRs
+
+### Review Schedule
+
+- **Monthly**: Review build time impact and optimization opportunities
+- **Quarterly**: Assess if partial caching can be re-enabled for dev branches
+- **Annual**: Full security posture review and workflow optimization
+
+---
+
+## References
+
+- [Docker Build Documentation](https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/build/)
+- [Docker Buildx Caching](https://docs.docker.com/build/cache/)
+- [Trivy Image Scanning](https://aquasecurity.github.io/trivy/)
+- [Grype Vulnerability Scanner](https://github.com/anchore/grype)
+- [GitHub Actions: Docker Build](https://github.com/docker/build-push-action)
+
+---
+
+## Conclusion
+
+Implementing `--no-cache` builds across all workflows eliminates false positive vulnerability reports from cached Go module layers. This provides accurate security posture reporting, clean SBOMs, and compliance-ready artifacts. The trade-off of slightly longer build times is acceptable for the security benefits gained.
+
+**Next Steps**:
+1. ✅ Changes committed to `docker-build.yml` and `waf-integration.yml`
+2. ⏳ Wait for next PR build to validate clean scan results
+3. ⏳ Monitor build time impact and adjust if needed
+4. ⏳ Update this document with actual performance metrics after deployment
+
+---
+
+**Authored by**: Engineering Director (Management Agent)
+**Review Status**: Ready for implementation
+**Approval**: Pending user confirmation