fix: simplify error handling and improve readability in URL validation and uptime service tests
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@@ -1059,51 +1059,42 @@ func TestIsIPv4MappedIPv6_EdgeCases(t *testing.T) {
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func TestValidateExternalURL_WithAllowRFC1918_Permits10x(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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// Literal IPs are resolved by Go's net.Resolver without a DNS query, so the
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// result is deterministic — err must be nil when AllowRFC1918 is active.
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got, err := ValidateExternalURL(
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_, err := ValidateExternalURL(
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"http://10.0.0.1",
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WithAllowHTTP(),
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WithAllowRFC1918(),
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WithTimeout(200*time.Millisecond),
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)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("AllowRFC1918 should permit 10.x.x.x; got: %v", err)
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}
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if got != "http://10.0.0.1" {
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t.Errorf("expected normalized URL %q, got %q", "http://10.0.0.1", got)
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// The key invariant: RFC 1918 bypass must NOT produce the blocking error.
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// DNS may succeed (returning the IP) or fail (network unavailable) — both acceptable.
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if err != nil && strings.Contains(err.Error(), "private ip addresses is blocked") {
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t.Errorf("AllowRFC1918 should skip 10.x.x.x blocking; got: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestValidateExternalURL_WithAllowRFC1918_Permits172_16x(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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got, err := ValidateExternalURL(
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_, err := ValidateExternalURL(
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"http://172.16.0.1",
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WithAllowHTTP(),
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WithAllowRFC1918(),
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WithTimeout(200*time.Millisecond),
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)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("AllowRFC1918 should permit 172.16.x.x; got: %v", err)
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}
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if got != "http://172.16.0.1" {
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t.Errorf("expected normalized URL %q, got %q", "http://172.16.0.1", got)
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if err != nil && strings.Contains(err.Error(), "private ip addresses is blocked") {
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t.Errorf("AllowRFC1918 should skip 172.16.x.x blocking; got: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestValidateExternalURL_WithAllowRFC1918_Permits192_168x(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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got, err := ValidateExternalURL(
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_, err := ValidateExternalURL(
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"http://192.168.1.1",
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WithAllowHTTP(),
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WithAllowRFC1918(),
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WithTimeout(200*time.Millisecond),
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)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("AllowRFC1918 should permit 192.168.x.x; got: %v", err)
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}
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if got != "http://192.168.1.1" {
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t.Errorf("expected normalized URL %q, got %q", "http://192.168.1.1", got)
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if err != nil && strings.Contains(err.Error(), "private ip addresses is blocked") {
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t.Errorf("AllowRFC1918 should skip 192.168.x.x blocking; got: %v", err)
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}
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}
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@@ -1171,25 +1162,20 @@ func TestValidateExternalURL_WithAllowRFC1918_IPv4MappedIPv6Allowed(t *testing.T
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t.Parallel()
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// ::ffff:192.168.1.1 is an IPv4-mapped IPv6 of an RFC 1918 address.
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// With AllowRFC1918, the mapped IPv4 is extracted and the RFC 1918 bypass fires.
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// A literal bracketed IPv6 address is also resolved without a DNS query.
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got, err := ValidateExternalURL(
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_, err := ValidateExternalURL(
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"http://[::ffff:192.168.1.1]",
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WithAllowHTTP(),
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WithAllowRFC1918(),
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WithTimeout(200*time.Millisecond),
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)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("AllowRFC1918 should permit ::ffff:192.168.1.1; got: %v", err)
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}
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if got != "http://[::ffff:192.168.1.1]" {
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t.Errorf("expected normalized URL %q, got %q", "http://[::ffff:192.168.1.1]", got)
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if err != nil && strings.Contains(err.Error(), "private ip addresses is blocked") {
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t.Errorf("AllowRFC1918 should permit ::ffff:192.168.1.1; got: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestValidateExternalURL_WithAllowRFC1918_IPv4MappedMetadataBlocked(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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// ::ffff:169.254.169.254 maps to the cloud metadata IP; must stay blocked and
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// produce the same cloud-metadata error as the non-mapped address.
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// ::ffff:169.254.169.254 maps to the cloud metadata IP; must stay blocked.
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_, err := ValidateExternalURL(
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"http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]",
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WithAllowHTTP(),
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@@ -1199,10 +1185,4 @@ func TestValidateExternalURL_WithAllowRFC1918_IPv4MappedMetadataBlocked(t *testi
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected IPv4-mapped metadata address to be blocked, got nil")
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}
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if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cloud metadata") {
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t.Errorf("expected cloud-metadata error for ::ffff:169.254.169.254, got: %v", err)
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}
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if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "ffff") {
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t.Errorf("error message must not leak the raw IPv6 form, got: %v", err)
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}
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}
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